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 ABSTRACT  
 
This study is about the management of ‘truth’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It aims to 
investigate the ways in which the official ‘truth’ is constructed and institutionalised in the 
country. It attempts to critically analyse some of the ways in which the official ‘truth’ is 
tailored to rationalise the prevailing model of the distribution of power in Saudi Arabia.  
This study argues that truth is not born in a power vacuum and often its construction and 
institutionalisation signify domination in one way or another. Hence, what the management 
of truth means is, in principle, the management of power, and the quest for truth is the quest 
for power.  
 
The main focus of this study is Wahhabism, which functions as the official ‘truth’ of the 
state in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism, which is the product of an eighteenth century revivalist 
movement, is portrayed as the most ‘authentic’ reading of Islam, which provides the raison 
d'être for the prevailing political mechanism in the country. This thesis puts forward an 
argument that there are two interrelated notions which articulate the ways in which ‘truth’ 
is conceptualised in Islam. One, at macro level, constitutes the trans-historical foundational 
principles of the religion, a set of engrained beliefs, which establish the ‘finality’, and 
‘oneness’ of Islam in relation to other competing narratives, and the other at the micro level 
takes place internally to find ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. Unlike Islamic truth at the macro 
level, which is entrenched, the Islamic truth at the micro level refers to the various attempts 
by different agencies to claim to have found the ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’.  Wahhabism is 
introduced as an example of truth management at the micro level. This study underlines 
four factors of narrative construction, leadership, socialisation and violence, which are 
instrumental in the management of truth in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
Throughout this thesis I have used a simplified transliteration scheme that roughly follows 
the logic of the Library of Congress system, except principally for the diacritics. I have 
generally not designated the ‘ayn or hamza, however, except when they are frequently used 
in non-Arabic sources: ulama (not ‘ulama’) or Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud (not ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn 
Sa‘ud), but Qur’an, Ka‘ba, shari‘a or Ha’il. The spellings of individual and place names that 
are commonly used in English are adopted here – e.g., Mecca, Jeddah, Hejaz, Ibn Saud.   
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This study is about the management of ‘truth’ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It aims to 
explore the ways in which the official ‘truth’ is tailored, sustained and promulgated in the 
country. It attempts to critically analyse some of the ways in which the official ‘truth’ is 
constructed to rationalise the prevailing model of the distribution of power in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Indeed, ‘truth’ as a notion signifies winning and losing at the same time. It concurrently 
refers to superiority of a thesis and inferiority of its antithesis. It signifies the triumph of the 
prevailing perspectives at the expense of the overpowered ones. Truth monopolises the 
highest rank in the hierarchy of perspectives. Within the realm of ideas, truth is the 
anointed king of perspectives and it rules and dominates like a king. Indeed, once a 
perspective is crowned as the truth, it becomes the instrument for measuring other 
competing narratives and perspectives. Hence truth, more than anything, signifies power 
and the relations of power.  
 
For Foucault truth is not outside power. As he puts it, ‘It is not the reward of free spirits, the 
child of prolonged solitudes, or the privilege of those who have been able to liberate 
themselves, truth is of the world, it is produced there by virtue of multiple constraints and it 
includes there the regulated effect of power’.1For Foucault, 'truth' is linked in a circular 
relation with the systems of power, which produce and sustain it and to the effects of power, 
which it induces and which extend it. As he notes: ‘Truth is not a form of power innocent of 
coercion, discipline and normalisation, it is not knowledge without deception’.2 In this light, 
truth is not born in a power vacuum and often its construction and normalisation signify 
domination in one way or another. Hence, what the management of truth means is, in 
principle, the management of power, and the quest for truth is the quest for power. Although 
the notion of power can be conceptualised in many ways, the transitional nature of power has 
created many moments in history when the management of truth has shifted from one power 
complex to another.   
                                                
1 Michel Foucault, Power, Truth and Strategy, ed by Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton (Sydney: Feral 
Publications 1979), 46.   
2 Ibid.    
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This study aims to explore the ways in which the Wahhabi narratives, which emerged in the 
eighteenth century, were translated into the official ‘truth’ in the modern Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.3 The ruling mechanism in Saudi Arabia claims to be the ‘authentic’ implementer of 
the ‘purest’ Islamic narrative. It believes that it has rediscovered the ‘truth’ after centuries of 
false interpretations, which were worldly innovation promulgated by deviant Muslims. 
According to Wahhabi doctrine, there has been a discrepancy between the truth and the 
practices of the vast majority of Muslims.4   
 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the creed was born in 1702 or 1703 in the 
town of al-Uyayna in the area of Najd, a rocky plateau in the hinterland of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Despite his humble background, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab went on to 
become one of the most influential scholars of his time whose ideas and perspectives are 
being enforced by state machinery in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until the present day. 
What he suggested in the eighteenth century is still embraced by millions of people within 
and without the Arabian Peninsula. Even in his lifetime, he was a very divisive character. He 
was either loved or hated.  His followers regarded him as the ‘saviour’ of the religion, who 
‘cleansed’ Islam from bid’ah (innovations) and returned to religious practices of the salaf as-
salih (pious predecessors). For them, he reincarnated the ‘truth’ as it was expounded to the 
Prophet and his following three generations. For his enemies, however, he was a dogmatic 
literalist whose perspectives cultivated nothing but division and ‘hatred’ in the Muslim 
world.5 
 
Indeed, Wahhabism does not recognise any dialogue between the religion and the social, 
cultural and intellectual structures of the societies, which have accommodated Islam. There 
should be no reflection of the cultural particularities of an eclectic Muslim society on the 
                                                
3 The term Wahhabism was originally used derogatorily by its opponents. People who adhere to its principles 
would not usually refer to themselves as ‘Wahhabi’. The term of Muwahidin is more commonly used for the 
followers of this school of thought. This study only uses the term of wahhabism, because it is most commonly 
used and recognised in the western world.  
4 Al Ymani al Fakhrani, al Nezateh al-Tajfiriyyeh fi fikr al-Wahabyyeh (Cairo: Maktabeh Mdbouli, 2012),19. 
5 The divisive nature of his ideas has hugely affected his biographies. It is extremely difficult to find objective 
sources, which can depict him as a person or a religious leader. Of course, there never can be an absolute 
‘objectivity’ for any form of historiography. Often, ideological and religious perspectives of historians 
influence the way they choose to shed light on the past. Indeed, there is no such as thing as ‘objective’ history 
as our account of the past equally signifies the socio-political particularities of the present and this study does 
not pretend to be free from the obstacles that most historical narratives face. Although ideally, the aim should 
always be objectivity, it is impossible to escape from the gravity of the present in order to view the past from 
a neutral ground. 
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religion; otherwise worldly ‘innovation’ would replace the ‘truth’. Indeed, the notion of takfir 
is a familiar tool, repeatedly used in classic Wahhabi literature to declare various Muslim 
groups as ‘non-believers’.6Any ‘inauthentic’ correspondence between culture and religion is 
portrayed as ‘moral corruption’, and therefore Wahhabism pays an extraordinary amount of 
attention to the ways in which believers express their faith. For the Wahhabi doctrine, the 
methods of expression are as important as the ways in which the believer has internalised the 
faith.   
 
Wahhabi tenets, which include a mission for ‘authentication’ of Islam, constitute the basis of 
the ideological structures of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Hence the Saudi regime finds its 
raison d'être in restoring the ‘truth’. The Saudi state take various measures to enforce its 
official regime of truth, hence it cannot be indifferent towards the agencies and structures, 
which shape the collective consciousness in society. What is meant by official truth here is a 
combination of certain official narratives, tenets, dogmas, principles, symbols and 
institutions, which seek to articulate the ways in which society should function. As well as 
providing a normative yardstick for the ways in which society should be organised, it offers a 
guideline for the division of power and the ways in which power should be distributed to 
maximise the chances of reaching the desired ‘ideals’.  
 
Accordingly official truth provides the raison d'être for the monopolisation of power for the 
prevailing social groups who claim to be best placed for reaching the ‘ideals’. Wahhabism 
constitutes the ideology of the state in Saudi Arabia. It provides the blueprint for the division 
of power and provides comprehensive moral, ritual and cultural guidelines for the ways in 
which that society should operate.  
 
Focus of the Thesis  
 
This study attempts to explore the mechanisms, which were adapted to canonise Wahhabism 
as the indisputable ‘truth’ in the official discourse of the state. This study will focus on the 
capacity and the operations of those social, cultural, religious and political institutions, which 
                                                
6 Takfir refers to the practice of one Muslim declaring another Muslim an ‘unbeliever’ 
See, Al Ymani al Fakhrani (2012). And   
Sami Qasim Amin al Maliji, al Wahhabiyyah (Cairo: Maktabeh Madbouli, 2008). 
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are adapted to affect the prevailing discourse in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Along with 
using transformative violent instruments to shape the society in accordance with the 
ideological mandate of the state, the regime uses creative measures to reshape the collective 
consciousness.  
 
This study attempts to investigate the ways in which these transitions have been taking place 
in the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It will examine the creative and violent measures 
which have taken place to constitute Wahhabism not only as the state’s raison d'être but also 
as the ‘most authentic’ frame of reference to arrange a system of human organisation 
generating distinctive cultural patterns and institutions.  
 
In a similar way to many schools of thought, Wahhabism has not been a constant creed. 
Although there are some core beliefs, which define the creed, Wahhabism has been subject to 
factionalism as well. Although Wahhabism has been an instrumental legitimising narrative 
for the state of Saudi Arabia, some grassroots forces have been challenging the state, using 
the very same Wahhabi pretext in order to undermine the religious legitimacy of the state. In 
fact, some of the forces who have actively opposed the regime have criticised the state for the 
incomplete implementation of Wahhabi doctrine. Hence, this study recognises that 
Wahhabism is not a monolithic entity but that it is composed of various orientations. It also 
recognises that the conflation of Wahhabism and the Saudi state would be a simplification. 
Although Wahhabism has manifested itself in various ways, this study is primarily interested 
in looking at ‘official Wahhabism’, which is still used as the ideological foundation of the 
state in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The modern Kingdom was officially established on 23 September 1932; from 1902 the 
House of Saud conquered and ruled much of the Arabian Peninsula. The modern Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was founded by Abd- al-Aziz Ibn Saud  (Ibn Saud) who established the near 
absolutist political system which has remained intact until the present day.7 Like his 
                                                
7 Some scholars such as Steffen Hertog and Madawi Al-Rasheed have argued that the power is divided 
between various factions within the House of Saud. Hence the system should not be regarded as absolutist per 
se. Although one cannot deny the existing factionalism within the Saudi regime, there are no official 
structures for the division of power. In absence of a defined political structures to distribute power, the system 
floats between absolutism and de facto-absolutism. Indeed there are factional forces in the Saudi politics , but 
the division of power is decided in an arbitrary manner, this is one the main characteristics of  absolutist 
regimes. There are on-going competition over power and resources within the regime, but the internal 
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ancestors, Ibn Saud had a religious mission to implement the purest Islamic state possible 
based on Wahhabism. The ties between the House of Saud and Wahhabism go back to the 
eighteenth century. In two separate periods of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the 
House of Saud briefly conquered and ruled parts of the Arabian Peninsula. In both the 
emirate of Diriyah (1744–1818) and the emirate of Nejd (1818–1891) Wahhabism was the 
main frame of reference for articulation of both politics and religion. 
 
Almost as soon as the first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate was established, Wahhabism came to the 
attention of the outside world. Wahhabism was radical and did not recognise the Islamic 
legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire, which was still the major power in the region. The Saudi-
Wahhabi attempts at expansionism resulted in the collapse of the first emirate at the hands of 
Ottoman forces who could not tolerate Saudi-Wahhabi invasion of the holiest Islamic cities in 
Hejaz. The second Saudi-Wahhabi emirate did not last long either; it collapsed due to tribal 
rivalries within the peninsula. However, the third Saudi-Wahhabi attempt at establishing an 
autonomous religio-political unit was successful and it has continued until this day.   
 
Since 1932, the modern Kingdom has always maintained its Wahhabi characteristics. The 
state regards itself as the Islamic state, which implements the will of God and the edicts of the 
Qur’an in their purest sense. Hence, almost every facet of political and social life is organised 
in a away to correspond with the state’s ideology. Like many other states, which seek to gain 
legitimacy from ideology rather than a democratic mandate, the Saudi state has been heavily 
dependent upon socialising agencies to perpetuate the applicability of its ideology in 
everyday life. In other words, if the state’s raison d'être depends upon an ideology, that 
ideology has to be continuously reproduced and implemented in order to prevent a crisis of 
legitimacy. Subjects constantly have to be reminded about the ‘sui generis’, the ‘authenticity’ 
and the ‘exceptionality’ of the ideology and develop a sense of trust that the state is the best 
implementer of this ‘authentic’, ‘unique’ and ‘empowering’ ideology, which not only serves 
                                                                                                                                               
political rivalry alone cannot disqualify the Saudi regime to be an absolutist state. Despite the complex 
internal rivalry, the office of the King remains an indispensable source of power in Saudi Arabia. Having said 
that, the personality of the King meters significantly. For example, under the reign of King Khalid the nature 
of the regime was far  from being absolutist. He was weak and effectively the state was run under the 
supervision of his brother Faisal. However, the shift of power changed the political dynamics again, under the 
rule of the King Faisal the Office of the King started to be the ultimate platform for the arbitration of power. 
See, Michael Herb,  All in the Family :  Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies 
( New York: State University of New York, 1999) 
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well in this world but also prepares the followers for the afterlife. For the modern Saudi state 
Wahhabism is an indispensable ideology, which rationalises the status quo in the country, so 
that it has to be reinforced on a daily basis through various instruments, including productive 
social mechanisms. 
 
Although its terrain is a mostly uninhabited and sandy desert, the modern Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is an important country in many ways. It is the largest and most populated country 
within the Arabian Peninsula.8 In terms of land area it is the largest country in West Asia and 
the second largest in the Arab world.9 The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia accommodates 
the region of Hejaz, which is the birthplace of Islam. Hence, the country is home to the 
holiest sites in the Islamic Umma (community of faith). 
 
Sometimes it is represented as ard  al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (The Land of the Two Holy 
Mosques) in reference to al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, and al-Masjid al-Nabawi (Prophet’s 
Mosque) in Medina. Every year, millions of Muslims from across the world fulfil their 
religious obligations by visiting the country in order to perform hajj. Every day hundreds of 
millions of Muslims turn towards Mecca to pray. It is indeed the religious heart of the Islamic 
world. Hence, regardless of the state’s status the country has a unique religio-historical 
importance in the Islamic Umma. The guardianship of these holy sites has been a great 
source of religious capital for the ruling family, which claims to be the licit enforcer of the 
most ‘uncontaminated’, ‘undiluted’, ‘unalloyed’, ‘flawless’, ‘irreproachable’ and genuine’ 
form of Islam.    
 
However, the importance of Saudi Arabia goes far beyond its religious heritage. From the 
mid-twentieth century factors such as geopolitics, natural resources, instrumental ties with 
the United States and the ongoing assertion for regional leadership have made Saudi Arabia 
one of the most important countries in the Middle East.10 The country possesses around 
                                                
8 Border countries: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Yemen. It has also 2,640 km of coastline 
between the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. 
9  Comparatively Saudi Arabia is slightly more than one-fifth the size of the United States, totaling 2,149,690 
sq. km. 
10 The Saudi state has been playing a leading role in many international organisations such as Organisation of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council and joined the World Trade 
Organisation in December 2005. 
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one-fifth of the world's proven oil reserves and ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum.11  
For decades Saudi Arabia has been seen as a middle power state in the international system 
with unavoidable regional influence. The ideological nature of the regime plus 
unprecedented new wealth generated from natural resources paved the way for conditions 
whereby the state could exercise power even beyond its own borders.  
 
Indeed, the influence of Saudi Arabia has been felt not only in the region but also in the 
wider international context. Besides its political position and assertion of regional 
leadership, religious ideas coming from Saudi Arabia carry great influence in different 
corners of the world. Thanks to the unprecedented wealth generated from petroleum, 
Wahhabism is penetrating various Islamic communities from central Asia to Western 
Europe and from North Africa to North America. Thus, the set of pre-modern ideas that  
emerged in the eighteenth century, are adapting well in the age of globalisation, and 
Wahhabism remains a small but influential school of thought, which continues to influence 
the Muslim consciousness within and beyond the Arabian Peninsula. 
 
In this light, the demand to study Saudi Arabia from different angles is not surprising. 
However, this study does not aim to provide yet another account of the country’s history, 
nor is it intending to examine the country’s position in the international system and its 
interstate relations. Rather, the central question of this study is: how has the Saudi state 
constructed and managed the prevailing regime of truth?  
 
Although truth management is instrumental in maintaining the status quo, it is not the only 
factor which guarantees the continuity of the regime. Of course, factors such as rentier  
economy have been vital for the survival of the regime since the discovery of oil. Indeed, 
providing the social classes with generous resources has constituted an indispensable 
legitimacy for a state, which invests heavily in the country’s infrastructure and expects 
minimal taxation in return. There is already a wide literature available on the ways in which 
the rentier state works in Saudi Arabia. Although from time to time inevitably there will be 
references to political economy and its implications, this study will focus primarily on the 
ideological mechanisms of the state.    
                                                
11 The oil sector in Saudi Arabia accounts for about 80% of budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export 
earnings. 
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Methodology and Structure  
 
This study adopts a qualitative approach in order to investigate the research topic. It will 
rely upon both previous research studies, and data gathering from primary sources such as 
press releases, policy statements, governmental data and reports from various non-
governmental organisations focusing on relevant issues in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
Materials have been collected both from English and Arabic sources.  
This study attempts primarily to constitute a framework to analyse the ways in which the 
official truth is constructed, sustained and enforced in the country from its establishment in 
1932 until the present time. Given the nature of the enquiry, it would be difficult to cover a 
more specific period within the life of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, because most of 
the state’s policies targeting the official ideology have been long term and interconnected. 
Given the fact that this study attempts to cover an extensive period, it is impossible to pay 
equal attention to every historical zone from 1932 until the present time. Thus, our focus 
has to be targeted and the attention has to be given only to those issues and developments, 
which relate the most to the core of this study.   
 
This enquiry is undertaken within five interrelated chapters, each of which will address a 
theme. In the first chapter there will be an attempt to provide a conceptual framework for 
the entire study. Accordingly, this chapter draws on various theories to build a conceptual 
framework to explain the management of truth in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Social 
constructionism informs the theoretical perspectives of this study. Social constructionism is 
a useful tool, which determines the historicity of knowledge and helps us to analyse the 
ways in which knowledge is conditioned by the prevailing forces of the time. This approach 
that knowledge is rooted in specific historical and social context immensely helps us to 
understand the ways in which we conceptualise truth management in this study.   
 
Truth and truth management are overarching notions in this study. Hence there will be an 
attempt to theorise both truth and truth management in this chapter. However, we cannot 
sufficiently conceptualise the politics of truth management in Saudi Arabia unless we pay 
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adequate attention to the context in which truth management takes place. Since the 
Wahhabi frame of reference is Islam, it is essential to determine the ways in which the 
notion of truth is conceptualised in Islam. Through this ‘top-down’ approach, we start from 
the general Islamic narratives of truth, which in their turn have shaped Wahhabism’s 
particular conceptualisation of truth. Hence, through this deductive approach we will move 
from the more general to a more specific account of ‘truth’. To this effect this study 
introduces two interrelated notions to articulate the ways in which ‘truth’ is conceptualised 
in Islam. One, at the macro level, constitutes the unchanging foundational tenets of the 
religion, a set of entrenched principles, which establish the finality, and oneness of Islam in 
relation to other competing narratives, and the other at micro level takes place internally to 
find ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. 
   
As will be discussed, there are certain tenets which have remained constant and have 
constituted the precondition of what it is to be Islamic. Regardless of the conflicting 
interpretations and implementations, all Islamic schools of thought and madhhabs (legal 
schools) share these foundational elements, which compose the macro ‘truth’ of Islam. 
Understanding Islamic truth at the macro level is a prerequisite for addressing Islamic truth 
at the micro level. Unlike Islamic truth at the macro level, which has been entrenched, 
Islamic truth at the micro level has been ductile, pliable and eclectic. Unlike Islamic truth at 
the macro level, which can be defined in a trans-historical manner, Islamic truth at the 
micro level refers to the various attempts by different agencies throughout Islamic history 
to claim to have found the ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. However, the historical struggle to find 
the ‘true’ path to the ‘truth’ has created and sustained various strategies of interpretation, 
which have influenced Islamic consciousness and undermined attempts at Muslim unity 
throughout different ages. These various interpretations have paved the way for the creation 
of various religious entities with wide and influential constituencies across the Islamic 
world. Indeed, when one is referring to the intellectual, theological, philosophical, 
jurisprudential and ritualistic eclecticism of Islam[s] this statement is being contextualised 
within the framework of Islamic truth at the micro level. 
 
This study is primarily interested in Islamic truth management at the micro level, as 
Wahhabism and its on-going mandate is a manifestation of a truth finding mission within 
the truth.  In order to constitute a sufficient theoretical basis for Islamic truth management 
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at the micro level the first chapter will identify and conceptualise the factors that pave the 
way for the successful assertion of truth within the truth; leadership, narrative construction, 
socialisation and violence. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on these factors.  
 
The second chapter, will elaborate on the Wahhabi construction of narrative and articulate 
important dimensions of its perspectives. In addition, there will be a discussion of the role 
of the House of Saud and how it offers effective leadership in promoting Wahhabism as the 
official ‘truth’. However, we cannot address the two notions of narrative construction and 
leadership without the historical context. Indeed, we cannot ignore those dominating 
structures that were, in place when Wahhabi agency was in formation. 
 
The following two chapters (third and fourth) will focus on socialisation, which is one of 
the significant four factors mentioned above. Since socialising and associational agencies 
are preconditions for effective socialisation, the third chapter attempts to examine the 
process of institution building in Saudi Arabia after 1932. This chapter aims to examine the 
formation of some specific organisations and ministries, which have helped the House of 
Saud to recondition national religious consciousness in accordance with its official regime 
of ‘truth’. For example, Dar al-Ifta, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Hajj 
will be examined, and their role in establishing Wahhabism as the unquestionable ‘truth’ 
will be analysed. Furthermore, there will be an attempt to analyse the role of religious 
practitioners within these state institutions. 
 
The fourth chapter aims to examine the process of socialisation of the Wahhabi regime of 
truth and its challenges, through pedagogic action and the educational mechanisms, 
which were constructed after the formation of the Saudi nation-state. Before the 
establishment of the modern kingdom, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance was prone to continuous 
conflict and friction. Accordingly, the pedagogic basis of Wahhabism was influenced by 
conflict and ideological confrontation. The polemical nature of Wahhabi education in these 
periods of conflict reached on into the modern era. Within the modern nation state system, 
education started to be more systematic with a defined scope and clear objectives, and then 
the discovery of natural resources, which shifted the political economy, resulted in the 
further institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of education. Further institutionalisation 
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meant further vertical control, which enabled the state to use the educational system to 
embed its regime of truth in the country.    
 
In this light, a more complex educational infrastructure emerged in order to accommodate 
the ideological demands of the new polity. From the early stages of building the 
educational infrastructure, the religious practitioners close to the fledgling establishment 
played an active role in creating vertical national subjectivities according to the religio-
political mandate of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. Thus, education was used as a powerful 
instrument of social control to standardise the collective consciousness according to the 
Saudi-Wahhabi narratives. The Saudi education system is a wide and complex mechanism, 
which cannot be scrutinised in its entirety. In this light, there will be a particular emphasis 
on subjects such as religious studies and history due to their potential for ideological 
manipulation by the state. 
 
Chapter five will deal with violence as another of the main four ingredients of truth 
management in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This chapter will address the violent 
mechanisms of social control and scrutinise the capacity of violence to enforce the state’s 
regime of truth. Although the state has heavily invested in creative measures to standardise 
the collective consciousness in accordance with its official discourse, violence remains an 
essential instrument in preserving the official status of truth. Indeed, the state has 
continuously relied upon violent mechanisms of social control to enforce its ideological 
mandate to foster a utopian model of social and moral standards and of governance which, it 
asserts, is morally superior and final.  
 
As will be discussed, violence does not only refer to the limited definition of physical harm 
and death. It is multifaceted and it can be defined in various ways. Indeed, there are many 
forms of ideological violence, which include religious hatred, racism, homophobia and 
sexism. These may not necessarily result in bodily harm, but they can psychologically 
damage the victims. This study will pay attention to various forms of violence such as 
structural and economic violence and examine their role in the politics of truth management. 
It examines the wider implications of violence in the ways in which women and minorities 
are ideologically targeted. Some of the policies, which constitute structural violence, will be 
identified and their relationship with the official management of truth will be examined. It 
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will also examine how notions of governance endear the King with a unique hybrid authority 
to employ violence in enforcing his state’s policies and will examine violent instruments of 
social control such as the mutawwi‘in (religious police). They are portrayed as the ‘guardians 
of morality’, controlling and rigidly monitoring public as well as private spheres to 
standardise collective behaviour in accordance with the recognised ideals.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter will examine the analytical framework by which Saudi management of the 
‘truth’ is explained in this thesis. Social constructionism informs the theoretical framework 
of this study. Although social constructionism has been a controversial approach, it has 
been widely used in social sciences and humanities over the last few decades. Since social 
constructionism is highly multidimensional and multifaceted, we cannot proceed unless we 
rigidly define the basic tenets of this approach, which inform the formative perspectives of 
this study. This chapter does not necessarily aim to add new perspectives to the already 
established theories of Social Constructionism, but it will attempt to articulate those 
relevant aspects which correspond to the theoretical themes of this study.     
  
‘Truth’ and truth management are overarching notions in this research. Therefore, 
following the discussion on Social Constructionism, the notion of truth management and its 
relationship to power will be defined. This will set the stage for elucidating the notions of 
Islamic truth at the macro and the micro levels. Indeed, there are two interconnected 
dynamics, shaping and portraying the notion of truth in Islam. The one at the micro level 
constitutes the unchanging foundational tenets of the religion, a set of entrenched principles 
which establish the ‘finality’ and ‘oneness’ of Islam in relation to the other competing 
narratives and the other one at the micro level takes place internally to find ‘truth’ within 
the ‘truth’. 
   
As will be discussed, there are certain tenets which have remained static and have 
constituted the precondition of what it is to be ‘Islamic’. Regardless of conflicting 
interpretations and implementations, all Islamic schools of thought share the same 
foundational elements, which make up the macro ‘truth’ of Islam. In this light, 
understanding Islamic truth at the macro level is a prerequisite for addressing Islamic truth 
at the micro level. Unlike Islamic truth at the macro level, which has been entrenched, 
Islamic truth at the micro level has been malleable and eclectic. Unlike Islamic truth at the 
macro level, which can be rigidly defined in a trans-historical manner, Islamic truth at the 
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micro level refers to the various attempts by various agencies throughout Islamic history to 
find the ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. The historical struggle to find the ‘true’ path to the ‘truth’ 
has created and sustained various strategies of interpretation, which have influenced Islamic 
consciousness and undermined attempts for Muslim unity throughout different ages. In this 
light, when one is referring to the intellectual, theological, philosophical, jurisprudential 
and ritualistic eclecticism of Islam[s], this statement is being contextualised within the 
framework of Islamic truth at the micro level. 
 
This chapter aims to identify and conceptualise these factors that pave the way for the 
assertion of truth within the ‘truth’. In this light, this chapter will suggest that ‘truth’ 
management at the micro level depends upon four interrelated factors; these include 
leadership, narrative construction, socialisation and violence. These factors are necessary 
for the registration of the account of ‘truth’ that attempts to represent the religious notions, 
which provide a theoretical context for the politics of ‘truth’ management in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Social Constructionism  
 
Social constructionism has been the most controversial if not the most influential 
theoretical development in the past few decades.1As Holstein and Miller note, from its 
dawn, the social constructionist approach has been controversial since it breaks with the 
conventional and ‘commonsensical’ conceptions of social problems by analysing them as a 
social process of definition. 2  
 
Social construction is an umbrella approach, which is multidimensional and multifaceted. 
Accordingly, one cannot provide a sharp and concise definition, which would correspond 
with all aspects of social constructionism.3However, it is possible to assert that the most 
important element of social constructionism is the rejection of ontological reality and any 
form of knowledge, which claims to exist independently of our consciousness. Hence, most 
theoretical perspectives that are informed by the social construction epistemology reject the 
                                                
1 Holstein. J.A and Miller.G Reconsidering Social Constructionism: Debates in Social Problems Theory (New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 5.  
2 Ibid. 6. 
3 The social constructionist approach can be applied to the various academic disciplines including, area 
studies, history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy and more recently international relations. 
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notion of objective knowledge on the grounds that one must already have a predefined 
model of ‘truth’ in mind in order to measure it, scrutinise it, circulate it and distinguish it 
from other competing perspectives.  
 
Therefore, social constructionism has a critical stance towards any type of knowledge that is 
taken for granted. Indeed, there are various categories of knowledge, which inform our 
values, concepts and definitions. These categories of knowledge shape the way we evaluate 
the world and can constitute filters for the way we internalise and objectify our social 
environment. John Wild referred to this as ‘imprisonment in a world of our own 
construction’4. Thus, social constructionism attempts to analyse the ways in which 
knowledge is constructed and institutionalised in social environments.  
 
As Crotty puts it: 
 
The sense we make of things [tends] to be the way things are. We blithely do that and, 
just as blithely, hand on our understanding as quite simply ‘the truth. Understanding 
transmitted in this way and gaining a place in our view of the world takes deep root and 
we find our self-victims of the ‘tyranny of the familiar’. Inherited and prevailing 
understanding becomes nothing less than, in William Blake’s time honoured phrase, 
‘mind-forg’d manacles.5  
 
With that in mind social constructionism seeks ways to overthrow this tyranny of the familiar 
and analytically challenge the limitations it creates. Social constructionism invites us to be 
apprehensive about how the world appears to be. Hence, the prime concern of social 
constructionism is to critically investigate the nature of what is perceived as ‘truth’. As put 
forward by Nowell-Smith, ‘Social constructions must be seen in an institutional context, as 
arising from the institutionalisation of patterns of interaction and meaning in society leading 
to a construction of social institutions and institutionalised perspectives and understandings.’6 
 
                                                
4 John Wild, The Challenge of Existentialism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 191. 
5 Michael Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and perspective in the research process 
(London: Sage Publications, 1998), 59. 
6 Nowell-Smith P.H, “The Constructionist Theory of History”, Journal of History and Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4, 
Beiheft 16: The Constitution of the Historical Past , (1977), 1-28. 
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With this in mind, social constructionism contests the formation of powerful and highly 
sedimented social institutions such as religion, which have been successful in creating and 
sustaining collective values and definitions. Social constructionism contests what is perceived 
as the ‘essential’ character of other social categorisations such as race, gender and class. 
Indeed, social constructionism investigates the way in which these categories have been 
institutionalised and portrayed as brute facts. As Berger and Luckmann state, within such 
enquiries ‘the philosopher is obliged to take nothing for granted and to obtain maximum 
clarity as to the ultimate status of what the man in street believes to be reality and 
knowledge.’7 
 
Of course this line of analysis only applies to social phenomena. In other words social 
constructionism does not claim that literally nothing can exist independently of our 
consciousness. As Greenwood puts it:  
 
Physical and social phenomena… differ in one essential respect. Chairs may exist 
independently of our knowing that they do; our knowledge of the existence of chairs is 
not constitutive of their existence. In contrast, social phenomena do not exist 
independently of our knowledge of them… social realties therefore, are constructed and 
sustained by the observation of the social rules which obtain in any social situation by 
all the social interactors involved… social reality is a function of shared meanings; it is 
constructed, sustained and reproduced through social life.8 
 
Social constructionism encourages us to be wary of historical and cultural specificity since 
the categories, concepts and definitions we utilise are culturally specific and accordingly 
our perception changes historically. In Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in 
the Age of Reason Foucault soundly demonstrates the case for the historicity of 
knowledge. 9Of course, Foucault never categorically claimed to be a social constructionist. 
Nonetheless, his analysis was in line with the social constructionist approach of critically 
questioning the roots of what is perceived as ‘reality’. In particular, in relation to the 
                                                
7 Berger Peter and Luckmann Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 
14. 
8 J. Greenwood,”Action Research and Action Researchers: Some introductory considerations”, Journal 
Contemporary Nurse vol. 3, n,  (1994), 85.    
9 Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, (New York: 
Vintage, 1988). 
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historicity of knowledge he clearly describes the process by which the same phenomenon 
(madness) has been perceived and treated differently in various periods of history. He 
portrays the rapid transition of knowledge, which, in the course of four centuries 
transformed madness from ‘evil’ unworthy of sympathy to a ‘mental illness’ worthy of 
utmost medical care and attention.  
 
This ties in to an important element of social constructionism that knowledge is socially 
determined and it is only sustained by social process. Hence, it is the product of the world 
and it is to be constructed not to be discovered. In this light, social constructionism is 
inherently anti-realistic, since it rejects the idea that our knowledge is a direct perception of 
reality. Every narrative is culturally specific, rooted in a specific historical context.  
 
The terminology of social constructionism mainly derives from the work of Karl Mannheim 
(1893-1947) and Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1967), but of 
course, its history goes far beyond the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 In their 
comprehensive and highly influential study, Berger and Luckmann discuss the process of 
sedimentation in social constructionism. This notion can help to explain the historical 
crystallisation of meanings in a social environment. As they describe it: 
 
Only a small part of the totality of human experiences is retained in consciousness. The 
experiences that are so retained become sedimented, that is, they congeal in 
recollection as recognisable and memorable entities. Unless such sedimentation takes 
place, the individual cannot make sense of his biography. Intersubjective sedimentation 
also takes place when several individuals share a common biography, experiences of 
which become incorporated in a common stock of knowledge. Intersubjective 
sedimentation can be called truly social only when it has been objectivated in a sign 
system of one kind or another, that is, when the possibility of reiterated objectification 
                                                
10 Although it is difficult to determine its origin, we could trace it back perhaps as far as Heraclitus and a Pre-
Socratic philosopher Protagoras who shocked his generation by rejecting the objectified certainty of gods. He 
highlighted human subjectivity conditioned by the way we understand or even construct our world, and he 
famously stated, ‘Man is the measure of all things’. This line of analysis has formed the edifice of social 
construction epistemology, which actually started to be seriously embraced from the 19th century. 
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of the shared experiences arises. Only then is it likely that these experiences will be 
transmitted from one generation to the next, and from one collectivity to another.11   
 
Berger and Luckmann argue that all human activity is subject to habitualisation. Any action 
that is repeated recurrently forms a pattern, which can then be replicated with an economy of 
effort and which ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern.12 Hence, 
habitualisation implies that the action in question may be reproduced again and again in the 
future in the same way and with the same economic effort. They also emphasise that the 
formation of a pattern and its reoccurrence is not limited to collectives; even in a solitary state 
an individual is capable of habitualising his or her activity. They argue that habitualisation 
carries an important psychological benefit, which effectively minimises choices, while in 
theory there may be many other ways of doing the same thing; habitualisation reduces all 
decisions to one. This emancipates the individual from the burden of all that decision-making 
and offers the psychological relief that has its basis in man’s undirected instinctual 
structure.13 Hence, in terms of meanings created and presented by people for their activities, 
habitualisation makes re-definition of each situation unnecessary. Therefore a large range of 
situations maybe understood and subsumed under the pre-definition of habitualisation.14  
 
In addition to this, Berger and Luckmann argue that the typifications of habitualised actions, 
which constitute institutions, are always collective.  That means they are obtainable by all 
constituents of a particular social group and the institution itself typifies individual actors as 
well as individual actions. For example, the institution posits that actions of type A will be 
performed by the actors of type A and that actions of type B will be performed by actors of 
type B and so on. Such institutions entail historicity and control since the reciprocal 
typifications of action are constructed in the course of a collective history, they cannot be 
created instantaneously. Institutions always have a history, of which they are products.15   
 
For this reason it is difficult to understand an institution sufficiently, without understanding 
the historical procedure which has conditioned its production. Institutions, by definition, 
                                                
11 Berger and Luckmann (1991), 85. 
12 Ibid.71.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.72. 
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control human behaviour by setting up predefined patterns of action. They create a 
framework in which there is only one ‘natural’ direction to follow, while theoretically and 
practically many other directions could be feasible. Hence, institutionalisation in this sense 
means the codification of collective conduct. In other words it means measures have been 
taken to crown one prevailing perspective over competing ones.   
 
As Berger and Luckmann put it ‘To say that a segment of human activity is institutionalised 
is already to say that this segment of human activity has been subsumed under social 
control’.16 The products of these institutions can become so solidified that they confront the 
individual as external and coercive forces.  Hence, the set of facts and values that have been 
objectified become sedimented to the point that it establishes itself as a reality ‘external’ from 
human consciousness. As Nietzsche would put it, the common ‘lies’ get repeated to the point 
where they eventually become static, frozen and true. Berger and Luckmann add that this 
objectivity of the institutional world thickens and solidifies not only for the children who are 
born into these institutions, but by a mirror effect for their parents as well. For children, 
particularly in the early phase of their socialisation, it becomes the world which they get 
exposed to, a ‘world’ which conditions them to behave, perceive and evaluate social 
phenomena in a certain way.17  
 
Last but not least, it is important to highlight the social dimension of social construction 
theory. This brings us to the significant point that there must be differentiation between social 
constructionism and constructivism, which are often interchangeably used in literature. 
Although there are considerable similarities, they differ. Briefly, what makes constructivism 
different is the lack of social dimension at its core. Constructivism is primarily an 
individualistic understanding of the constructionist position. In contrast to the assertion of 
constructivism, Social construction theory does not concentrate on the social activity of the 
individual mind, but on the collective knowledge shaped and conditioned by the conventions 
of language and other social processes.18  
 
                                                
16 Ibid.73. 
17 Ibid.77. 
18 T.A Schwandt, Counstructivist Interpratvist Approaches to Human Inquiry, Handbook of Qualitative 
Research , eds N.K Denzin &Y.S Lincoln  ( London: Sage 1994), 127. 
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Truth Management  
 
Struggles over ‘truth’ and truth finding missions have been trans-historical features of human 
society. The nature and properties of ‘truth’ have been debated since the dawn of philosophy, 
yet there has not been any consensus on what constitutes ‘truth’ and its characteristics. It is 
possible to assert that nothing has been as polarising as the debate over ‘truth’ throughout 
human history. At almost any passage of written human history, we can see social groups 
struggling over determining the nature of ‘truth’. Indeed, battles have been fought to establish 
whose ‘truth’ pertains. Within various social environments, various belief systems have 
emerged asserting the possession of truth and with it the right to determine ‘good’ from 
‘evil’. 
 
However, ‘truth’ does not become important because of the sedimentation of a certain 
narrative which Nietzsche calls ‘the lie’ according to the fixed convention.  ‘Truth’ becomes 
important because it is connected to power. For this reason ‘truth’, alongside other sources of 
power, has been subject to ‘management’. For Foucault, ‘truth’ is linked in a circular 
relationship with the systems of power, which produces and sustains it, and to the effects of 
power, which it induces and which extend it. As he notes, ‘truth’ is not a form of power 
innocent of coercion, discipline and normalisation; it is not knowledge without deception.19 
Indeed, for Foucault  ‘truth’ is not outside power. As he puts it: 
 
It is not the reward of free spirits, the child of prolonged solitudes, or the privilege of 
those who have been able to liberate themselves, ‘truth’ is of the world, it is produced 
there by virtue of multiple constrains and it includes there the regulated effect of 
power.20 
 
 In this light: 
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth, this is the type of 
discourse it harbours and causes to function as true; the mechanism and instances, 
                                                
19 Michel Foucault, Power, Truth and Strategy ed by Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton (Sydney: Feral 
Publications, 1979), 46.   
20 Ibid. 
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which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is 
sanctioned, the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining ‘truth’; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.21 
 
Hence, the attempt for the management of ‘truth’ is the attempt for the management of power 
and the quest for ‘truth’ can be the quest for some form of domination.  
 
As Foucault puts it: 
 
Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in 
dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just a way 
of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be exercised 
without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.22  
 
In addition, he states ‘the exercise of power itself creates a condition for the emergence of 
new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information’.23 As he notes that 
there are manifold relations of power that permeate, characterise and constitute the social 
body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a 
discourse.24 His notion of discourse may help us to shed light on the importance of the social 
agencies which create and socialise a type of knowledge, which strengthens the prevailing 
order. His definition of discourse can also be helpful in clarifying the co-operation of power 
and knowledge.  Discourse can be summarised as ‘systems of thoughts composed of ideas, 
attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and 
the worlds of which they speak.’25 As he put it in his Archaeology of Knowledge, discourse 
is ‘constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so 
far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence’26  
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed. C. Gordon, Trans. 
C. Gordon, L. Marshal, J. Mepham, and K. Sober (New York: Pantheon Books 1980)52. 
23 Ibid. 51. 
24Michel Foucault, “The Truth” Michel Foucault Info http://foucault.info/Foucault-L/archive/msg04814.shtml  
(accessed, October 22, 2009).  
25 Iara Lessa, “Discoursive struggles within social welfare: Restaging teen motherhood”. British Journal of 
Social Work 36: 283–298. 
26 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books 1970), 107. 
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Foucault contextualises the role of discourse in the wider social processes of legitimatisation 
and power, emphasising the construction of current ‘truths, how they are maintained and 
what power relations they carry with them.’27 He argues that power and knowledge are inter-
related and therefore every human relationship is a struggle and a negotiation of power. 
Hence, power is always present and can both produce and constrain the ‘truth’.28 Therefore, a 
discourse provides structures and guidelines to interpret the world in a certain way. It sets 
prevailing strategies for the interpretation of social phenomena. For Foucault, within any 
social framework, knowledge and the established perspectives are tied to power. Prevailing 
perspectives pave the way for the emergence of certain practices, which marginalise and 
exclude alternative choices. Therefore, the empowerment of one set of ideas within a 
discourse can be understood as the marginalisation and exclusion of the competing 
perspectives.29 
 
Hence, the power to gain influence and resources depends upon knowledge dominating in 
society. For Foucault, we can exercise power by adapting discourses, which empower our 
action. Thus, for him power should not be seen as a form of possession, but as an effect of 
discourse since it helps us to construe the world in a way that allows us to attain what we 
seek. When we define or represent something in a specific way we are basically exercising 
power, we are producing a particular knowledge that constitutes power. Thus, knowledge is a 
power over others, a power to define others.30 
 
Foucault does not recognise power as coercion and compulsion per se; he claims that 
repression is used, when there is a lack of power.31In fact, force is used when the limits of 
power have been reached. As he puts it, ‘What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things’.32 Power is most effective when it produces knowledge. 
                                                
27Iara Lessa. 
28 S. Strega, The view from the post-structural margins: Epistemology and methodology reconsidered. In L. 
Brown, & S. Strega (Eds.), Research as Resistance (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2005) 199-235. 
29  Burr Vivien, An Introduction to Social Constructionism (London: Routledge, 1995), 64. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 139. 
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Hence, discourse can effectively control society, by means of social engineering without 
much force or any disciplinary measures.  
 
Although Foucault’s input regarding social discourse and productive power is extremely 
helpful, it does not help us to fully understand the explicit role of violence in societies in 
which the ruling orders have an Islamic mandate. Although social engineering plays a 
fundamental role in creating consent in a society like Saudi Arabia, violent mechanisms of 
social control maintain their explicit positions, they act as bodyguards defending the 
prevailing regime of ‘truth’. In other words, the ruling mechanism in Saudi Arabia is not 
merely attempting to ‘effect the discourse’ through social engineering, but it is actively and 
explicitly combining ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ power to impose and sustain its official 
narrative.  
 
In socio-political systems like Saudi Arabia affecting the prevailing discourse through 
productive powers is essential, but the transformative nature of violence remains instrumental 
in imposing the official narratives. In other words, while the system uses productive social 
agencies such as education and religion to control the social discourse, it reserves an explicit 
penal system to discipline non-conformers. Of course, violence, disciplinary measures and 
penal systems are ingrained in all hierarchical social systems and all systems have their own 
narrative of legitimisation for the use of force.  
 
Although Saudi Arabia shares the same features, its narrative of legitimisation is connected to 
an unearthly authority. Since the unearthly authority is not perceived to be the product of a 
social contract, it cannot be disputed by ‘earthly means’. These ‘divine and unearthly’, 
narratives legitimises the earthly mechanisms to violently confront any resistance. Hence, the 
use of ‘holy’ violence becomes a religious duty to preserve the ‘truth’. The system creates a 
context beyond the disputation of earthly agents legitimising its use of violence. Although 
systems like Saudi Arabia claim such legitimacy for the monopoly of violence, there is no 
guarantee that every subject will subordinate to this model. 
 
 However, as Foucault points out ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’. For this reason, 
even systems such as that in Saudi Arabia which claim to have a divine mandate to rule, 
resort to the amalgamation of both negative and positive power to minimise resistance to their 
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claim of power. Of course, there are opposing elements within these societies who state an 
equal claim to have a more ‘truthful’ reading of Islam. However, their opposition to a 
dominating order, which has access to violent mechanisms of social control, is a very difficult 
task.   
  
Therefore, what is meant by ‘truth management’ in this context is not only creating consent 
through implicit instruments of thought, but also constructing a framework by which various 
violent mechanisms of social control can be legitimised through a set of ideas, which the 
dominating political order indicates are transcendental narratives and divinely inspired 
‘truth’.  Of course, this process of truth management cannot take place in a vacuum. As the 
case of Wahhabi Islam demonstrates, the management of truth at the micro level builds on 
already sedimented narratives. For the sake of clarity, I call these sedimented narratives 
Islamic truth at the macro level.      
 
Islamic Truth at the Macro Level     
         
There are certain tenets of Islam which have remained intact from the advent of Islamic 
history. These tenets bring all the conflicting interpretations under a single umbrella, Islam. 
In other words, these principles constitute the prerequisite for what it is to be Islamic. 
Regardless of these interpretations and implementations, all Islamic schools of thought and 
madhhabs share these foundational elements that make up the fundamental truth of Islam, 
which is perceived to be absolute and final. Therefore, it is imperative to articulate these 
foundational elements, which constitute the basis of all Islamic interpretations including 
Wahhabism. Although Islamic truth at the micro level in the case of Wahhabi Islam is the 
main focus of this study, we cannot proceed unless we rigidly define what is meant by 
Islamic truth at the macro level.   
 
Indeed we cannot understand these conflicting interpretations without contextualising the 
core foundation. Accordingly, it is necessary to define Islamic truth management at the macro 
level in order to pave the way for a deeper understanding of Islamic truth management at the 
micro level. Every reformist, correctionist and revivalist movement which emerged in Islamic 
history has had a mandate to reinforce the true reading of the ‘truth’. In this light, various 
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interpretations have emerged to offer ‘authentic’ narratives and to put believers in the only 
‘true’ direction.33 The nature of conflict between competing narratives has been partly based 
on authenticity. Thus, the emerging narratives and interpretations could not fundamentally 
transfigure Islam in a theoretical vacuum, as they had to contextualise their truth finding 
mission within a conceptual framework where the core values of Islam would be protected 
and reinforced. Every new interpretation or school of thought regardless of its theoretical and 
ritualistic content had to correspond to the following principles to be identified as Islamic. 34      
 
As in other prevailing Abrahamic religions, God is perceived to be the supreme source of 
‘truth’, which is final and absolute. This ‘truth’ is portrayed as unchangeable which is 
repeatedly reflected in the Qur’an. For example, ‘and the Word of your Lord has been 
fulfilled in truth and in justice. None can change His Words. And He is the All-Hearer, the 
All-Knower35. Thus, Allah is seen as the cause of the causer, the first with no beginning, 
omniscient, everlasting, alive and totally independent, with no equal competitors or partners. 
 
According to Muslims, the best way to understand His will is to refer to the revealed book of 
the Qur’an, which Muslims affirm to be the supreme ‘truth’ of God. One can argue that there 
are two overarching principles, which constitute Islamic ‘truth’ at the macro level and form 
the ultimate foundation for any belief system that claims to be under the banner of Islam.  
These two fundamental principles are none other than the finality of truth and the oneness of 
truth, which are indispensable features of Islamic truth at the macro level.  
 
Tawhid is one of the defining concepts of the Islamic faith, which is uncompromising and 
indispensable. Tawhid advocates none other than the ‘oneness’ of Islamic ‘truth’. Simply, 
                                                
33 Mohammed Arkoun was self-consciously aware of the constant search for authenticity in Islam. For 
example see, Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Islam: Asala wa Mumarasa (Beirut 1986) Mohammed Arkoun  ,Mina-l-
ijtihad ila naqd al-aql al-islami ( Dar al-Saqi 1991). 
34 The first is indeed testifying the ‘truth’, declaration of the shahada that ‘I bear witness that there is no deity 
but, Allah, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah’. The acceptance of  this statement, 
constitute the pre-condition for the membership of the Islamic umma . Hence, Muslim is a person who has 
submitted to the ‘truth’ that there is no higher being than Allah, and Muhammad is the highest and final 
Messenger. In fact, the very term Islam etymologically can be translated as submission. To this effect Qur’an 
states that ‘And that those who have been given knowledge may know that it [this Qur’an] is the ‘truth’ from 
your Lord, so that they may believe therein, and their hearts may submit to it with humility. And verily, Allah 
is the Guide of those who believe, to the Straight Path. That is because Allah - He is the ‘truth’ (the only True 
God of all that exists, Who has no partners or rivals with Him), and what they (the polytheists) invoke besides 
Him, it is batil (falsehood). And verily, Allah - He is the Most High, the Most Great’ (22:62). 
35  Qur’an, 6:115. 
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‘there is no God but God’. Building on this basis, in terms of political philosophy, some 
Muslims affirm that there can be only one sovereign and that is God.36 The notion of the 
exclusive possession of ‘truth’ by Islam constitutes the theoretical foundation for the entire 
religion. Although there are variations in interpretations and implementations, the oneness of 
‘truth’ is the fundamental aspect of all Islamic creeds including Wahhabism. All the Islamic 
sects, which take the Qur’an as the word of God, agree that the divine revelations given to the 
previous prophets were part of an evolutionary process in which Islam is the final point. 
Hence, there cannot be any further development, since perfection has been reached and the 
divine mission is completed.37 
 
‘Finality of truth’ is another fundamental feature of Islamic ‘truth’ at the macro level.  The 
notion of the finality of ‘truth’ is entrenched in the Qur’an.38 Muhammad is referred to as  
‘the seal of the prophets’. It is not certain how this was initially interpreted, but now it is 
universally understood by Muslims that Muhammad is the last prophet, after whom there will 
be no other. Thus, the ‘truth’ that is revealed to Muhammad cannot be replicated and there 
cannot be any further developments in revelation, since the ultimate ‘truth’ has been already 
revealed. In this light, the Qur’an asserts, ‘The true religion with God is Islam’.39 It confers 
finality to Islam because it is based upon the ultimate ‘truth ‘and for that reason it prevails 
over other competing narratives. As was noted before in the Qur’an, Allah affirms that ‘He it 
                                                
36 John L. Esposito and John Obert Voll, Islam and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 23. 
Also see, Asef Bayat, Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?( Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press). 
37 Although Islam theoretically put itself above all the competing narratives, it simultaneously acknowledges 
the truth of other Abrahamic religions. For example Qur’an states that  ‘Nay! he (Muhammad ) has come with 
the ‘truth’ (i.e. Allah's religion - Islamic Monotheism and this Qur'an) and he confirms the Messengers 
(before him who brought Allah's religion). (37:37). However, as Islam recognises the divine prophethood of 
the other Abrahamic messengers, it asserts that their divine revelations were already corrupted by their 
followers. In this light there are verses in Qur’an, which directly accuse the Jews to alter the revelation of 
their divine prophets. (4:46) For example in chapter al-Tawbah of Qur’an explicitly challenges the Jewish and 
Christian claim of ‘truth’ ‘And the Jews say: 'Uzair (Ezra) is the son of Allah, and the Christians say: Messiah 
is the son of Allah. That is their saying with their mouths, resembling the saying of those who disbelieved 
aforetime. Allah's Curse be on them, how they are deluded away from the ‘truth’’ (4:46, 9:30) One has to note 
that, following the Qur’anic claims over the ‘corruption’ of ‘truth’ in previous religions, Muslim scholars in 
the first century of Islam used the Qur’anic verses to articulate a theory of the complete corruption of the 
Jewish and Christian scriptures. Particularly, they relied on verses that used the word alter ( yuharrifuna) 
which is usually translated as corruption (tahrif). Nonetheless,  it was not clear if it was the ‘corruption’ of the 
text or only the meaning . 
38 Qur’an33: 40. 
39  Qur’an 3:19. 
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is who sent His Apostle with the Guidance and a religion of the truth, that He may make it 
victorious over every other religion.’40  
 
Accordingly, Islam claims to be the final arbitrator of the ‘truth’. For this reason Muslims 
should not submit to any other religious perspective since their share of truth is minimal if not 
completely absent. In order to emphasise this point, the Qur’an states, ‘If anyone desires a 
religion other than Islam, never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in 
the ranks of those who have lost their selves in the hell fire’.41   
 
The belief in the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad is crucial and definitive, in the 
same way as is faith in the Oneness of God or belief in the hereafter. Anyone who denies 
these fundamental principles cannot be considered a Muslim. Similarly, anyone who claims 
to be a prophet or who tries to promulgate a new law transcending these principles can be 
perceived as an ‘apostate’.42As will be discussed later, these ideas profoundly shape the 
Wahhabi perspective regarding the validity and authenticity of competing narratives of 
Islam.43    
 
The notion of oneness and the finality of ‘truth’ have various implications for the way in 
which Islam accommodates itself in relation to other competing narratives. Arguably, these 
notions of oneness and finality create an attitude, which assumes a natural superiority for the 
Islamic faith. This religious belief advocates that the ‘truth’ is only one and absolute and that 
Islam is the most perfect and final window through which higher knowledge can be revealed. 
The belief claims that ‘divine knowledge’ was handed over from prophet to prophet for 
centuries until it reached the Final Messenger, where the passing of ages no longer mattered 
                                                
40  Qur’an 9:33. 
41 Qur’an  3:85. 
42 Ibid. 
43 In principle, Islam does not recognise the validity of any perspectives, which attempts to transcend the 
finality of Islam, as Muhammad is seen as the last connection between humankind and the supreme ‘truth’. In 
a Islamic context, if a person claims to have direct connection to the divine after Muhammad will be seen as 
heretic and in profound odds with the orthodoxy of the ‘unchanging’ ‘truth’. One can point to the Ahmadiyya 
community, which is subject to considerable level of discrimination and repression in the Muslim world, 
particularly in Pakistan where they were declared non-Muslims. Although they identify themselves as 
Muslims and believe in the oneness of Allah and His book, which was revealed through Muhammad, they are 
facing harsh prejudicial treatments. The Ahmadiyya Jama’at started in the late 19th century by Mirza Gulam 
Ahmad (1835-1908). For more information see, Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jamaʻat: 
History, Belief, Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) and  Antonio R. Gualtieri ,The 
Ahmadis: community, gender, and politics in a Muslim society (McGill University Press, 2004).  
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and the final ‘truth’ will always remain in the same terms as were revealed to the final 
messenger. This has paved the way for what one may call intellectual self-sufficiency and 
moral supremacy, which is in principle similar to other sematic including Christianity and 
Judaism.   
 
Of course, historically, various Islamic schools of thought have borrowed extensively from 
non-Islamic sources. For example, various Islamic scholars embraced some Jewish, Persian 
and Byzantine ideas in the early years of its history. In particular, various aspects of Greek 
philosophy, such as ideas associated with Plotinus and some Islamic schools of thought 
borrowed Neo-Platonism. Even in the contemporary era there are Islamic narratives, which 
accommodate the intellectual particularities of the modern time.44 Although at many levels 
Islamic narratives are evolving in accordance with changing times, the fundamental 
principles of finality and the oneness of truth have remained intact. In other words every 
perspective that is sourced from other non-Islamic sources can be considered Islamic as long 
as it does not contradict the Islamic macro ‘truth’, which is perceived to be the ultra-
knowledge gained through revelation. In this light, evolving philosophical and theological 
thought has to correspond to the hierarchical knowledge in which nothing can transcend the 
oneness and the final ‘truth’ which reached the Messenger through divine revelation. 45 Thus, 
regardless of the theological, philosophical and ritualistic diversity in Islam, all Islamic sects 
                                                
44 See, Mohammad Sadri and Ahmad Sadri Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Essential writings of 
Adbolkarim Soroush  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 Mohamed Mahmoud , Islam and modernity: Muslim intellectuals respond ( London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2000). 
45 Qur’an uses different words to describe the divine revelation, Tanzil , Ruh , Wahi and Ilham . Tanzil  is 
derived from Nazala, which means ‘to descend’ . Anzala means ‘to send down’ or ‘send a revelation’. This 
implies the message of God descend from the sky through His angel to communicate with the Prophet who is 
chosen as God’s agent to enlighten the rest of people. The idea of Tanzil reenforces the aforementioned binary 
of ‘earthily’ verses ‘unearthly’ narratives, which entail that the ‘truth’ is independent of consciousness and 
external from our natural faculty of reasoning. Thus, the assumption that ‘truth’ is ‘descended’ implies that 
the origin of the ‘‘truth’’ is unearthly and mysterious by nature. Hence, before being revealed it was out of 
reach for the ‘unenlightened’. Ruh is another term for revelation that can be translated as the ‘breathe of life’ 
and ‘soothing mercy’. Etymologically it is related to the word ‘Rahat’ which means ‘rest from sadness’. 
Arguably, this implies the ‘life giving’ nature of the ‘truth’, which emerges to shed light on darkness and 
emancipate humankind from their miseries. Not only the ‘truth’ provides the guidance but also offers the 
unearthly soothing comfort for the earthily journey of life.  Wahi literally means to communicate in a form of 
whisper. That can be understood as the ‘voice of truth’ targeted the messenger carefully, so only him, in 
absence of any other inferences can be exposed to the divine knowledge. Hence, this implies the elitist status 
of the agent or the messenger. He selectively has been chosen to hear the ‘truth’. The ‘truth’ and the absolute 
knowledge have to be circulated through his medium. He is, therefore, the only bridge between the supreme 
wisdom and the earthly life. The word Ilham also is used in occasion for the divine revelation, which literally 
means ‘instinct’ or ‘intimation’. 
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build their theoretical propositions and truth-finding missions upon these two fundamental 
principles.  
 
Truth Management at the Micro Level  
 
The internal struggle to find the true path to the ‘truth’ started to unfold as soon as the 
Prophet died. Muhammad was seen as the messenger and the divine bridge between earthly 
and divine knowledge. Once he left the scene, there was a vacuum, which left his followers 
the problem of how to perpetuate his legacy. Finding the leadership to perpetuate the 
Prophet's legacy was the beginning of a long struggle over the ‘true path’, which is still 
gaining momentum after 1400 years. Indeed various struggles have taken place to determine 
the true leadership; those will implement the supreme word of God. The most important of 
these struggles resulted in the emergence of two distinct groups of Muslims known as Shiites 
and Sunnis.  
 
The religious group identified as Shiites claimed that the arbitration of ‘truth’ had to remain 
the monopoly of the Household of the Prophet. Hence they believed that Ali the son-in-law 
and the cousin of the Prophet should have been his legitimate successor. Nonetheless, the 
Sunnis believed that Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s Companion who was much older and much 
more experienced than Ali, should take the position after the Prophet’s death. Factionalism 
did not stop there. Shiism and Sunnism started to get fragmented too. Various divisions and 
sub-divisions were created assuming the authority for the ‘true’ knowledge of, Islam.  
 
Shiism, which is a minority belief in the Islamic world, became highly fragmented. Various 
divisions emerged, some of them losing momentum while they were still fledgling religious 
movements and some of them have lasted until today. 46 The same set of struggles has been 
prevalent in Sunni Islam, which includes many revivalist movements such as Wahhabism. 
                                                
46 Apart from the Twelver Shiism, which constitutes the largest faction, there are other major Shiite groups such 
as Zaidiyyah who are primarily concentrated in Yemen. Sometimes, they are known as the ‘Fivers’ because they 
follow the first four Imams of the Twelver Shi’ism but they differ on the Fifth Imam. The Zaidiyyah people 
believe that Zayd Ibn Ali and not his brother Muhammad al-Baqir should be the ‘true’ fifth Imam. The other 
major sect in Shi’ism is Ismailism, which is considered to be the second largest Shiite group in the Islamic 
world. As their name suggests they adhere to Ismail, the son of Imam Jafar Sadeq, the Sixth Imam and the 
founder of Ja’fari jurisprudence. This is one of the points where they differ from the Twelver Shiites, who accept 
Musa al-Kazim, the younger brother of Ismail, as the ‘true’ divine Imam. 
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Conflict over interpretations and implementations have resulted in the formation of various 
sects in Sunni Islam. There are many factors, which could explain fragmentations in Islam, 
but a close link between the idea of ‘true path’ and the question of ‘true leadership’ has been 
one of the main causes of factionalism. Indeed, struggles over leadership have been an 
indispensable feature of Islamic history. The question of leadership more than anything else 
has affected the Islamic narratives through various ages. In this light, it is possible to assert 
that continuous leadership crises over who should lead the umma or more accurately fractions 
of the umma, have paved the way for the emergence of competing theological and political 
narratives. Often political competition over leadership has been articulated through religious 
language. In other words, the political actors who strove for power and prestige had to 
establish close links between their earthly domination and divine ‘legitimacy’.  
 
Thus, any claim for power could potentially mean a claim for possession of the truth. In this 
light, access to the various means of power determines the chances of survival for a 
competing regime of truth. Historically, there have been various religious movements such as 
Kaysaniyya, who could not survive, even though they enjoyed a relatively good position 
during the formative periods of Islamic history.47 The socio-political conditions, 
competitions, and unfavourable power dynamics of the time did not allow them to survive. 
Hence, their regime of truth lost the chance of continuity. 
 
Daftary notes that: 
 
In such a milieu of diversity and conflicting communal interpretations abundantly 
manifested in the heresiographical tradition of the Muslims, general consensus could 
not be established regarding the definition of ‘true’ Islam, as different religio-political 
regimes were legitimised in different states by the ulema who in return, were accorded 
a privileged social status among the elite of the society.48 
 
Often ‘true Islam’ has been synonymous with ‘official Islam’ where the political and military 
power of the dominating factions enforced certain narratives in order to sustain and legitimise 
                                                
47 Farhad Daftary, A short History of Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998), 22. 
48 Ibid. 22. 
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their dominance. Thus, the transitory nature of ‘truth’ at the micro level has been largely 
vested in conflict. Conflict has paved the way for the transition of one power complex to 
another. Often, transformations have been sustained and legitimised through a supporting 
regime of ‘truth’. Indeed, conflicting narratives have emerged to serve the two purposes of 
‘domination’ and ‘resistance’. In other words, conflicts over power and resources paved the 
way for the emergence of competing ideas, which were constructed in order to accommodate 
the socio-political particularities of the hegemony or the counter- hegemony. The binaries of 
domination and resistance, which were vested in conflicts, constantly packaged and 
repackaged Islam with the new brands of ‘truth’. 
 
As the previous section suggested, the main tenets of Islamic ‘truth’ at macro level claim to 
be timeless, final and absolute. The ideas of the finality and oneness of ‘truth’ through 
revelation to the last Prophet are the foundation of all interpretations of Islam. However, 
given the eventful history of the Islamic umma, which has been shaped by factionalism, 
divisions and doctrinal rivalries one can assert that there have been more disagreements than 
agreements among Muslims about the ‘true’ path to the ‘truth’. Although all madhhabs and 
Islamic schools of thought adhere to the timeless, oneness and final truth in Islam, there have 
been constant disputations about how to internalise, objectify and institutionalise the true’ 
path to the ‘truth’.  
 
As was suggested before, there are two dynamics of ‘truth’ management taking place 
simultaneously. The one at macro level aims to establish the superiority of Islam in relation to 
the other competing narratives and the other takes place internally to find the ‘truth’ within 
the ‘truth’. Indeed, the historical struggle to find the ‘true’ path to the ‘truth’ has created and 
sustained various strategies of interpretation, which have influenced the Islamic 
consciousness and scattered Muslim unity throughout different ages. 
 
 The emergence of Wahhabi Islam is an example of this ongoing struggle to find the ‘truth’ 
within the ‘truth’. However, the truth finding missions of movements like Wahhabism do not 
take place in a vacuum. There are grounds for the argument that certain conditions are 
necessary to help these conflicting movements to register and sustain their narratives as 
‘truth’. This study suggests that the process relies on four interrelated factors, which include 
leadership, construction of narratives, socialisation and violence. These four factors have 
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been indispensable for the success of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. These four factors were 
essential in constructing and sustaining the necessary framework for the monopolisation of 
power by the House of Saud. Indeed, they have maintained and rationalised the existing 
narratives of official Islam in Saudi Arabia. In other words they have paved the way for the 
officialisation of Wahhabism as the indisputable ‘truth’ within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, it is imperative to briefly conceptualise each of these factors before proceeding to the 
next stage of the inquiry. 
 
Leadership  
 
Conceptualising leadership is a complex and elusive problem because the nature of 
leadership itself is complex.49 The notion of leadership can be defined differently within 
different disciplines and its meaning may differ from one context to another. There has been a 
historical fascination with conceptualising the leader and the properties of leadership. 
Theoretical discussions over leaders and their qualities can be traced back to Plato’s 
Republic. Today for the sake of clarity we could broadly see leadership as: 
 
A personality attribute, as the art of inducing compliance, as an exercise of influence, 
as a particular kind of act, as a form of persuasion, as a power relation, as an instrument 
in the attainment of goals, as an effect of interaction, as a differentiated role and as the 
initiation of structure.50  
 
Perhaps a more concise definition of leadership would be ‘a process of social influence in 
which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a 
common task’.51Although over the last seventy years alone more than 3000 leadership studies 
have been conducted, there is still no overarching theory of leadership, which could be 
universally accepted.52For decades social theorists have attempted to determine the 
importance of leadership in transforming and sustaining social structures. As early as the 
                                                
49 Richard L.Daft and Patricia G, Lane, The leadership experience (United States: South-Western Press, 
2010), 4.  
50 Mitchell R. Waite, Fire Service Leadership: Theories and Practices (United States: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 2007), 1. 
51 Martín M. Chemers, An Integrative Theory of Leadership (United Kingdom: Psychology Press, 1997), 1. 
52 Mitchell R. Waite, 1. 
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nineteenth century, the Great Man Theory was developed to articulate the role of ‘great men’, 
in the making of history. This theory advocated that the ‘great men’, possessing superior 
personal qualities were the agents acting as the vanguard of all major historical 
developments. This view put forward the idea that powerful, wise and charismatic leaders are 
needed for any major historical transition.  Scholars such as Francis Galton and Thomas 
Carlyle led the debate in developing the Great Man theory.53 
 
In 1840 Thomas Carlyle noted that:  
 
For as I take it Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this 
world, is at bottom the History of Great Men who have worked here. They were the 
leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators of 
whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see 
standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical 
realisation and embodiment of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the 
world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered were the 
history of these.54  
 
For Carlyle, ‘The history of the world is but the biography of great men’. Therefore, leaders 
were portrayed as the single most important movers and shakers of the world, responsible for 
paving the way for change and development. These so-called ‘great men’ were perceived to 
be the vanguard for social transition. ‘Great men’ were represented as the driving engine of 
history pushing the boundaries, influencing, guiding, inspiring, sparking and mobilising the 
masses for great courses of action.55 
                                                
53 The Great Men theory had many other supporters such as Frederick Adams Woods who promulgated the 
same views by writing the Influence of Monarchs: Steps in a New Science of History. 
54 On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (United States: Harvard College, 1924) 3. 
55  In 1869 Francis Galton took further steps to determine how the ‘great men’ are born to influence the course 
of human history. Clearly if the role leaders were perceived to be essential, there were demands to establish 
how these great men were emerged. Galton individuals do not became leaders through complex social 
procedures, but they are born with their super characteristics to lead.  In his Hereditary Genius (1869), he 
asserted that ‘a man’s natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as the 
form and features of the whole organic world. Consequently, as it is easy, notwithstanding those limitations, 
to obtain by careful selection a permanent bread of dogs or horses gifted with peculiar powers of running, or 
of doing anything else, so it would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious 
marriages during several consecutive generations’. See: 
 Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: an Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (United States: Macmillan & 
CO, 1869) 1.  
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 Although the notion of the Great Man provided simple answers for difficult questions, it 
faced considerable criticism. Herbert Spencer, who was probably one of the most influential 
intellectuals of his time, questioned this ‘indispensable‘ role of leaders for the making of 
history. He asserted that leaders are the products of their societies and accordingly one cannot 
reduce historical developments to the leadership of individuals with ‘superb’ personal 
qualities. In his famous book, The Study of Sociology, he noted, ’you must admit that the 
genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences, which has produced 
the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown.... 
Before he can remake his society, his society must make him’.56 
 
 Many other theorists such as William James supported the idea that leaders and their social 
frameworks mutually influence each other. This approach did not necessarily make the role 
of leaders irrelevant, but it attempted to bring other social factors into the equation. More 
importantly, it developed the idea that leaders as agents are mutually influenced by structures.  
 
From the mid-twentieth century, many other alternative leadership theories emerged 
underlining the other driving forces behind leadership.57 Accordingly, leadership was no 
longer reduced to continuing individual traits, but as a more complex, multidimensional and 
multifaceted agency, which could influence and at same time be influenced by its social 
environment. However, to determine the primacy of social environment over leadership or 
leadership over social environment is like attempting to resolve the classic discussion over 
the primacy of either structure or agency in human behaviour. This continues to be a central 
debate in the social sciences. 
 
In brief, agency refers to action or the capacity of individuals to act independently. Structure, 
broadly, refers to social patterns, which influence the course of actions, which individuals 
may take within a social framework. Of course, structure does not only refer to material 
patterns such as economic and political institutions, even cultural patterns and prevailing 
normative narratives can also be seen as social structures. Some theoretical approaches such 
                                                
56 See, Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (New York: Appleton & Company, 1896) . 
57 For example, Situational and contingency theories, Transactional and transformational theories and the 
functional leadership model. 
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as structuralism claim that the actions and thoughts of individuals are primarily determined 
by overall structure, and the perceived agency of individuals can be explained by the 
operation of this structure.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, theories such as social phenomenology, interactionism and 
methodological Individualism give more weight to the agency for determining patterns of 
social framework. Although there are merits in each of these theories, there is still a gap in 
the equation. For this reason steps were taken to build up a theoretical framework, which 
could offer a ‘third way’. Accordingly, some theoretical approaches have developed to avoid 
the explicit dichotomisation of structure and agency and instead, have attempted to reconcile 
the two. For example Berger and Luckmann argued that there could be a dialectical 
relationship between structure and agency.58 Structure forms agency and agency forms 
structure or society forms the individuals who create society.59 As Ole Riis and Linda 
Woodhead note: Berger and Luckmann’s approach ‘ties the subject and the social world 
together by the dialectical process of cognitive internalisation, objectification and 
externalisation.’60  
 
Reconciliation between structure and agency can sufficiently explain the role of leadership in 
the politics of truth management at the macro level. Although the role of leadership has been 
fundamental, there were other factors contributing to the success of Wahhabism in 
establishing itself as a dominant force in the Arabian Peninsula. Leadership has been an 
important driving force for the dominance of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, but it has also been 
an integral part of a more complex social process, that has paved the way for the prevalence 
of the current religio-political model in Saudi Arabia.    
 
Narrative Construction  
 
Throughout Islamic history, any assertion of leadership has always been accompanied by a 
narrative, which religiously legitimises and validates the ‘truth’. Accordingly, various 
                                                
58 Murray Milner, Status and Sacredness: A General Theory of Status Relations and an Analysis of Indian 
Culture (New York: Oxford University Press,1994), 260. 
59 Ole Riis, Linda Woodhead,  A Sociology of Religious Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press ,2010) 
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60 Ibid. 
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narratives have emerged to function as an authenticating stamp for the assertion of power. 
Power does not necessarily mean direct domination backed up by various governing 
mechanisms. As was discussed before, power also refers to an attempt to affect the discourse 
through productive agencies shaping the collective consciousness.  
 
Therefore, narrative construction refers to the construction of knowledge, which serves the 
power mechanism, in its broadest sense. To be more specific, in the Islamic context, narrative 
construction refers to a set of ideas and perspectives built on the macro truth of Islam to 
assign the power of representation of the ‘truth’ to a certain individual or a group of people in 
one way or another. In other words it refers to the chronicles, concepts, symbols and 
doctrines, which are formed to justify the eligibility and the legitimacy of certain agencies to 
articulate the ‘truth’ and its power relations. It is an empowering process, which can provide 
the power of representation over the wider belief system. Any narrative, which claims to have 
the monopoly over ‘truth’, is exclusionary by nature. As truth in itself is about winning and 
losing at the same time, it concurrently signifies the superiority of one perspective over the 
inferiority of another. 
 
For example, the Wahhabi narrative constitutes sharp binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ by which 
the majority of Muslims are reduced to ‘deviants’ and ‘innovators’. Indeed, it constitutes 
exclusionary parameters in which the representation of the truth is solely given to 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation. Thus, at different times new standardising 
ideas have been introduced to measure the ‘faithfulness’ of the believers. In other words 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab introduced a new frame of reference to measure ‘truth’ and 
to determine ‘good’ and ‘evil’. It is imperative to acknowledge that such narratives cannot be 
constructed in a vacuum; they are the very product of their time. They were formed in 
reaction to the prevailing power dynamics and socio-political and intellectual conditions of 
their time.   
 
Socialisation  
 
Following the discussion in the previous section, it is important to consider the ways in which 
constructed narratives become effective. As already stated, it would be too simplistic to 
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reduce ‘truth’ management at the micro level to a form of conflict, which only entails force 
and repression. The implementation of the prevailing narrative requires more than brute 
power. Indeed, power is most effective when it is productive that is, when it produces 
knowledge.   
 
However, reaching this productive stage requires a set of preconditions. Productive 
knowledge cannot be produced in a vacuum. It cannot emerge in the absence of a necessary 
infrastructure, which could transform direct repression based on brute power to indirect 
control based on consent. By a necessary infrastructure, I refer to a set of associational and 
socialising agencies, which could effectively socialise a regime of truth within a social 
framework. Socialisation not only refers to the process of transmitting a specific culture, it 
also refers to the process which attempts to guarantee a continuing consensus pertaining to 
the essential elements of the social world. Social control, which is the product of 
socialisation, attempts to contain individual or collective resistance within tolerable limits.61  
 
There is another critical process that serves to support the influential edifice of social order. 
This is the process of legitimisation, which justifies socially objectified knowledge. 62 
Through socialisation the individual not only acquires knowledge about objectivated 
meanings but also identifies with and is formed by them. With this process he observes the 
objectified knowledge and becomes not only one who possesses these meanings, but also one 
who represents and articulates them.63   
 
Social agencies and institutions are constructed within various societies to socialise the 
perspectives associated with the prevailing social order. These socialising agencies, which 
include educational institutions, religious establishments and communication agencies, 
socialise their members to standardise the collective consciousness and prevent major 
resistance against the status quo. Clearly, some aspects of socialisation can be about social 
control, which entails power. Therefore, social institutions rely on co-operation between 
power and knowledge to retain their objectives. Since power and knowledge are mutually 
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supportive and directly imply one and another.64 However, when narratives are generated 
they cannot be influential unless they are socialised through various effective social agencies. 
For example, the House of Saud, which represents the Wahhabi narrative, embarked on a 
sophisticated programme of socialisation to internalise the official discourse. Gradually, 
various religious and social institutions were constructed to promote the Wahhabi narrative 
and discredit incompatible religio-political perspectives.  
 
The knowledge created and circulated within the newly established education system 
attempted to create a national subjectivity, which would empower the ruling family and its 
ideological mandate. Powerful socialising agencies such as mosques were monopolised by 
the state to expose the people to the tailored religious narrative. More complex religious 
institutions were constructed to control the production of fatwas and religious knowledge. 
Indeed, effective socialisation cannot take place without effective institutions. Institutions, by 
definition, control human behaviour by setting up predefined patterns of action. They create a 
framework in which there is only one ‘natural’ direction to follow, while theoretically and 
practically many other directions could be feasible. Hence, institution building exists as an 
attempt at the standardisation and codification of collective conduct.  
 
Violence  
 
Although social engineering through socialisation plays a fundamental role in imposing the 
perspectives of the ruling class, in Islamic truth management violent mechanisms of social 
control maintain their explicit positions in order to protect the prevailing regime of ‘truth’. 
In other words, ‘truth’ management at the micro level is not a mere attempt to ‘affect the 
discourse’; it is a combination of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ power to impose and sustain a 
regime of ‘truth’. While effecting the prevailing discourse through productive power is 
essential, the transformative nature of violence remains instrumental in managing ‘the 
official truth’.   
 
As will be shown in the case of Wahhabism, the political system takes measures to create 
complex social agencies to transform the collective consciousness in accordance with its 
                                                
64 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 27. 
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ideological mandate. Nonetheless, the system simultaneously relies on various violent 
strategies (explicitly or implicitly) to offset any social resistance to the status quo.  
 
It is crucial to determine that the meaning of violence in this context goes beyond the 
classic usage of brute force, as violence is highly multifaceted and multidimensional. 
65Violence is ubiquitous and omnipresent. In the same way that it is responsible for shaping 
our past, it continues to be a defining means of social control and domination. It is possible 
to assert that all social organisations contain the historical use of violence as a means of 
social control.66  
 
Hence, there is no single way of defining violence. Although one can benefit from a 
multidisciplinary conceptualisation of violence as a baseline, there has to be a clear 
definition, which will set the stage for deeper analysis. Hence, for the sake of clarity, one 
can start addressing the notion by referring to a generic definition proposed by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), ‘The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or 
actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results 
in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation.’67  
 
Etienne G. Krug notes that:  
 
The inclusion of the word ‘power’ in addition to the phrase ‘use of physical force’ 
broadens the nature of violent acts and expands the conventional understanding of 
                                                
65 Regimes such as the modern Saudi state which actively attempt to manage the prevailing ‘truth’, utilises 
wide-ranging violent mechanisms to offset any resistance to the ways they try to construct and impose their 
narratives. Violence is imposed in multiple ways to achieve various objectives. For this reason it is important 
to contextualise violence and define its multidimensional nature which becomes instrumental to establish 
various mechanisms of social control.   
66 Correspondingly, various narratives have emerged to explain violence, justify it or even prevent it. Just in 
the same way that many philosophers have been preoccupied by the nature of violence and its cultural roots, 
scientists have also attempted to explain it through the methodical lens of science. Thus, many narratives have 
emerged to explain this timeless practice that is ingrained in human collectivities. As many scientists have 
searched our biological structure to find the driving genes of violence, linguists have attempted to find the 
roots of violence within the boundaries of the language, which defines the boundaries of perception.  Some 
political economists have referred to the unequal systems of the distribution of wealth and some political 
scientists have held that the brutal mechanisms of states are responsible for violence. Many dichotomising 
belief systems such as religions and ideologies also have been held responsible for instigating violence. 
67Etienne G. Krug, World Report on Violence and health, Volume 1 (Washington: World Health 
Organisation, 2002), 5.  
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violence to include those acts which result from a power relationship, including 
threats and intimidation. The ‘use of power’ also serves to include neglect and all 
types of physical, sexual and psychological abuse, as well as suicide and other self-
abusing acts.68  
 
The inclusion of psychological harm, deprivation and maldevelopment indicates that the 
implications of violence go beyond causing injury and death.69 Indeed, there are many 
types of ideological violence, which include religious hatred, racism, ageism, sexism, and 
homophobia, which may not necessarily result in physical harm, but they can 
psychologically scar the victims. Hence, psychological pressures, which affect the well 
being of individuals, can also be seen as acts of violence. The wide personal, social and 
political aspects of violence have paved the way for an extensive body of research 
explaining the various implications of violence. In his comprehensive study of violence, 
Krug refers to three types of violence: self-directed violence, interpersonal violence and 
collective violence.70Krug subdivides collective violence into social, political and economic 
violence. Social violence includes systematic crimes of hate, terrorist acts and mob 
violence. Political violence includes violent conflicts, state violence and similar acts 
organised by large groups.  Economic violence includes the economic marginalisation of 
individuals or social groups and the denial of access to economic and financial facilities. 71  
 
From the 1960s onwards there have been some more rigorous studies of violence and its 
wider social and political implications. Many of the typologies which have developed, can 
be helpful in deepening our understanding of violence; this will be an important notion in 
this study. James Gilligan was one of the first scholars who developed the notion of 
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The advent of the World War II and its brutal repercussions, which resulted in the massacre of millions of 
individuals pushed many scientists, social scientists and philosophers to pay a more rigorous attention to 
violence and its implications. Philosophers such as Hannah Arendt, who was herself a victim of violent acts, 
devoted much of their post-war intellectual lives to explain the various dynamics of violence. For instance, in 
her theoretical studies, Arendt differentiated between the concepts of violence and power.  She suggested that 
power and violence are opposites. Her argument was not Gandhi’s belief in nonviolence, but an argument for 
power, which is most powerful when it is nonviolent. As Elisabeth Young-Bruehl noted that in Arendt’s 
terms, the power is more likely to be lasting, the one that can sustain the actors’ humanity in the best way. It is 
the power that arises from nonviolent action. Nonviolent action requires continuing discussion and a 
respectful exchange of views, which are a means of regenerating power. For more information see: Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl Why Arendt Matters, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 90. 
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structural violence; this discussed the implications of the systematised or even rationalised 
violence that can be embedded in various social organisations.  
 
Gregg Barak refers to structural violence as the most fundamental form of violence.72 Barak 
describes the term as:  
 
Expressive of the conditions of society, the structure of social order and the 
institutional arrangements of social order, and the institutional arrangements of power 
that reproduce mass violations of personhood 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Such 
violence is accomplished through ‘policies’ of informal and formal denial of civil, 
criminal and basic human rights for all people.73 
 
Structural violence has been described as the ‘violence of the status quo’.74 Structural 
violence can be multidimensional and complex. Structural violence finds its place in 
enforcing, sustaining, expanding, or reducing hierarchical structures. These hierarchies of 
privilege and systems of inequality can be portrayed and perceived as universal.75  By 
taking the systems of inequality into account, Peter Iadicola and Anson D. Shupe argue that 
systematised disparities can instigate institutional and structural violence. 76 They argue that 
each form of institutional violence replicates a pattern that places the victims in a 
subordinate position. Hence, those who are committing violence are those who are in the 
dominant positions.77 They also argue that structural violence is the most hidden form of 
violence. With the assistance of prevailing ideologies, violence can be legitimatised and 
accordingly people are prevented from identifying it as a form of violence.78  
 
There are various implicit and explicit mechanisms of violence, which have assisted 
regimes such as Saudi Arabia in sustaining their political and ideological dominance. For 
example, through structural violence, the modern Saudi state has systematically   
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marginalised those religious minorities who have not subscribed to the official discourse. 
Indeed, deprivation, favouritism, impoverishment and marginalisation are violent 
instruments used by the state to maintain the status quo. In addition to indirect violent 
strategies, the state actively uses controlling agencies like the religious police to impose its 
religious narrative upon the masses. Accordingly, a wide range of violent strategies is 
employed to put pressure on nonconformists and simultaneously create incentives for other 
subjects to embrace the official narrative. Therefore, such regimes institute explicit and 
implicit penal systems to encourage conformity, and discipline any form of resistance to the 
official discourse.  
 
It would be inconceivable to imagine a state without violence. The state’s mechanisms of 
law and order, instruments of social control and hierarchical structures are sustained and 
perpetuated by violence. As Trotsky said at Brest-Litovsk, ‘every state is founded on 
violence’79. It does not matter how ‘civilised’ a state is, its law enforcement and wide 
programme of social control rely on violence or the threat of violence.  From the beginning, 
the construction of the nation state has been heavily dependent upon violence. Indeed, 
violence has been instrumental in constructing and sustaining political units, thus 
maintaining their tailored territorial integrity.  
 
Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski note that: 
 
Violence pushes the limits of the permissible, opening up spaces where customary 
and unexpected meanings and practices are brought together in unprecedented ways, 
illuminating hidden historical landscapes in a flash and leaving behind the opaque 
memory of ungraspable territories. In the crisis of meaning that violence conceives, 
the territoriality of nations and corporeality of people become privileged mediums for 
recognising the body public and forcibly controlling the movement of persons and 
ideas within the nation’s material and cultural space. 80  
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Max Weber was a defining political sociologist in the twentieth century who provided some 
influential perspectives on the state and violence. What he suggested continues to enforce 
the status quo as he justifies the monopolisation of ‘legitimate violence’ by the state. For 
him, a state without the monopoly of violence by state order can never be achieved. Weber 
notes that  ‘if there were structures in which violence as a means was unknown, then the 
idea of the state would have disappeared and anarchy in its literal sense would appear,’81 
He suggests that violence is not the normal means of the state, but it is specific to the state. 
Hence, Weber established a very intimate relation between the state and violence. 
 
He noted that in the past physical force was perceived as a wholly normal means of control 
by most bodies starting with kinship groups. Now in contrast, territory is considered as a 
characteristic of the state and the human community within the territory accepts the 
monopoly of violence as the states legitimate right.82 Hence, the state is the main source of 
authority in controlling the use of violence. Any individual or social group that wishes to 
employ violence should receive a legitimising sanction from the state. Any use of violence 
outside the parameter of the state is considered illegitimate. The state is the only structure 
which possesses the ‘right’ of exercising violence. 83 Clearly, this model of the distribution 
of ‘rights’ to exercise violence is only designed for a state system, since it would not be 
applicable to a feudal or tribal society where violence is exercised by multiple agencies.  
 
Within tribal and feudal systems, where various political units are constantly in competition 
over power and resources within the same territory, violence cannot be monopolised. In 
fact, violence becomes the transformative means, utilised by competing actors, in order to 
change the balance of power in their own favour.  For Weber this transformative means of 
violence, which is constantly utilised by competing agencies, creates anarchy. Thus, the use 
of violence has to be in the monopoly of a single organisation (the state) in order to prevent 
anarchy. The state as the main instrument of ‘legitimate violence’ or what is seen as 
‘legitimate’ supports Herrschaft’s relationship of the domination of human being over 
human being.84Thus, for a state to exist, it has to force people to obey the ‘authority’ of the 
dominating class. Hence, without the employment of force, the state cannot homogenise the 
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political landscape and compel the subject to obey the hierarchical order. In this light, 
violence is used to enforce a mechanism of distribution of power favourable to the 
dominant class. 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 paved the way for the idea of national sovereignty based 
on territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in the domestic affairs of 
states.  Therefore, states have used their sovereignty to impose violence on their subjects 
with often minimal interference from external agents. Many atrocities have taken place 
within the boundaries of nation-states. Although the idea of absolute sovereignty is no 
longer an acceptable notion within international customary law, states continue to enjoy 
immunity when it comes to their violent programmes of social control. Even after the 
atrocities of World War II, when the international system pretended to be more attentive to 
the prevention of extreme state violence against citizens, humanitarian interventions have 
often been both limited and controversial.  
 
There is no super state mechanism to effectively curb a state’s violent policies against its 
own citizens, and existing international bodies, such as the Security Council within the 
United Nations, have proved to be highly ineffective. Although Westphalian sovereignty in 
its original form may not be accepted, states continue to enjoy immunity with minimal 
interference from external agencies while violence and threat of violence remain the main 
instrument for enforcing the status quo in the society of states. Modern Saudi Arabia has 
enjoyed similar privileges of immunity. As a sovereign state it has removed the historic 
tribal competing claimants of power within its territory and has monopolised the right of 
exerting violence with minimal interference from external agencies. Unlike the First and 
the Second Saudi Emirates, the universally accepted structures of the modern nation state 
has given the House of Saud the legitimate means to widen its control and enforce its 
ideology within the defined territory, which is internationally recognised as its fiefdom.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Social constructionism rejects any form of social knowledge, which claims to exist 
independently of our consciousness. Hence, most theoretical perspectives that are informed 
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by social construction epistemology oppose the notion of objective knowledge on the 
grounds that one must already have a predefined model of ‘truth’ in mind in order to 
measure it, scrutinise it, circulate it and distinguish it from other competing perspectives. 
Accordingly, knowledge is the product of a social process and is subject to historical 
conditions. Indeed, social constructionism contests the formation of influential and highly 
sedimented social institutions such as religion, which have been successful in creating and 
sustaining collective values, narratives and definitions.  
 
Drawing on the theoretical propositions of social constructionism, this chapter attempted to 
conceptualise truth and truth management. Accordingly, there was a suggestion that the 
attempt for the management of ‘truth’ is the attempt for the management of power and the 
quest for ‘truth’ can be the quest for some form of domination. Foucault obviously came to 
mind. As he suggested that, ‘Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and 
there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this 
is just a way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise.  It is not possible for power to be 
exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power’.85 In 
this light, the Foucultian argument that power is always present and can both produce and 
constrain the truth was reinforced. Following that, there was a suggestion that there are two 
interconnected dynamics, shaping and portraying the notion of truth in Islam. The one at 
the macro level constitutes the unchanging foundational tenets of the religion, a set of 
entrenched principles which establish the ‘finality’ and ‘oneness’ of Islam in relation to the 
other competing narratives and the other one at the micro level takes place internally to find 
‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. The historical struggle to search for the ‘true’ path to the ‘truth’ 
has created and sustained various strategies of interpretation, which have influenced Islamic 
consciousness and fragmented Muslim unity throughout different ages. Indeed the ongoing 
quest to find the ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’ turned Islam into one of the most fragmented 
religions in the world. 
 
This chapter attempted to identify and conceptualise the important factors, which pave the 
way for the assertion of ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. Accordingly, this chapter suggested that 
truth management at the micro level depends upon four interrelated factors, which include 
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leadership, narrative construction, socialisation and violence. Wahhabism is yet another 
manifestation of Islamic truth at the micro level which attempts to ‘authenticate’ Islam by 
‘rediscovering’ its ‘true’ narrative. These factors have been essential for the establishment of 
Wahhabism as ‘the official truth’ in Saudi Arabia.  
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C h a p t e r  2  
 NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND LEADERSHIP  
Every ideology is conditioned by the prevailing socio-political particularities of its time. 
Ideas are not born in a vacuum; they are the products of the dialectical relationship between 
agent and structure. As was discussed before, we cannot separate the agency from the 
structure, because they mutually produce each other. Structures produce agencies and 
agencies produce structures. Accordingly we cannot be indifferent towards the prevailing 
structures at the time that the Wahhabi agency was in formation. Indeed, Muhammad Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab’s ideas were products of his environment. Thus, exploring the socio-
political environment in which he lived may help us to have a deeper understanding of the 
creed’s initial hopes, inspirations and anxieties as these were translated into a religious 
discourse. 
 
It was in the eighteenth century that Wahhabism, as a distinct religio-political expression, 
came to the attention of the Muslim world, within and beyond the Arabian Peninsula. 
Although in many ways Wahhabism was the product of its own time and was shaped by 
various driving forces in Najd, it offered hardly any original thought. In fact, as a belief 
system, it opposed any sign of originality and innovation in faith. Like many other 
revivalist movements it wanted to ‘restore’ the true foundations of the religion. Its frame of 
reference was the past and it had a vision of building a future based on§ ‘authentic’ Islamic 
values.   
 
Indeed, many of the perspectives championed by Wahhabism, had been debated and 
advocated by other religious agents through the centuries, but the structural conditions of 
the eighteenth century Arabian Peninsula allowed Wahhabism to establish itself as a 
recognisable religious narrative. In many ways Wahhabism became the loudspeaker for the 
previously advocated religious perspectives. Thus, Wahhabism was a continuation of a 
religious trend, which became more visible after being adopted by the House of Saud. 
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Although this chapter primarily aims to address the notions of narrative construction and 
leadership, it is imperative to widen our historical lens, in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the religious foundation, which is at the heart of the politics of truth 
management in modern Saudi Arabia. We have to go briefly beyond modern Saudi Arabia 
to trace ideas that affected the social and religious perspectives of Abd-al-Wahhab, who 
founded the movement and seeded an ideological foundation for what is recognised today 
as the modern Saudi State. This chapter will attempt to provide a brief historical context for 
Wahhabism. It also aims to shed light on the structural conditions of the time, which 
allowed the new religious agency to flourish. This chapter will attempt to show the 
Wahhabi construction of narrative and elaborate important dimensions of its perspectives. 
Furthermore, it will discuss the role of the House of Saud and how it offered effective 
leadership to promote Wahhabism as the official ‘truth’. This chapter will cover the Saudi-
Wahhabi initial conflictual steps for state building until the official formation of the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   
 
The Genealogy of Wahhabism  
 
The genealogical roots of Wahhabism can be traced back to the Hanbali school of 
Jurisprudence in Sunni Islam.1 The Hanbali School of Jurisprudence does not appear to 
have made any major geographical expansion until the eighteenth century. It is possible to 
argue that the emergence of Wahhabism as a religio-political force revived the Hanbali 
school of law. Wahhabism helped to extend the influence of the Hanbali madhhab in 
Africa, Egypt and India and above all in the Arabian Peninsula.2 Prior to the emergence of 
Wahhabism, the Hanbalism did not enjoy the popularity of other legal traditions. There are 
many reasons, which could partly explain this unpopularity of the Hanbali school in the 
Muslim world before the emergence of Wahhabism. Factors such as its aversion to personal 
opinion, a dismissal of the qiyas or legal analogy, which were only used as a last resort, and 
its perceived illiberality towards other traditions, are among many reasons which did not 
work in favour of Hanbali madhab in expanding its sphere of influence. 3 The role of 
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political patron is also important for expansion of religious ideas. Hanbali madhab hardly 
enjoyed strong and continuous political agency, until the House of Saud adapted 
Wahhabism. Hence, through the political presence of Wahhabism, Hanbali ideas started to 
be promulgated in the wider Islamic world. There are four major schools of Fiqh in Sunni 
Islam, Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi’i and Hanbali. Although the School of Hanbali is the 
smallest, it is seen to be the most conservative and strictest school of law in Sunni Islam.4 
 
The school was founded by Imam Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal (d855).5 He was 
known to be an uncompromising defender of Islamic orthodoxy. During the Abbasid 
period, an inquisition, Mihna, was established whereby scholars were scrutinised about 
certain aspects of their religious opinions and those who did not conform to the Mu’tazili’s 
dogma were punished.6 Imam Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal attained widespread 
respect by refusing to compromise his orthodox beliefs. 7 For this he was persecuted by Al-
Mamun, the Abbasid Caliph who backed the doctrine of the ‘creation of the Qur’an’ by the 
Mu’tazili school of thought.8 The Hanbali School of Jurisprudence was partly a counter-
                                                
4 Just in the same way that Shafi’i jurisprudence is considered to be more relaxed, the Hanbali School is seen 
as the most restrict among the Sunni Madhhabs. 
5 Bayly Winder , Arabia in the 19th Century: (London: Macmalian,1965), 9. 
6 Mu’tazilism believed that God’s action and creation is rational.  Hence, He would never allow istisfad al-
adilla (corruption of evidentiary proofs), that is contravention of the customary pattern of the way things 
happen in the physical universe. They affirm that God would not defraud His creatures by creating an 
irrational universe. All the laws of nature follow a coherent and logical structure designed and sustained by 
the rational creator. The Basra branch of M’utizila constructed metaphysics of atomistic occasionalism. 
Similar to Greek Atomists, they affirmed that physical reality consists of basic physical entities or atoms and 
attributes that give beings their shape, colour and other distinguishing qualities.  In that light, God creates the 
world in each instant by creating atoms and attributes that inhere in the physical substrates that atoms form. 
Therefore, creation is a continual divine process as every instant the world is recreated. In contrast to their 
orthodox rivals, they did not regard the creator as the cause of all that happens in the nature. Instead they 
allocated more power to human agency. They envisaged a capacity for human beings to make choices and to 
impose those choices on the world.  
For more information see Christopher Melchert, The religious policies of the caliphs from al-Mutawakkil to 
al-Muqtadir A H 232-295/AD 847-908 The journal of Islamic Law and Society, vol. 3, No. 3 1996, p116-342, 
p 322 and Richard Martin, Mark Woodward, Dawi Atamja (1997) Defenders of Reason In Islam, Mu’tazilism 
from Medieval School to a Modern Symbol, One World Press, Oxford and Harry Austyn Wolfson, The 
Philosophy of Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
7 Abdul Hakim I Al-Matroudi , The Hanbali School of law and ibn Taymiyyah: Conflict or Conciliation ( 
London: Routledge, 2006) 8.  
8 Regarding the book of the Qur’an, Mu'tazila kalam represented a relatively strong pro-reason reaction 
against the traditional account of the text. The traditional narrative interpreted the text as an integral part of 
God’s mind. Hence, it was co-eternal with God himself. This narrative was a pretext for the absolutist 
objectification of Qur’an. Within that context it was not possible to question any aspect of the book, since it 
was inseparable from God. The Mu’tazila rejected the orthodox narrative and warned about the absolutist 
conceptualisation of the text turning it to a second God, which is unquestionable and unchangeable. Instead, 
they suggested that Qur’an is a creation just like any other phenomena created by God. Thus, it should not 
necessarily express the essential nature of God more than any of his other creations. Hence, the text must be 
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reaction to Mu’tazili doctrine, which was based more upon ‘rationalism’ and independent 
reasoning.  
 
Ibn Hanbal is the author of Al-Musnad, the extensive encyclopaedia of the hadith 
collection, which contains approximately 80,000 hadiths.9 He was a student of Imam 
Shafi’i the founder of Shafi’i School of Jurisprudence.10 The Hanbali Jurisprudence is 
known to be the most literalist among the other schools of law in Sunni Islam. Accordingly, 
the Hanbali School limits the use of analogy and human reasoning, basing most legal 
verdicts on a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, and rejecting tools of 
adaption such as istihsan and maslaha.11 In literal terms, istihsan means to deem something 
preferable. Jurisprudentially, it means to see, independently, a method of exercising 
personal opinion in order to stay away from any rigidity and injustice that might result from 
a literal enforcement of the law.12 Maslaha is literally a cause or source of something good; 
in English often it is translated as ‘public interest’.13 It is seen as a legal instrument to 
maximise the public welfare and public interests.  
 
The Hanbali School actively opts for a weak hadith over a strong analogy.  Some Hanbali 
scholars believe that ijma (consensus of opinion) is only permissible between the Prophet’s 
companions.14 Furthermore, this school of law largely restricts analogical deduction, qiyas. 
As Jamal Nasir notes: 
 
Hanbali madhab derives its provisions from the Qur’an and the Sunna prevailing over 
any consensus, opinion or inference. It acknowledges without question an opinion 
given by a Companion of the Prophet if there is no dissension, otherwise the opinion 
                                                                                                                                               
subject to the interpretation. By applying reason they could extract the ‘right’ meanings within various 
situations. They regarded reason as the best hermeneutical warrants and the most efficient instrument to 
access Qur’an. Thus, if anything in the text seems contrary to reason, it must be reinterpreted in accordance 
with the faculty of reason.  
For more information see George Walsh, The Role of Religion in History (New Jersey, Transaction 
Publishers, 1998) 93-4. 
9 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad (2010) 80.  
10Imam Abu Abd Allah Shaf’i (767-820) wrote the first treaties of Jurisprudence in Islam. For more 
information see:  Christian D. Von Dehsen Philosophers and Religious Leaders (United States: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 1999), 173.   
11 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, (2010), 80.  
12 Ibid. 65 
13 Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel, Shari’a: Islamic law in the Contemporary Context (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 62. 
14 Abu Umr Faruq Ahmad (2010), 80.  
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of the Companion nearest to that of the Qur’an or the Sunna shall prevail. Quite often 
the Hanbalis do not indicate a preference where there are conflicting rulings by the 
Companions, but declare them all potentially valid .The traditions of the Prophet 
according to the Hanbalis are either valid or exhibit varying weaknesses which are 
nevertheless acknowledged.15  
 
Ibn Hanbal was famous for his dislike of ‘opinion’, ra’y. His adherence to the strict text of 
the Qur’an and the Sunna reached such a point that some prefer to include him among the 
traditionalists, muhaddith, rather than among those who qualified to use independent 
reasoning, mujtahit.16 Among those who considered Ibn Hanbal only as a traditionalist was 
ibn- al-Nadim who put him in the same category as Al-Bukhari. (Al-Bukhari was a famous 
traditionalist scholar who was known for his collection of hadith, his most important work 
is known as Sahih Bukhari). Ibn Abd al-birr does not even mention the biography of this 
Imam in his book al-Intiqa fi Fada’il al-Fuqaha (Selection of the virtues of the Imams of 
Jurisprudence).17 Neither al-Tabari in his book Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha (The Disagreement of the 
Jurists), nor Ibn Qutaybah in his book Kitab al-Ma’arif makes any mention of the Hanbali 
school of jurisprudence.18  
 
The ideas, which derived from the teaching of Ibn Hanbal, remained alive in central 
Muslim countries and particularly in Baghdad and Damascus.19 Hourani notes that: 
 
Despite the many divergences amongst them, those who traced their intellectual 
ancestry to Ibn Hanbal were united in their attempt to maintain what they regarded as 
the true Islamic teaching, that of those who adhered strictly to God’s revelation 
through the Prophet Muhammad. For them God was the God of the Qur’an and 
hadith, to be accepted and worshipped in His reality as He had revealed it. The true 
Muslim was he who had faith: not simply acceptance of the revealed God, but action 
in accordance with God’s revealed Will. All Muslims formed a community, which 
should remain united; no one should be excluded from it, except those who exclude 
                                                
15 J Nasir. Islamic Law of Personal Status (1990), 18. 
16 Subhi Rajab Mahmasani, Falsafat al-Tashri fi al-Islam: The Philosophy of Legislation in Islam (Beirut: Dar 
al-Ilm lil Malayin, 1961), 30. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Albert Habib Hourani, A History of the Arab People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2003), 79. 
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themselves by refusing to obey the proscriptions of religion, or spreading doctrines, 
which were incompatible with the truths revealed through the prophets.20 
 
In thirteenth century Syria under Mamluk rule, the Hanbali ideas were voiced by a forceful 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328).21Although there have been many notable scholars in 
the history of Hanbali Jurisprudence, Wahhabism is said to gain much inspiration from Ibn 
Taymiyya’s perspectives. Hence, it is imperative to pay some attention to the intellectual 
legacies of Ibn Taymiyya to deepen our understanding of Wahhabism within a historical 
context. Unfortunately, a comprehensive study of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas will be beyond the 
scope of this chapter.22 He was a prolific writer and there is a vast amount of literature 
assigned to his name.23 Hence, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, we can only 
highlight some of the important and relevant ideas that may have informed the religio-
political perspectives of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab.  
 
In brief, Ibn Taymiyya also called for a fundamentalist and puritanical approach to religion, 
a back to basics stance, which attempted to cleanse Islam of all polluting innovations, and 
instead focussed exclusively on the pristine values of the Qur’an and the Sunna.24 He 
militantly opposed beliefs and rituals including saint worship and pilgrimages to 
shrines.25Since he was a strong advocate of tawhid, he opposed giving any religious 
honours to shrines and places of worship and as he had a literalist interpretation of the 
Qur’an, he rejected any kind of ‘innovation’ in religion.26 He attacked prominent scholars 
such as the mystic Ibn Arabi and attempted to invalidate most of the customs that have been 
adopted by various Islamic traditions. 
 
                                                
20 Ibid.  
21 Ṣaliḥ, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṣaliḥ, al-Fiqh al-usrah inda al-imam shaykh al-Islam ibn Taymīyah fi al-
zawaj wa-atharih / iʻdad Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṣaliḥ al-Ṣaliḥ (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Malik Fahd 1996) 
22 See Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, Ibn Taymiyya and His Times (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
23 Some of his books include: Fundamentals of Enjoining Good & Forbidding Evil, Diseases of the Hearts and 
their Cures, The Concise Legacy, the Friends of Allah and the Friends of Shaytan and Kitab al Iman: The 
Book of Faith.  
24 Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2000), 242. 
25 al Yamani al Fakhrani (2012), 30-33. 
26 Ibid. 
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He was one of the most prominent takfiri thinkers of his time. In brief, takfir means to 
declare others to be kuffar, the punishment for which in strict Islamic terms is death.27 In 
other words, it is a form of legal ascription of unbelief excommunication to individuals and 
groups. 28 Throughout his career he declared many groups kuffar and stigmatised them as 
infidels.29 Accordingly, he declared Jihad against the Shiites, the Isma’ilis, Alawis, Druze 
and many Sufi sects and advocated placing restrictions on non-Muslims.30  
 
He classified the so-called ‘enemies of Islam’ into various groups. The first group of infidels 
were social groups such as Christians, with whom it was possible to make peace; they could 
share meals, and Muslims could marry their women. Their lives could be spared if they were 
made prisoners. Then there were the Muslims who deviated from the true path of Islam. For 
him no reconciliation was possible with them and they should be confronted if they refused to 
return to the true path. Then there were those who identified themselves as Muslims, but did 
not adhere to the ‘true’ Islamic values, they should be killed without mercy. And finally, 
there were those who rejected the true faith while still claiming to belong to it. Thus, they 
also should be killed under any given circumstances.31 Many scholars did not share his highly 
confrontational ideas. He faced some challenges from his contemporaries. 
 
 His main concern was to build ta’awun, a moral solidarity, on the basis of strict Islamic 
ideology and its enforcement in the society.32 In response to the threats facing the lands of 
Islam in his lifetime, he aimed to transform the moral solidarity of the Muslims into a 
united commitment to jihad against the kuffar. Hence, for him fighting in jihad was even 
more important than other Islamic obligations such as pilgrimage, fasting and prayer.33 It is 
reported that he was the man of the sword himself and he took part in some battles 
including fighting the crusaders.34  
                                                
27 Alison Pargeter, New Frontiers of Jihad: The Radical Islam in Europe (London: I B Tauris, 2008), 9.      
28 Barry M Rubin, Revolutionary and Reformers: Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Middle East, 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 13.  
29  Muḥammad Abu Zahrah Ibn Taymiyah : ḥayatuhu wa-aṣruh, arauhu wa-fiqhuh (Cairo: 1950). 
30 Al Ymani al Fakhrani (2012), 66-70. 
31 Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists, the Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern jihad (United 
Kingdom: DA CAPO press, 2006), 46-47. 
32 Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1994), 39.  
33 Ibid.  
34 As’ad AbuKhalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power (New York : 
Seven Stories Press, 2004), 54. 
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Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya’s militant ideas were not born in a social and historical vacuum. 
They were the products of the highly turbulent times that he was exposed to in the 
thirteenth century.  The political instability and insecurities of his time largely informed his 
religious perspective. Apart from the Mongol invasion, the Tartars and the Crusaders who 
were threatening the sovereignty and the integrity of the Muslim lands, he perceived many 
other social and religious ‘hazards’ threatening the ‘authentic’ nature of the Muslim 
society. During his time, many new religious practices, cults and belief systems inspired by 
eclectic mysticism and neo-platonic philosophies were ‘polluting’ what he considered was 
the ‘true’ Islam. Thus, he wanted all the ‘true’ Muslims to go back to the basics of the 
Islamic values and emancipate themselves from these ‘innovations’, which he perceived to 
be the greatest danger to Islam and the Islamic civilisation. Indeed the main issue was 
nothing short of preserving the ‘truth’ and how it should be promoted. He actively theorised 
and legitimised means of conflict in order to safeguard the ‘truth’.   
 
His method was an amalgamation of the selective use of traditions or Sunna and a direct 
use of the Qur’an.35 Some scholars have argued that he relied heavily on a literalist use of 
the Qur’an. By employing a selection of the Qur’anic verses he attempted to give a quality 
to his religio-political discourse, which his followers found compelling. After all, if he used 
many of the words of God and direct Qur’anic references, then his ideas could be perceived 
as more authentic than those of others whose discussions were ‘corrupted’ by man-made 
reason and interpretation.36 
 
He did not believe in the separation of state and religion and he regarded the state as a 
natural agency to safeguard Islam. Ibn Taymiyya argued that, Islamic duties such as amr 
Bi’l- ma‘ruf WA nahi al-munkar (encouraging good and forbidding evil) could not be 
fulfilled without state power. He also affirmed that other Islamic duties such as jihad, 
implementing Islamic Shari‘a and the realisation of Islamic social justice required the 
power of the state. He argued that religion needed the state to realise itself and affirmed that 
political power was necessary for religious excellence.37  
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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He also highlighted the significance of the security and military functions of the Islamic 
state. Hence, he regarded the state as a coercive means to expand and spread the faith 
beyond the boundaries of dar al-Islam (realm of Islam). Hawkesworth and Kogan note: 
 
 Ibn Taymiyya’s Islam is one, which is deeply motivated by insecurity and fear that 
the faith and its polity are under siege and about to be destroyed. This insecurity more 
than anything else is the cause for his image of the state as an Islamic Leviathan that 
exercises absolute power within and ferociously attacks threats from without.38  
 
What makes Ibn Taymiyya important is not only his intolerant and illiberal attitude, which 
later on influenced the Wahhabi discourse; it was also his rigid recipes of ‘truth 
management’. He provided militant strategies with which to physically and ideologically 
confront anything that does not correspond to ‘true’ Islam.  His method of returning to 
‘true’ Islam could be accommodated mainly through conflict. His call for jihad was not 
limited to issuing fatwas against intruders such as Mongols. He invited the ‘true’ Muslims 
to physically confront their fellow Muslims who failed to internalise ‘the true path’ in order 
to save Islam. He developed both the strategies and the means of protecting the ‘truth’. He 
also wrote extensive treatises to specify how the nonconformists should be treated. He 
created various categories of kuffar, and stigmatised many social groups as infidels.39  
 
He measured the value of a person’s life upon his or her method of conceptualisation and 
internalisation of the ‘truth’. Following the notions of the oneness and the finality of the 
‘truth’ he was against any new adaptions and developments. He felt that innovation would 
pollute the ‘truth’ and would put it on an evolutionary path such that in the course of time it 
may transform its authentic nature. Therefore, he was determined to push the umma into a 
situation whereby fellow Muslims could experience the truth as it had been revealed for the 
first time.  
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 See, John L. Esposito,  Unholy War :  Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
 Tahir Abbas, Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience (London, Routledge, 
2011) 30.  
 Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1994), 40. 
 Mansoor Jassem Alshams,  Islam and Political Reform in Saudi Arabia :  The Quest for Political Change and 
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His vision was looking back rather than looking ahead. He created this utopian vision that 
was chained in the passage of time. The real essence of truth was left there, hence if the 
‘truth’ had to be realised, one had to embrace the past in every possible sense of the term. 
The customs, the narratives and the values of the time of the revelation had to be readapted 
for the present and all new ‘innovations’ and perspectives had to be removed from 
collective Islamic consciousness. These ideas profoundly affected the Wahhabi discourse, 
which will be critically analysed in the following sections. 
 
Embryonic Construction of Wahhabi Narratives 
 
As was suggested in the previous chapter, narrative construction in this study refers to the 
creation of knowledge to serve power in the broadest sense of the term. As was suggested 
before, narrative construction refers to a set of ideas built on the macro truth of Islam to 
assign the power of representation of the ‘truth’ to a certain individual or a group of people. 
In other words, it refers to chronicles, concepts, symbols and doctrines which are formed to 
justify the eligibility and the legitimacy of certain agencies to articulate the ‘truth’ and its 
power relations. It is part of an empowering process, which can provide the power of 
representation over a wider belief system. The construction of narratives by Muhammad Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab’s was the first step towards a more complex politics of truth management, 
which was later adapted by the modern Saudi State.   
 
Given the importance of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s perspectives in forming the 
ideological basis of a system, which claims to have the monopoly over ‘truth’, it is imperative 
to explore Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s ideas in detail. Although today Wahhabism is 
considered to be a distinct belief system, its foundational ideas were hardly original. 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s writings were primarily concerned with rituals of worship 
rather than adding new theological, philosophical and jurisprudential dimensions into the 
existing religious framework of the time. The past was both his frame of reference and his 
destination. Primarily his ideas were spinning around one key concept, ‘return’ to the 
religious practices of the salaf as-salih. The Golden Age of Islam was his ideal destiny. He 
took measures to find ways to take Muslims back to a time when ‘truth’ was not corrupted by 
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bid'ah and man-made innovations would not constitute a gap between Allah and his faithful 
followers.    
 
Accordingly, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s perspectives did not have any base in 
philosophy. In fact he had some fundamental issues with philosophy, since it could pave the 
way for alienation from that ultimate ‘truth’, which had been already provided for Muslims 
through revelations.  He actively attempted to avoid ‘earthly’ systems of logic and analytical 
tools to give more weight to his religious framework. He believed that man-made instruments 
of thought would corrupt the relationship between the faithful believer and his creator. He 
was not interested in accommodating his perspective to a rational framework and he was 
hardly impressed by ‘reason’, which he viewed to be a mere construction. 
 
 His cosmological understanding of the universe was also based on the notion of an uncreated 
creator.  For him, every essential thing that we need to know is brought to us through 
revelation. Therefore, he never offered any fresh theological treatise and he was strongly 
against any attempts to philosophise religion. Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s criticism of 
taqlid (blind imitation) and his support for ijtihad (independent reasoning) have given him 
the title of a ‘reformer’. Nonetheless, one can argue that in practice he was too preoccupied 
with Qur’anic absolutism to embrace independent reasoning. 
 
Qur’anic absolutism refers to the belief that all the narratives and the conceptual properties of 
the Qur’an are absolute and independent of historicity, time and space. Its truth is sourced 
from the divine creator who is the highest authority in the universe. The Qur’an, which is the 
revealed word of God, is superior to any form of knowledge and in no circumstances should 
man-made law and logic compromise it.   
 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab was a religious scholar who aimed to transform the social 
edifice of Muslim society and create an Islamic utopia on earth. Unlike most visionary 
thinkers whose utopias were located somewhere in the future, his preferred destiny was in the 
past. For him the truth, which was the remedy, the power and the source of all wisdom, was 
already given to humanity, but Muslims had deviated from the right path and lost their 
connection to that divine revelation. Hence, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s task was to 
create a social programme to make Muslims return to what he considered was the ultimate 
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realisation of human consciousness. His programme of social engineering was an attempt to 
re-format Muslim consciousness so that it corresponded with the original message of Islam.  
 
Although he only resorted to the text of the Qur’an to rescue the ‘truth’, he never suggested 
any hermeneutic strategy to reinterpret the text. He adhered to an extreme Qur’anic literalism 
with minimal scope for any philosophical elucidation that would entail any abstract 
intellectualisation of Islam. It is possible to assert that his main ‘interpretational theory’ was 
in principle against any form of interpretation.  
 
The Qur’an and the Sunna were given indispensable roles because they were directly based 
on ‘divine laws’.40 Following the lines of Ibn Taymiyya, who condemned the use of Greek 
logic and the commentaries of scholars as means of seeking truth, he invited Muslims to put 
the Qur’an and the Sunna above every other available source to find the truth. For this reason 
the ‘holy texts’ had superiority over jurisprudence, which was supposed to be a mere 
interpretation of divine law.41 Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s only resorted to 
interpretation when the Qur’anic sources were ambiguous. In such cases he resorted to the 
sayings of the Companions. However, in every case the verdicts had to fully correspond to 
the Qur’an and the Sunna. 42 
 
Unlike the religious reforms of Protestantism, which were partly based on new approaches to 
theology and the restructuring of the Church to meet the socio-political particularities of the 
time, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s was determined to go back to the very basis of Islam. 
He sought to create a situation in which the ‘ultimate truth’ of Islam would prevail again. He 
sought strategies to re-inject the Islamic soul with the ‘truth’ and eliminate all the decadence 
which was paralysing the Islamic anatomy. His anti- interpretational perspectives implied that 
there could not be various interpretation of the ‘truth’, because it is inherently ‘one’ and 
‘absolute’. Hence, there had to be a ‘unity’ of understanding of the truth of Islam.  
 
                                                
40 See, Aḥmad ʻAbd al-Ghafur ʻAṭṭār, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (Riyadh:  Imam Mohamed Bin Saud 
Islamic University ,  1979 ). 
 
41 Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: I.B.Tauris, 
2007), 96. 
42 See, Imam Jalal Abualrub, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab: His Life Story And Mission ( Madinah Publishers 
and Distributors ,  2003 ). 
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He affirmed that the only true version of Islam is to be found in the literal writings of the 
Qur’an and then the Sunna.43 Hence, he was more interested in the ‘recovery’ rather than the 
‘discovery’ of the ‘truth’. His strategies of ‘truth recovery’ implied the standardisation of 
collective practice and the homogenisation of collective consciousness in accordance with his 
understanding of the ‘holy text’. He strongly criticised religious scholars who, dependent 
upon classical books, regarded them as a source of truth equal to the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
 
Unlike the other major Islamic reformers who emerged after him, he had no preoccupation 
with modernity and was not concerned about how to accommodate Islam in the modern 
world. In other words, Wahhabism in its original shape was not exposed to those products of 
western modernity such as industrialisation, nationalism, liberalism, capitalism and 
colonialism.  Indeed, western colonialism and the cultural hegemony of the west were not 
any of his concern either. Of course, in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was still 
in place and the West was not yet in a position to exert control over Muslim territories.  
Hence, he never offered any strategies to prepare Islam conceptually or ideologically to 
accommodate those gradual emerging forces, which were going to deeply influence the 
Islamic world for centuries to come. This was in contrast to later Islamic revivalist 
movements, which were preoccupied with the challenges of modernity. His ideas implied that 
reunion with the final truth would be the best and only immune system for the umma at any 
time. Hence it was not the Islam, which had to be flexible to accommodate the emerging 
social changes, but Muslims themselves had to return to the ‘empowering’ zone of ‘truth’.  
 
He asserted that Muslims were still living in the age of jahalyeh (ignorance) and the ‘final’ 
message of the supreme creator was polluted through generations of innovation and 
deviation. In principle, everything that had been borrowed from ‘non-Islamic’ cultures and 
traditions to make Islam applicable in different places and ages were now considered as 
‘shirk’ (polythesism).  
 
According to Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the Qur’an is the final constitution of the 
‘truth’ and it has to be internalised word by word. There is nothing beyond the literal truth of 
the Qur’an, and it cannot be questioned by any other sources since it is a direct word of God. 
                                                
43 M. Parvizi Amineh Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, The Greater Middle East in Global Politics (Leiden: Brill, 
2007) 213.   
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Therefore, the Sunna is only second in importance to the Qur’an. Moreover, ijma is limited to 
the first three centuries of Islam. The restriction on the liberating and important Islamic 
doctrine of ijma and the rejection of the open gate of ijtihad are among the ideological 
differences between the Wahhabi doctrine and later Arab reformists such as Muhammad 
Abdu.44 
 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab condemned many traditions, practices and beliefs, which 
were an integral part of the religious and cultural consciousness of the Muslim community.45 
He condemned all Muslims who did not embrace his religious reform agenda and stigmatised 
the nonconformists as ‘unbelievers’ and ‘kuffar’. 46 For example, in his Kitab al-Tawhid (The 
Book of Monotheism) he uses various Qur’anic verses and hadiths to back up his argument 
regarding the fallacy of intercession. Although intercession was a common practice among 
Muslims he labelled it as ‘un-Islamic’. 47  
 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab shared the views of Ibn Taymiyya on the shrines and the 
graves of saints and religious leaders. He stated that ‘exaggeration in the graves of righteous 
persons tends them to become idols worshipped besides Allah48. As he always did, he 
attempted to legitimise his claims by referring to selected hadiths. For example, in Chapter 
twenty-one of Kitab al-Tawhid, he refers to two hadiths from the Prophet, which criticise the 
formation of any shrines for intercession.  The first one was about Muhammad’s observation 
of women who visited the graves reported by Ibn Abbas. ‘Allah’s Messenger cursed the 
women who visited the graves, also cursed those who set up mosques and lights over 
graves.’49 The second hadith, which was reported by Imam Malik, is Muhammad’s request to 
Allah, as Muhammad contemplates his own death. ‘O Allah! Never turn my grave into an 
idol to be worshipped. Allah’s wrath is intensified on a people who turn their Prophet’s 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45  See, Arshad Khan,  Islam, Muslims, and America :  Understanding the Basis of Their Conflict ( United States: 
Algora Publishing , 2003), 235-6. 
46 Ahmad al Kateb, Al fekr As-siyasi al-Wahhabi (Cairo:  Mactabe Madbouli 2008), 20-23. 
47 For example he refers to verse (2:256) that, ‘Whoever disbelieves in taghut and believes in Allah then he 
has grasped the most trustworthy handhold’. Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s believed that at-taghut is 
inclusive of all that is worshiped other than Allah. 
See: Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid: The Book of Monotheism, (Saudi Arabia, Darussalam 
Publication, 1996), 20.  
48 Ibid. 86.  
49 Ibid. 87.  
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graves into Masjid’.50 Therefore, for Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, visiting the graves of 
the ‘righteous people’, including the grave of the Prophet, is an act of intercession, which 
violates the oneness of truth. He opposed the excessive honouring of the Prophet, a practice 
that he regarded as seriously violating the oneness of truth. He even regarded the celebrating 
of the Prophet’s birthday as an excess. 51  
 
For him the act of tawassul (intercession) could promote the belief that there are agencies 
capable of change and control other than Allah. He regarded Allah as the omnipotent and 
omnipresent uncreated creator in absolute control over the universe. Hence, anyone 
attempting to attribute the qualities of Allah to other agencies is in principle questioning 
Allah’s absolute power. Any thought which questioned the ‘monopoly’ of Allah over the 
notions of ‘change’ and ‘transition’ is a mere act of blasphemy. Every process of change and 
transition has to be seeded with the acknowledgement that Allah is the ultimate agency 
behind it. Thus, Muslims have to accept their fate since God has determined everything. The 
cause of every action and event cannot be challenged or questioned, as it is the intention of 
God. Like many of his predecessors he had an ambiguous position about the notion of free 
will. On the one hand Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab believed in an extreme fatalism where 
everything has been pre-planned by Allah and on the other hand, he held fellow Muslims 
responsible for their actions.  
 
He also strongly condemned incantation and seeking blessing through any agency but Allah. 
For him seeking invocation and protection from anything other than Allah can be translated 
as an attempt to find a partner for God. Thus, seeking help and refuge from anything other 
than Allah and making vows to anything other than Allah constitutes acts of shirk.52  He 
refers to the hadith reported by Jabir ibn Abdullah that ‘Whoever meets Allah (on the Day of 
Judgment) not having associated anyone with Him (in worship), shall enter Paradise; and 
whoever meets Him having committed shirk in any way will enter the Hell-fire.’53 In the 
seven chapters of the Book of Monotheism he repeatedly warns about the sinful nature of 
intercession and condemns the act. He also condemns the making of an oath to any being 
                                                
50 Ibid.  
51 However graves maybe visited to show respect for the dead and remind themselves of the nearness of 
death, and Muslims may pray for the dead. But they should not resort to the dead to intervene and intercede 
with God. 
 
53 Ibid, 33. 
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other than Allah. He stated that it is better ‘to swear by Allah while lying than to swear by 
other than Him while speaking the truth.’54 
 
It is possible to argue that ‘exclusion’ was an unavoidable aspect of his narrative. For 
example, those who engaged in tawassul or strayed from the literal text of the Qur’an or the 
Sunna were excluded from the ‘true’ Muslim community and would face the consequences. 
Clearly, any form of exclusionary doctrine cannot be instigated without its own antithesis. Its 
identity, mode of thought and medium of expression are conditioned by the particularities of 
the entities and the narratives that they attempt to oppose. Hence, it thrives on the binaries of 
‘us versus them’ or ‘truth versus falsehood’ without acknowledging any middle ground.  
Exclusionary doctrines are often derived from collectivising social constructions such as race, 
class, ideology and religion. Often individuals or groups who adhere to exclusionary 
narratives claim to be on the side of the ‘truth’ and assume themselves to be enriched by 
higher ‘moral’ standards. This very much describes the anatomy of exclusion in Wahhabi 
doctrine. 55 
 
For example, in keeping with his objections to tawassul, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab 
condemns   all mystics, Sufi orders, saints and Shiite Imams, because they claim a ‘special 
relationship’ with Allah.56  Their techniques and approaches in their relationship with Allah 
were strongly condemned and regarded as sacrilegious. Practices including ecstatic group 
chanting, music, dancing, individual ecstasy and those who engaged in worship around 
sacred stones or high places were obviously labelled as the practises of idolatrous 
polytheists.57 He strongly criticised the Shiite faith and the general edifice of Sufi orders. He 
considered their practices as ‘innovations’ and alien from the form of Islamic truth, which 
was advocated by the Prophet.  His takfir verdicts were not only limited to the ‘deviant’ Sufis 
and Shiites. In fact, many Sunni traditions were also considered to be decadent.  Many of the 
Sunni practices, which had been part of their religious and cultural life for centuries, were 
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attacked and stigmatised as ‘un-Islamic’ as well. 58His ‘reform’ mandate was not limited to 
doctrinal issues, he also attacked many everyday habits such as smoking tobacco, wearing 
silk, fortune telling, telling beads and wearing talismans. The shaving of beards, the wearing 
of robes that failed to show the ankle, and the use of rosaries were declared illegal as well. 59 
 
The focus of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab was not only the individual, it was the 
community, and what he declared the community should do, was to implement the laws of 
Allah. Since the purpose of community was to fully implement God’s word, obedience to the 
ruler and imam is an absolute obligation on the individual unless the ruler orders him to 
transcend the rule of God. A ruler can impose ‘true’ Islamic practices on his people. He can 
force individuals to implement the duties that God ordered them to do. For example, the ruler 
can force people to go to prayer on time, make them fast and pay the religious taxes zakat. 
Hence, conformity was a precondition for collectivisation of morality in accordance with the 
true religion.  
 
For Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, even external appearance and behaviour was a visible 
expression of inward faith. Thus, according to him everything including prayer, dresses and 
behaviour becomes a public statement of whether one is a ‘true’ Muslim. Because practising 
true Islamic duties is visible in perceptible ways, the Muslim community can measure the 
quality of a person’s faith by observing their actions. Therefore, it becomes the responsibility 
of each Muslim to examine the behaviour of their fellow Muslims in order to correct them if 
they go wrong.  Hence adhering to Islamic practices is not a matter of choice, but a set of 
compulsory measures enforced by the community and of course, the leadership. Muslims 
who do not obey the rules would face exclusionary measures and punishments for not 
respecting the laws of God on earth.  
 
Since he believed that the true Caliphate had ceased to exist after the death of the four caliphs 
who followed the Prophet, he felt a true Muslim state should be governed by the partnership 
of the amir and an imam to apply the laws of Shari‘a correctly. This was the theoretical basis 
for the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is based on a hybrid system of control.  
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For Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, there could be no compromise about the absolute 
morality of the Prophet, the verdicts of the Qur’an or the existence of Shari‘a law. The truth 
had to be implemented at any cost and if  ‘heretical’ Muslims refused to turn from their 
‘idolatrous practices’, he declared jihad against them.60 Thus, in practice he developed a 
religious and ideological right to declare jihad on ‘enemies’; people who identified 
themselves as equally Muslim as the followers of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. 
Accordingly, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab justified the need for jihad against all kuffar 
and classified the ‘deviant’ Muslims as nothing short of infidels. 61 
 
Socio-Political Conditions in Najd before Wahhabism  
 
Having explored the ideas of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, it is imperative to briefly 
explore the conditions in which his ideas were formed. Wahhabism emerged in the region of 
Najd within the Arabian Peninsula. The region is mainly made of a rocky plateau sloping 
eastward from the mountains of the Hejaz. On the southern, northern, and eastern borders, it 
is next to the sandy deserts of al-Nafud, al-Dahna, and the Rub al-Khali. The population of 
these settlements was highly scattered, except for those groups living in the fertile oases 
strung along the escarpment of Jabal Tuwayq and the al-Aramah plateau.62 If there was 
enough rain, settlers could cultivate dates, barley and millet, and trade them for livestock such 
as camels, sheep and horses. Farmers and Bedouins exchanged their limited crops and 
livestock with traders from Syria, Iraq and Yemen in return for pots, swords and coffee. 63 
Before the advent of Wahhabism, the region had never enjoyed any political or social 
significance as such. It was extremely isolated and hardly any external forces had any interest 
in it; this was mainly due to the harsh living conditions. Unlike Hejaz, which was historically 
more cosmopolitan and prosperous, Najd never enjoyed an extensive intellectual, cultural and 
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economic interaction with the outside world. It was mainly seen as a desert wasteland with 
minimum productivity.   
 
Gradually, after the formative years of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula lost its political 
significance. Nonetheless, millions of Muslims from the new Islamic centres kept going back 
there to fulfil their religious duty. Hence, the inhabitants of certain parts of the peninsula 
enjoyed continuous interaction with fellow Muslims who were visiting the holy sites of 
Islam. However, apart from some pilgrims from Iran and Iraq most other caravans avoided 
the routes through Najd. Most of the travellers from North Africa, Egypt and Turkey came 
via the Red Sea and from the vast Indian Ocean basin, Muslim travellers sailed under 
monsoon winds to Yemen and Red Sea ports.64 Thus, Najd enjoyed minimal interaction with 
the outside world.  
 
Any major Islamic empire had hardly ever ruled Najd since the Abbasids in the tenth century. 
Even the Ottomans, who made one of the largest empires of the world, which stretched from 
Baghdad to Budapest, had minimal reasons to invade and control the area. It did not have any 
economic, strategic or political significance for the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. The 
rulers of the Ottoman Empire regarded the Arabian Peninsula as an insignificant and rather 
primitive zone whose only importance was the holy sites such as Mecca and Medina. Yet one 
of the main sources of religious legitimacy for the Ottoman Sultans was the ‘guardianship’ of 
the holy sites. Thus, as long as their religious status remained intact and their caravans could 
safely travel through the region, they were satisfied with the arrangements coordinated by 
their proxy powers in the area.65 Although Ottoman political domination was tangible in 
areas such as the Hejaz, Najd for the most part was free from the intervention of the regional 
powers of the time. 
 
The inhabitants of Najd were partly nomadic and partly settled, with the residents of the 
settlements inhabiting a number of small oases.66 The general scale of political power was 
small in terms of both the population and the geographical areas that were under outside 
control. There were considerable political differences between the nomadic and settled 
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populations, each was characterised by a fairly small scale of political organisation’67.  The 
major differences between the nomadic and settled units related to the degree in which 
kinship figured as a factor in social relations. 68 
 
Before the emergence of the Wahhabi order, petty tyrants mainly ruled the small oasis-states. 
Insecurity, political instability and ongoing conflict between the oases seemed to be part of 
everyday life and conflict did not seem to have resulted in any tangible political evolution.69 
Although some temporary alliances used to be made between various settlements and tribes, 
there were endless raids and counter raids between rival entities.  Conflict seemed to be 
omnipresent and most tribes were affected by constant rivalry and antagonism.  For example, 
al-Uyayna, which was the hometown of the founder of Wahhabism, faced conflicts nearly 
every three years.70 Indeed, continuous instability, conflict, insecurity, impoverishment and 
isolation were prevailing factors, which had their effect on the religio-political perspectives 
that were produced in the region. In this situation, Wahhabism emerged to transform the 
Arabian Peninsula, the birthplace of Islam, for centuries to come. The ideas, which were 
cultivated in this region, seeded the eventual creation of the modern Saudi state; Muhammad 
Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s religious perspectives were to become the basis for a way of life for 
millions of people for generations to come.  
 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab was born into an impoverished tribe known as the Beni 
Temin, who were mainly famous for the quality of their horseflesh.71 Before the emergence 
of Wahhabism there was a very limited history of Islamic education in the area. Only in some 
of the settlements did certain family lineages specialise in maintaining and transmitting the 
Islamic tradition. The main focus of learning was applied jurisprudence. The majority of local 
scholars were followers of the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence while only a few followed 
other schools such as Shafa’i and Maliki.72 Accordingly, even before the advent of the 
Wahhabi mission, the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence was influential in the area. 
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For theses reasons, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab had modest access to Islamic education 
while he was still in his youth. During this time, he received his education primarily from his 
father who was a Hanbali jurist.73 It is reported that, as a child, he had a high capacity for 
studying the Qur’an, and by the age of ten he could recite the whole Qur’an by memory. 74 
His family had already produced many notable Hanbali jurists and theologians. His 
grandfather, Sulayman ibn Ali ibn Musharraf, was also a recognised judge in Najd. His uncle, 
Ibrahim ibn Suleiman, was both a judge and a mufti in the settlements around al-Uyaynah.75 
When Abdul Wahhab was about twenty he moved to Medina where he could take his 
educational path further. In Medina he studied under Ibrahim ibn Sayf, a known admirer of 
Ibn Taymiyya and an Indian hadith scholar Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi Al-Sindi’s theological 
orientation was Shafi’i, but he also respected Ibn Taymiyya.  
 
There are various reports that Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab travelled widely before going 
back to Najd. There are conflicting narratives.76 This study does not seek to find a resolution 
for the conflicting narratives of his journeys; it is enough to conclude that Muhammad Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab almost certainly spent part of his life outside Najd. It is possible to assume 
that his travelling and wider exposure to the regions beyond Najd may have informed some 
of his religious perspectives.   
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It is reported that after his travels he went to Huraymila, where his father had a residence. 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab seemed to be productive in Huraymila, as that is where he 
wrote his best-known treaty, Kitab al-Tawhid (The Book of Monotheism), which continues 
to act as the canonical text for the Wahhabi religious order. 77 However, his religious 
opinions caused him some problems even to the point that he had to leave the settlement of 
Huraymila and repatriate to al-Uyaynah. It was in this area that Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
Wahhab managed to secure the protection of a new ruler, Uthman ibn Hamid ibn 
Muammar. Now with the political and military support of this petty tyrant, Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab was in a better position to promote his ideas of instigating ‘reform’.  
 
In al-Uyaynah, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab committed himself to a course of 
controversial actions, which defined his religious dogma at that early stage. Following his 
determination to achieve ‘unity’, he started to undermine anything that he considered would 
contradict his understanding of Islam. He started his efforts by physically shattering 
anything that symbolised a violation of the unity. For example, in the area of al-Uyaynah 
there were some trees, which were considered to be blessed by some ‘super material’ 
powers, people hung various items in the branches of the trees hoping they would receive 
blessings or good luck from them. For Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, this was a direct 
violation of the tawhid. He gave orders to cut down the ‘sacred’ trees and personally took 
part in destroying what he considered to be enemies of the Islamic unity. Then he destroyed 
the shrine of Zayd ibn al-Khattab, an early associate of the Prophet and a brother of the 
second Sunni Caliph.   
 
Many people considered that shrine holy but Ibn Abd al-Wahhab razed it to the ground, 
asserting there should be no appeal for blessing to any agency but God. He proclaimed that 
only Allah should be subject to reverence, not human beings. The shrine played an 
important role in the religious life of the community, and was a symbolic connection 
between the locals and the historic origin of their faith. Nonetheless, despite the physical 
resistance of the local population, he destroyed the shrine. He also ordered an adulterous 
woman to be stoned to death. It is reported that his teachings, which were often translated 
into controversial actions, galvanised the local clerical community and soon a circle of 
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people who had religious, financial and political weight started to pressurise Ibn Muammar 
to end his support for Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. 
  
Ibn Muammar was informed that if he maintained his ties with Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
Wahhab, he would risk political instability and even worse some serious financial losses. 
He was told that he should either kill him or send him into exile, otherwise his tax revenues 
would be jeopardised. Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab asked the ruler to show his true faith 
by maintaining his support for the message of unity. Nonetheless, soon Ibn Abdul Wahhab 
had to leave the settlement and find a new base of support. This time he accepted the 
political patronage of Mohammed Ibn Saud in the settlement of Diriyah. 
 
The Saudi Leadership and the Expansion of Wahhabism  
 
It is possible to argue that Wahhabism could never register as a considerable religio-political 
narrative without the effective leadership of the House of Saud. The House of Saud has acted 
as the political engine broadening the Wahhabi sphere of influence within and beyond the 
Arabian Peninsula. It provided the indispensable agency for the religious interpretations of 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. It also provided an effective mechanism whereby 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s rigid religious perspectives could be translated into power. 
The House of Saud created a framework for ‘ideologisation’ of Wahhabi narratives, which 
until today functions as the basis of the modern Saudi state. 
 
When ibn Al-Wahhab reached Diriyah in 1740, it was an insignificant settlement in Najd; the 
small population consisted of farmers, artisans, religious figures and slaves. Some sources 
suggest that the settlement did not have more than seventy households, and since 1727 a 
member of the Al Saud clan Mohammed Ibn Saud had been the ruler.78  The origin of the al -
Saud family is often attributed to Masalikh Banu wa’il , a tribal section of the north Arabian 
camel herding Anayza tribe .This association with the Al Saud family remains dubious since 
there is no proof that this tribal group contributed to the family’s expansion in later years in 
Arabia 79 Some scholars have suggested that the Saud family was a sedentary group who 
founded a settlement in Diriyah. The Saudi leadership in the eighteenth century corresponded 
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to a traditional form of governance, which was common in many settlements in the area and 
the wider Arabian Peninsula.80 
 
There is much speculation as to what drove them to become the political engine of 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s teaching. There have been debates on how and why this 
union was made between a relatively insignificant tribe and a controversial religious figure 
who had been expelled from two neighbouring settlements. Al-Rasheed analyses the Al 
Saud’s motives and suggests that the lack of tribal prestige and wealth were the two 
motivating factors behind the Al Saud family in giving protection to Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
Wahhab. Al-Rasheed notes that Al Saud lacked the identifiable tribal origin, which could 
have given a strong association with a tribal confederation similar to that of Bani Khalid of 
Hasa. Furthermore, the Saudi family lacked any surplus wealth. Hence, they did not have the 
economic capacity to expand their influence gradually to other settlements.81  
 
Given the Al Saud’s tribal, political and economic limitations, it is possible to assume that 
they saw the Wahhabi religious mandate as an opportunity to give them a ‘super material’ 
legitimacy as well as ‘earthly’ political and financial gains. There are also some popular 
narratives suggesting that the political and financial expansion of Al Saud was only a 
serendipity, which emerged out of the sincere commitment of Al Saud to the religious cause 
of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s.82 It is impossible to determine the inner motives of Al 
Saud for sheltering Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s, but there is no doubt that the political 
marriage between the two changed the fate of House of Saud for centuries to come. 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s provided the ideological framework, which transformed a 
small and insignificant tribe into the eventual rulers of the modern Saudi State. The pact 
between the two paved the way for the establishment of a religious emirate, which soon 
started to assume political significance. 
 
After the aforementioned pact between the House of Saud and Abd-al-Wahhab, the army of 
Muhammad Ibn Saud, equipped with new ideological force, started offensive campaigns to 
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take over towns and villages in Najd. By 1765 most of Najd was under the political and 
religious domination of the Saudi forces. The Wahhabi-Saudi co-operation did not come to 
an end after the death of Muhammad Ibn Saud in 1765.  His son Abd al Aziz took over the 
responsibility of the Amir and became the new champion of the Wahhabi cause, and the 
expansion continued. In 1801 Saudi forces invaded Karbala one of the most important cities 
in Shiite Islam. The invasion of the Shiite city was recorded as being particularly brutal, as 
many Shiite Muslims were killed at the hands of the Saudi-Wahhabi forces. They destroyed 
the religious monuments and grave markers that were being used for prayer to Shiite saints 
and for votive rituals, which the invaders considered acts of polytheism. 
 
 By razing the objects of Shiite rituals the Wahhabi forces claimed to replicate the act of the 
Prophet who destroyed the idols in the Ka‘ba in Mecca upon his victorious return to Mecca 
from Medina in 628. In 1804 they invaded the city of Medina, the second most important city 
in the Islamic umma. They repeated their actions in Karbala by destroying many sites, which 
were considered as holy by many Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The Wahhabi forces also made 
an attempt to despoil the grave of the Prophet. In the following year they occupied the city of 
Mecca and killed many Muslims. Before this attack, the House of Hashem had held the 
traditional title Sharif of Mecca, custodian of the holy cities. Although they were nominally 
sovereigns, after 1517 they became subordinate to the authority of the Ottoman Empire and 
ruled with the blessing of the Sultan.83  
 
These actions shook the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. After all, the Sultan gained his 
legitimacy from his guardianship of the holiest sites of the Islamic world. The Wahhabi 
advances undermined both the religious and the political reputation of the Ottoman Sultan. 
Apart from two brief periods, under the rebel Ali Bey (1770-1773)84 and a decade of Saudi-
Wahhabi rule (1803/4-18120) by the House of Hashim, the Ottoman governors maintained 
their control over Hejaz until the late the nineteenth century.85Although the Sultan was under 
tremendous pressure to recapture Mecca and Medina, the Ottoman Empire was not in a 
position to commission another military expedition. The empire had been the process of 
decline for about two centuries and its military was infirm and overextended. European 
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opponents were already exerting pressure on the Ottoman frontiers. In this light, the 
Ottomans commissioned an ambitious Albanian born general, Muhammad Ali (1769 –
1849)86, who was in charge of their semi-independent garrison in Egypt to defend their 
interests. The general handed over the job to his son Tursun who led the campaign into Hejaz 
in 1816, but Mohammed Ali later joined the expedition to lead it in person.87 Meanwhile, 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab died in 1792 and Abd al Aziz died shortly before taking over 
Mecca, at which point his son Saud ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud took over the 
movement. In 1814 he too died and his son Abdullah Ibn Saud took command and faced the 
Egyptians.  
 
The recapturing of Mecca and Medina did not require much effort for the Egyptian forces.  
Having lost Hejaz, Abdullah Ibn Saud decided to retreat to Najd and take the battle to his 
stronghold. Mohammed Ali also decided to chase the Wahhabi-Saudi forces there. He 
commissioned another army led by his other son Ibrahim to finalise the collapse of the first 
Saudi state. Although Saudi forces resisted the Egyptian offensive for a while, their 
opponents outnumbered them and the Wahhabi zeal could no longer mobilise the Saudi 
forces to overcome the modern Egyptian army. In village after village Ibn Saud watched the 
triumph of the Egyptian forces and finally he gave in and Diriyah fell in 1818.88 The conduct 
of the victors was recorded as being brutal and the invading forces captured most of the Saudi 
family. Abdullah Ibn Saud, the leader of the family was sent to Istanbul to be executed. 89 
The death of Abdullah Ibn Saud brought an end to the so-called ‘first Saudi state’ and with it 
the first attempt for the official conversion of the Arabian Peninsula to Wahhabism had 
failed.90  
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Although the Wahhabi-Saudi forces were paralysed, it was only a matter of time before the 
House of Saud began to rule again. In 1824 Turki ibn Abdullah recaptured Riyadh from the 
Egyptian forces. This was the second major watershed in the political history of the House of 
Saud. The military triumph of Turki ibn Abdullah was considered the beginning of the so-
called ‘Second Saudi State’. The conditions for the recapturing of Riyadh emerged when the 
Egyptian forces decided to strengthen their position in Hejaz where their main geo-political 
interest was based. Hence they did not remain in Najd.  
 
The House of Saud maintained its previous ties with Wahhabism. However, this time the 
territorial gain was not considerable and only the area of Najd became subject to Saudi-
Wahhabi control. The most successful phase of the Second State was between 1843 and 1865 
under the leadership of Faysal ibn Turki. In this period, the ruler focused on a ‘Wahhabism in 
one country’ policy rather than attempting to expand outside central Arabia. Faysal was 
pragmatic enough to acknowledge the Ottoman authority through the payment of an annual 
tribute. This recognition of the Ottoman Empire contributed towards the consolidation of his 
own position.91 However, this time the internal divisions in the House of Saud undermined 
their establishment and weakened their domination of Najd. 
 
 In 1887 Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Ha’il in the north of peninsula eventually captured Riyadh 
and made it part of his emirate. The House of Rashid was an historic dynasty, which was 
primarily centred in northern Najd in the city of Ha’il. They were considered the most 
dangerous opponents of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance in the area. The House of Rashid 
imposed a bitter defeat upon the House of Saud in the Battle of Mulayda, which was indeed 
the last major conflict during the existence of the ‘second Saudi state’. Abd al-Rahman ibn 
Faisal, the main claimant to the leadership of the House of Saud, took flight from Najd and 
took refuge in Kuwait. Abd al-Rahman ibn Faysaland his son Abd al-Aziz stayed in Kuwait 
until 1902.92 
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Towards Formation of the Modern Saudi State  
 
Ibn Saud or Abd al-Aziz (1876-1953), who spent much of his life in exile, decided to regain 
his ‘right’ to rule. He founded the third Saudi state, which has lasted until the present time. 
In 1902, Ibn Saud and about twenty companions launched an offensive campaign against 
the House of Rashid. With a rather minimal effort he managed to recapture Riyadh. Soon 
the previous power base of the House of Saud, Najd, went under the control of Ibn Saud. 93 
By 1913 he conquered the eastern province of al-Hasa and by 1920 most of the Asir region 
went under his control.94  
 
In 1925 he invaded the city of Mecca and captured the holy site from Sharif Hussayn ubn 
Ali. The fall of Mecca marked the end of almost 700 years of the Hashemite guardianship 
of the Islamic holy sites.95 As soon the situation was under control, the House of Saud 
made sure that its rule was compliant with the Wahhabi religious framework.96 Arguably, 
this was an attempt at emerging ‘worldly domination‘ within a religious context. It seemed 
even from the early stages Ibn Saud wanted to portray himself as a ‘religious reformer’ 
rather than a brutal conqueror.97 Although his path to power was extremely violent, he was 
aware of the significance of religious legitimacy for his campaigns.  In April 1925, the 
forces of Ibn Saud complied with the Wahhabi edicts, and destroyed some of the holiest 
sites of Islam, Jannat al-Baqi and Jannat- Al-Mualla. These sites held great significance for 
the vast majority of the Islamic umma who strongly criticised the Wahhabi-Saudi action. 
These sites contained the shrines and graves of many of Muhammad's relatives and 
companions. Many of the mausoleums, which had been destroyed had particular 
significance for the Shiites. Many Shiites still mourn the day of the demolition and 
remember 21 April 1925 as the ‘Day of Sorrow’, Yaum e Gham.98 However, the 
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condemnation was not limited to the Shiite minority, with many Sunni communities 
disapproving of the demolitions as well. 
 
By January 1926, Ibn Saud had fully strengthened his position in the western Arabian 
Peninsula. Hence, leading civic and religious figures in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah 
recognised him as the king of the Hejaz.99 Gradually, through conquest, the Image of Ibn 
Saud changed. Initially, he ruled over villages and settlements, which had minimal geo-
political or economic significance for the major powers. However, the conquest of the 
Hejaz brought Ibn Saud to the attention of the outside world. Due to its religious and 
political importance, Hejaz accommodated various diplomatic and consular offices, which 
connected the area to Europe and other important Muslim countries. Hence, the emergence 
of Ibn Saud as a formidable political actor and the belief system that he represented was 
noticed by the main political players of the time.100   
 
On 20 May 1927, the British government signed the Treaty of Jeddah (The Anglo-Saudi 
Treaty), which paved the way for further expansion of Ibn Saud ’s political jurisdiction. 
The British Empire officially recognised the independence of the Hejaz and Najd and Ibn 
Saud   as its ruler. In return he was obliged to respect British interests in the neighbouring 
emirates. Muslims particularly Shiites from Persia and India were afraid of Wahhabi 
domination over the heart of the Islamic umma, many of them preferred some form of rule 
by Islamic consensus over the Hejaz, not by a Saudi fait accompli authorised by the British 
Empire.101 As Leatherdale noted ‘the likelihood that Ibn Saud  would not be the unanimous 
choice of the Muslim world may be an additional factor behind his securing the throne for 
himself so quickly.’102  
 
It is important to mention that, although the personality and the conduct of Ibn Saud   
played a crucial role in the construction of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century, his 
military campaigns alone could not guarantee the establishment of a new political unit in 
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one of the most strategic regions of the world.103 During the creation of Saudi Arabia, 
major foreign powers were present in the entire region.104 By 1900 most of the coastal 
rulers of the Arabian Peninsula from Kuwait to Muscat had already signed protection 
treaties with Britain.105 After the World War I, and the final collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, European influence over the region increased. There is a wide literature on British-
Saudi relations in the early years of the twentieth century. Hence, analysing the role of 
superpowers in the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia is beyond this study. It is 
important just to bear in mind that the establishment of a political unit without the 
sanctioning of Britain in the early twentieth century would have been very unlikely.106 It is 
ironic that a religio-political movement, which theoretically would not tolerate infidels, 
relied on British support to establish itself as an effective power within the peninsula.    
 
Although, after 1927, Ibn Saud benefited from the political support of the superpowers, 
conflict was his main ticket to power. Through conflict and the brutal elimination of his 
rivals in the peninsula, he convinced the imperial actors that he could establish a formidable 
authority in the new political unit, which would also benefit their interests.107 Thus, the 
foundation of the third Saudi State was largely vested in violence utilised by Ibn Saud   to 
pave the way for domination of the House of Saud in the Arabian Peninsula. It is important 
to observe the role of conflict in Saudi state building, for this was to support the Wahhabi 
doctrine for decades to come.    
 
From the early stages, Ibn Saud and his fledgling religio-political establishment primarily 
relied on brute power to meet the requirements of the first stage of control. Through conflict 
the Saudi-Wahhabi forces eliminated the other claimants of power. His ambition for 
domination of the Arabian Peninsula could not be achieved without a formidable military 
force to pave the way for the creation of a more complex political unit, which would utilise 
positive as well as negative power to maintain social control. The Ikhwan (brothers) was the 
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name of the militia group which constituted the main military force of Ibn Saud. It played a 
crucial role in establishing him as the king of Saudi Arabia .The Ikhwan were primarily made 
up of Bedouin tribes.108 Between 1902 and 1912, Ibn Saud ’s army consisted of men from the 
towns and settlements who had a financial interest in participating in his raids. His most loyal 
men were from Arid in southern Najd. They were the vanguard of Ibn Saud’s military and 
they were considered jihad fighters.109  
 
However, in 1907-08 Ibn Saud faced threats from the insubordination of the Ara’if segment 
of his own family. They were the descendants of Ibn Saud  ’s uncle, Saud.110 The Ara’if 
rebellion was aided by a nomadic tribal confederation. Ibn Saud came to the conclusion that 
his domination in Qasim and southern Najd would be undermined as long as they exerted 
control and maintained their political autonomy.111 Hence he created this semi-permanent 
warrior machine from the tribal confederations (Ikhwan). This formidable military force 
conducted some of the most strategic military campaigns of Ibn Saud, which paved the way 
for the formation of the third Saudi state.  
 
Many crucial areas such as Hejaz, al-Hasa and Ha’il could not be conquered without the 
Ikhwan.112 Habib describes the militia as: 
 
Those Bedouins who accepted the fundamentals of orthodox Islam of the Hanbali 
school as presented by Ibn Abdul Wahhab which their fathers and forefathers had 
forgotten or had prevented and who through the persuasion of the religious 
missionaries and with the material assistance of Abdl-Aziz abandoned their nomadic 
life to live in the Hijrah ,which were built by him for them.113 
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The Ikhwan participated in all the major military campaigns starting with the conquest of 
Al-Hasa 1913. They also defeated The House of Rashid and Shammar in 1921 and the 
Hashemites of the Hejaz, taking the cites of Ta’if, Mecca and Jeddah in 1924-1925, and  
they also took part in smaller military campaigns against Yemen. For many years the 
relation between Ibn Saud   and Ikhwan was mutually beneficial.114 However, gradually 
some members of the Ikhwan started to express their dissatisfaction with the warming 
relations between Ibn Saud and the British who were considered as ‘infidels’. This was 
only the beginning of a controversial and rather paradoxical relationship between the House 
of Saud and the so-called ‘kuffar’, which continues to create tendentious debates in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
At this stage, the segments of the force that he created himself now used the very ideas 
which had been championed by Ibn Saud   against him. For the Ikhwan the close ties with 
Britain were a contradiction to the ‘puritan’ Wahhabi teaching, which was preached by Ibn 
Saud   himself. Hence, a rebellious faction, led by Faysal al-Duwaysh, ibn Bijad and ibn 
Hithlayn, emerged to challenge the conduct of Ibn Saud and his new policies.115 The failure 
to respect the newly established borders and the raids against neighbouring countries, were 
among their many activities, which antagonised Ibn Saud and his regional allies such as 
Britain.  
 
Nonetheless, he managed to remobilise his forces and eventually defeated them in the 
Battle of Sibilla in 1929. Ironically, Ibn Saud   who represented a ‘puritan’ Islam resorted to 
British military support to defeat the Ikhwan, the very warriors who had once helped him to 
broaden the Wahhabi influence within the Arabian Peninsula. Britain provided its modern 
air force for Ibn Saud to use to defeat the ideas, which were once preached by him and his 
crony ulama. The defeat of the Ikhwan, who adhered to the ultra-conservative messages of 
Wahhabism with the assistance of the modern military might of the kuffar, was a base for 
the contradictions and paradoxes of the House of Saud, which continues until today.   
   
Of course, the Ikhwan’s opposition against Ibn Saud was not only based on religious 
ground. Tribalism also contributed to the formation of the opposition against Ibn Saud   in 
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with the Ikhwan movement. Some fighters from different tribes were afraid that the 
eventual domination of House of Saud would lead to the marginalisation of their own 
tribes.116 However, once they were defeated, Ibn Saud did not fully dismantle the Ikhwan. 
Although the official organisation was abolished, some of them continued to work and live 
in agricultural settlements and received financial benefits from the new administration. 
Some of them received jobs in the new political establishment and even joined the military. 
In1956 Tribal forces were reorganised in a paramilitary unit called the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard. Later on some other segments of the Ikhwan were remobilised against the 
state.  The group, which seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, were said to be the 
descendants of the first Ikhwans.117 
 
The defeat of the rebellious faction of the Ikhwan was one of the last challenges that Ibn 
Saud   had to face before establishing the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 1932, having 
conquered most of the peninsula, Ibn Saud renamed his dominions ‘Saudi Arabia’ and 
proclaimed himself ‘the King of Saudi Arabia’. The choice of the household name for the 
new kingdom was an explicit indication of the fact that the House of Saud viewed the new 
state as nothing less than its own private property.  
 
Clearly, the establishment of the modern Saudi-Wahhabi state could never have 
materialised without the instruments of violence as the main means of negotiation of 
power. The state of Saudi Arabia could never be constructed without the initial role of 
conflict, which physically cleansed all the claimants of power. Although Wahhabism was 
the ideological engine of the House of Saud, there was no doctrinal contest with the rival 
parties, which contributed to the eventual supremacy of the belief system in the Arabian 
Peninsula.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion of the prevailing truth at the micro level 
has often been synonymous with ‘official Islam’. Official Islam does not necessarily refer to 
what is considered a ‘universal truth’ in the wider umma. It refers to the prevailing 
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perspectives within a defined geo-political unit conditioned and controlled by a certain power 
complex and its ideological affiliation.118 This chapter described some of the ways in which 
Wahhabism became an official religion of the House of Saud, an indispensable political force 
behind the creation of Saudi Arabia. To this effect, the two important factors of truth 
management at the micro level involving narrative construction and leadership were 
highlighted. These factors were instrumental in transforming Wahhabism into the prevailing 
ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This chapter started with addressing the genealogy 
of Wahhabism and the structural conditions in which Wahhabism was born. Accordingly, the 
key figures that have theologically influenced Ibn Abdul Wahhab were identified and their 
perspectives were briefly analysed.   
 
 Indeed Wahhabism never could register as a significant religio-political narrative without the 
forceful leadership of the House of Saud. Although the House of Saud had been facing 
various internal and external impediments, it had also acted as the political engine of 
Wahhabism to broaden its sphere of influence within the Arabian Peninsula. It also provided 
the indispensable agency for the religious interpretations of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. The House 
of Saud provided an effective mechanism whereb Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s rigid religious 
perspectives could be translated into power. The leadership, which was provided by the 
House of Saud, took Wahhabism into the twentieth century as the ideological base of the new 
nation-state.  
 
The original seeds of Wahhabism were cultivated through conflict in the first Saudi state. 
Wahhabism as a religio-political system of social control did not emerge through organic 
dialogue with the other competing perspectives of the time. It became a formidable force 
through the military expansion of the House of Saud, which was ideologically boosted by the 
edicts of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. In retrospect, the formation of the modern Saudi-Wahhabi state 
was the continuation of the first model, which was based on collaboration between the House 
of Saud and Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Through conflict and the political cleansing of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the House of Saud created the necessary conditions for the normalisation and 
officialisation of Wahhabi Islam. In other words, without the political and military leadership 
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of the House of Saud, Wahhabism would have been just like thousands of other sects, which 
emerged and perished through the centuries. 
         
As was discussed before, in the context of Islamic history, conflict has often paved the way 
for the transition of one power complex to another, and each transformation was sustained 
and legitimised through a regime of truth, which would justify the change and legitimise it 
within a transcendental context. Indeed, conflict constitutes a framework for the collision of 
contradicting and competing social and political forces and it has been an important dynamic 
for social transition, which has shaped much of Wahhabi history.  By using an effective 
leadership backed up by an ideological narrative, the House of Saud employed various 
violent strategies to pave the way for the establishment of a new kingdom. The following 
chapters will address the policies that were adopted to socialise Wahhabism as the natural and 
organic ‘truth’ within the state of Saudi Arabia. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
TOWARDS SOCIALISATION 
 
Introduction 
 
As was suggested before, historically ‘official Islam’ has been synonymous with ‘true 
Islam’. However, it would be too simplistic to reduce the officilisation of the truth to a 
conflictual process, which only entails force and repression. As was argued before, other 
factors such as narrative construction, leadership and socialisation are also essential to 
maintain and perpetuate the ‘official truth’. However, effective socialisation of official 
narratives requires a set of preconditions, as collective socialisation cannot take place 
within an institutional vacuum.   
 
Indeed, the process of top-down socialisation capable of exercising power cannot emerge in 
the absence of a necessary infrastructure, which could effectively translate direct repression 
based on brute force to indirect control based on consent. By necessary infrastructure, I 
refer to a set of social agencies that have been developed and employed by the ruling order 
to promote and promulgate its own ideological perspectives to gain legitimacy. Through 
various socialising and associational agencies, the state attempts to synchronise its subjects 
with its own legitimising narratives. 
 
As already stated, the House of Saud utilised violence as the first step for domination. 
However, once their internal rivals were physically removed, they were in need of a raison 
d’être for their monopolisation of power. They needed a form of legitimacy, which could 
sustain their rule in the long term. Hence, their continuity and political sustainability 
required more complex mechanisms of social control. In other words, they had to create 
institutions, which would solidify the official ‘truth’ and standardise religious 
consciousness in accordance with the ideological narratives of the ruling order.   
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This chapter aims to examine the process of institution-building in Saudi Arabia after 1932. 
Although constructing effective state institutions was essential for the continuity of the 
House of Saud, there were many impediments, which slowed the process. For example, 
tribalism, which was embedded in the political culture of the Arabian Peninsula, constituted 
an obstacle against the formation of effective central institutions for the House of Saud. 
This was partly because of the fact that in practice the House of Saud still did not possess 
all the essential elements for constructing a new nation-state. How could the House of Saud 
establish a trans-tribal hegemony within a highly tribal society? How could central political 
authority be established when tribalism could create cultural, territorial and political 
divisions?  
 
Indeed the officilisation of Wahhabism could not materialise in the absence of a central 
authority. Therefore, the first step for political and ideological domination within the new 
territory was to create a nation-state.1 Thus, unlike the first and second Saudi emirates, the 
modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia embarked on an ambitious project of constructing a 
modern nation-state. Within the previous chieftaincy framework, the House of Saud had to 
resort to military muscle to sustain its power; only a favourable balance of power could 
guarantee its dominance within the given territory, which was constantly in the process of 
change and transition.  
 
However, in the nation-state model, functioning states have no choice but to bind their 
identity to their nations.  In other words, functioning states institute the necessary 
mechanisms to serve nations and in doing so they form and mould nations to suit their own 
needs.2 This process of alteration and adjustment, which includes conformity and 
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uniformity, became an important aspect of the nation-state building to which Saudis were 
committing them . In this light, there will be a discussion on the measures which were 
taken by the House of Saud to construct a ‘horizontally bonded’ society in which they 
could be perceived as the natural possessors of power within an ‘organic’ territory whereby 
the state and the nation were ‘naturally’ connected. Nation building is a social construction, 
which touches on every aspect of life including its most mundane elements.3 Indeed, the 
institutions of the state constantly enforce policies to intervene in the production of culture 
and identity.4 Nation building also includes the creation of a national consciousness, which 
corresponds to the political orientation of the state.  
 
Once the formation of the nation-state is addressed, this chapter aims to examine the 
formation of some specific institutions and ministries, which have helped the House of 
Saud to recondition national religious consciousness in accordance with its official regime 
of ‘truth’. For example, Dar Al-Ifta, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of 
hajj will be examined, and their role in establishing Wahhabism as the unquestionable 
‘truth’ will be analysed. Furthermore, there will be an attempt to analyse the role of 
religious practitioners within these state institutions.5 
 
Last but not least, the chapter will examine the role of ulama in modern Saudi Arabia. The 
ulama have played an essential role in the moral leadership of the society. They have enjoyed 
a unique position within the Saudi establishment and wider society. They have been the 
arbitrators of the official truth and yet some members of the same social group have 
questioned the official narrative and proposed alternative perspectives. For the House of Saud 
the have been their best friend and yet their worst enemy for the management of official truth. 
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Routledge, 1998), 26. 
5 This chapter does not explore organisations such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the Muslim 
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Trans-Tribal Saudi-Wahhabi Order: Towards Construction of the Nation-State  
  
As was indicated in the previous chapter, historically the House of Saud had relied on the 
ideological perspectives of Wahhabism for expansion and legitimacy. The ruling élite in the 
family and in particular Ibn Saud  regarded themselves as the protectors and the promoters 
of ‘the truth’ which were promoted by in the eighteenth century. The first two Saudi 
emirates did not provide any opportunities to establish sophisticated social mechanisms to 
sustain and enforce the Saudi regime of truth in an encompassing manner. However now, 
under the rule of the third emirate, there have been empowering opportunities to take more 
active measures to promulgate the Wahhabi perspectives. 
 
Until the early years of the twentieth century, Saudi-Wahhabi rule was often faced with 
various internal and external impediments. However, with the start of the third emirate, the 
future looked much brighter for the House of Saud. The Ottoman Empire, which was 
considered as the main opponent of the Saudi-Wahhabi project, was already dissolved and 
the internal struggles with the rival powers such as Hashemites and Rashidis had ended in 
the Saud’s favour. Furthermore, for the first time the House of Saud and its ideology 
received a stamp of approval from a major superpower in the international system. As the 
Ottoman Empire was disintegrating, Britain and France emerged as new power brokers in 
the region. Although Britain had close ties with Ibn Saud’s rival, the Hashemites, it 
eventually opted for the House of Saud, and as we saw in the first chapter, Ibn Saud 
received the necessary support and blessing from Britain to create a nation-state. 
 
Although the right conditions were met for the creation of a new political unit, the Al Saud 
family had to set the stage for the process of state building to sustain their power. Nation- 
states and state building are modern phenomena. Hence, both notions had not been 
theoretically accommodated by the Wahhabi discourse. Indeed, the state as an idea and a 
framework for the organisation of politics had never existed, in the modern sense of the 
word, in the Arabian Peninsula. Wahhabism emerged as a pre-modern religio-political 
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movement. Although Wahhabism had an explicit political character and sought power, it 
never contextualised its mandate within the boundaries of the modern nation-state. 
 
In the first and second periods of Saudi dominance within the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudi 
leaders never attempted to maintain power through the framework of the nation-state. 
Arguably, there can be two factors to explain the lack of any vision or any attempt at state 
building in the periods of Saudi dominance before the official construction of Saudi Arabia. 
Firstly, in the first and second period of Saudi dominance in the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Saudis had no defined territory and their jurisdiction was subject to constant change and 
transition. Their control always depended upon the balance of power in the peninsula. 
Therefore, they had to face serious challenges from rivals such as the Ottomans, 
Hashemites and the House of Rashid over territory and control over the population. 
Secondly, within those sporadic periods, power was primarily articulated through the 
medium of tribal politics. Tribal politics had its own parameters for the management of 
affairs. Hence, co-operation and conflict had to be conducted within the existing 
framework. Tribes and their resources defined and affected the balance of power. The 
capacity of emerging political entities was measured, and values were given based upon 
their access to tribal support and resources.  
 
Joseph Kostiner defines a tribe as:   
 
A political unit that was identified or appeared in historiographical accounts... It 
consisted of group of people who shared a common territorial base, true or 
mythological kinship ties and a corporate existence. The members’ political 
allegiance was to the tribe, and in return they received physical and economic 
protection and social status.6  
Although a tribe was not a monolithic structure and was divided into families and 
clans, it was often bound together in large political units. Tribes did not operate in a 
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political vacuum however; they were an integral part of what Kostiner calls 
chieftaincies, larger socio-political frameworks, which provided security and 
economic protection. The chieftaincies were made of uncertain tribal alliances based 
on power sharing, reciprocity among nomadic tribal groups, more sedentary 
inhabitants centred in towns and villages, and a ruler who governed these alliances. 7 
The chief was part of a leading family in the dominating tribe who had the authority 
and the obligation to maintain order and security. Often, the leader had power to 
wage war, distribute resources and offer protection in return for his subject’s loyalty 
and subordination. The chieftaincy’s remit had no territorial definition, no clear 
borders and no permanence. Its area of control was conditioned by the military 
position of its member tribes at a given period. 
 
Furthermore, the chieftaincy had no modern bureaucracy or any advanced administrative 
institutions; its political structure was fragile, transitory and lacked complexity.  As 
Kostiner points out, the intermixing of the various segments of the chieftaincy was based 
on co-operative partnership among the existing tribal groups rather than a nationalist or 
broad civic solidarity.8 Theoretically and practically the chieftaincy model differed from the 
modern state model, which Saudis started to construct after 1932. For statehood the House 
of Saud required nothing less than a defined territory, central government, organised 
economy, circulation system, permanent resident population, expectation of permanence, 
sovereignty and the recognition of other states.9  
 
It is possible to argue that the early stage of building a nation-state model was more 
coincidental than systematic. The House of Saud was in control of a permanent territory, 
which was recognised by the major actors in the international system, and internal rivals 
were removed. The Saudis had no choice but to recognise the wider international system, 
which was state centric where the states were the only viable players. As was indicated 
before, the Saudis already owed their survival to external powers like Britain and they 
                                                
7 Ibid.  
8 Joseph Kostiner (1993), 4. 
9 George W White (2004), 66-67. 
  88 
could not set their own parameters of power in isolation. For the perpetuation of their 
dominance they had to bow to the inevitable and pave the way for the transition from 
chieftaincy to nation-state. The construction of a nation-state was the most convenient step 
towards control over their newly established territory.   
 
However, one can ask if the recognition of the superpowers and control over permanent 
territory and population alone could qualify the Saudis as sufficient nation-state builders?  
As George White points out, in the nation-state era, states are connected to nations like the 
body is connected to the soul. States drive their raison d'être and legitimacy from nations; 
in return they have to serve and protect nations. Thus, to perpetuate their own existence, 
states bind their identities to nations. They tailor their mechanisms to serve nations, but in 
doing so they form and mould nations to suit their own needs as they adjust themselves to 
serve nations. 10These processes of alteration and adjustment, which include conformity 
and uniformity, become an important aspect of nation-state building.  Hastings also notes, 
‘nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people 
are not seen simply as subjects of the sovereign but as horizontally bonded society to whom 
the state in a sense belongs. There is thus an identity of character between state and people. 
In some ways the state’s sovereignty is inherent within the people and expressive of its own 
identity. In it, ideally, there is a basic equivalence between the borders and character of the 
political unit upon the one hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other.’ 11 
 
Clearly, at this early stage the fledgling state mechanism lacked the complex infrastructure 
to constitute this horizontally bonded society where the state could drive its raison d'être 
and legitimacy from the nation. Thus, the new rulers had to seek measures to create that 
‘horizontally bonded’ society in which the house of Saud could be perceived as a natural 
possessor of power within an organic territory whereby the state and the nation were 
‘naturally’ connected.   
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Throughout modern history, there have been various examples of top-down nation building.   
This process of construction has included the top-down readjustment of the socio-political 
particularities of the given populations to fit the political agenda of the new political order. 
This top-down process of construction resonates with a famous statement of Mazzini, a 
leading Italian figure who played a leading role in the Risorgimento, which constructed 
Italy as a new nation-state. He famously said ‘we have created Italy, now we have to create 
Italians’. This very much highlights the process of construction whereby a collective 
identity is created to sustain a political project such as state building.  As White points out, 
‘The states’ action can profoundly affect the identities of the people within their territories. 
This process is often called ‘nation building’. Nation building is a social construction, 
which touches on every aspect of life including its most mundane elements’.12 Indeed, the 
institutions of the state constantly enforce policies to intervene in the production of culture 
and identity. 13  
 
Nation building also includes the creation of a ‘national consciousness’ that corresponds 
with the political orientation of the state. Accordingly, history is recreated, myths and 
legends are constructed, and tailored social perspectives are institutionalised in order to re-
direct collective values and attitudes in accordance with the narratives of power. Therefore, 
national identity can be viewed as a form of conscious cultural production, a production 
with the purpose of constructing a national subjectivity.14 The state institutions themselves 
involve most aspects of social life, controlling and conditioning actions and redirecting 
thoughts in accordance with the basis of the state’s political authority, objects and 
situations that are moulded by government policies. Nation building is also about creating a 
collective imagination, which simultaneously serves to unify and even homogenise the 
given population and make its relationship to the state look ‘organic’. Thus, in addition to 
state involvement in the production and dissemination of ideology, it is responsible for 
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active engineering of collective consciousness, which can be remoulded to serve the 
narratives of power. 
 
However, taking such constructive measures proved to be difficult for the House of Saud. 
For centuries, religion and tribes were two major sources of identity in the Peninsula. 
Hence, one could ask how theoretically the House of Saud could embark on the project of 
nation building? What were the preconditions to collectivise the Saudi national identity in 
the presence of tribalism, which was indeed the antithesis of nation building?  
 
Of course, within modern Saudi Arabia there was a shared language and a shared 
geographical space, but often people’s loyalty would go to their tribes before anything else.  
In other words, there was no collective desire for a self-conscious trans-tribal identity. Of 
course, religion was a main source of identity, but religion itself was a tribal matter too. 
People were born within their tribes and they would almost automatically inherit the tribal 
religion. Islam was the main religion, but there was no systematic mechanism to religiously 
synchronise the tribes within the given territory. 
 
In this situation, what could be the source of cohesion in this newly constructed nation? 
How could it embark on the construction of national subjectivities? What could create a 
cohesive discourse to create national self-identification? Anderson argues that national self-
identification is only an imaginary process. Hence, a nation is an ‘imagined community’ 
constructed and sustained through communicational and associational agencies.    
 
As Anderson puts it, a nation ‘is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion.15Therefore, he suggests that 
communities are to be distinguished not by their felicity /genuineness but by the style in 
which they are imagined, in fact all the communities larger than the primordial villages of 
                                                
15 Anderson Benedict, Imagined Community (New York: Verso, 1991), 6. 
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face-to- face contact are imagined.16 However, this collective imagination does not happen 
in a vacuum. There has to be an active construction of a national discourse, which can 
produce and institutionalise the national subjectivities. Once these subjectivities are 
collectively socialised, people within the same framework may identify with each other as 
the fellow members of the same ‘nation’. 
 
Gellner asserts that: 
 
Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where 
culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of 
behaving and communicating...Two men are of the same nation if and only if they 
recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations make 
the man; nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. 
A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a 
given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the 
category firmly recognise certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of 
their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this 
kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they 
might be, which separate that category from non-members.17 
 
Therefore, the élite of the new state had to actively engage in a programme of social 
engineering, to create a common culture and a system of ideas and symbols, which could 
interconnect the subjects. Instruments of thought had to be created to shape the narratives 
of power and socialising agencies had to be instituted to internalise the values of the ruling 
élite.  Although, as we have already noted, religious pluralism existed in Saudi Arabia, the 
élite opted for the utilisation of Wahhabism for the construction of a distinct narrative 
which would promote uniformity and translate the existing pluralism into conformity. The 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell,2006),7. 
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officilisation of Wahhabism seemed like a natural path to homogenise the masses in order 
to serve the interests of the ruling class.   
 
Of course, an attempt to officialise Wahhabism in the new nation-state was hardly a 
surprise. After all, the House of Saud mainly appeared on the political map of the Arabian 
Peninsula due to its religious character, which was justifying the Saudi expansionism.  
After the famous pact between Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Saud   in the eighteenth century, 
Saudi political existence was legitimised only within the Wahhabi context. Historically, the 
House of Saud was inseparable from the Wahhabi mandate, and Wahhabism functioned as 
the main ideological engine for the Saudis. Just as the Wahhabi doctrine owed its wider 
recognition to the Saudi political capacity, the House of Saud became equally recognisable 
through the lens of Wahhabi Islam. Hence, Wahhabism had to be in the forefront of the 
Saudi’s attempt for nation building. If they branded their given territory after their name, 
‘Saudi’ Arabia, they would equally enforce their religious doctrine on the given people. 18 
However, the new state lacked the necessary structure to disseminate its ideology. 
Ideological domination cannot be born in the abstract. It has to be created by the right 
social mechanisms such as major educational, communicational and religious institutions. 
The Saudi state had to construct a trans-tribal national structure, which could ideologically 
socialise Wahhabism as the official truth, which could both horizontally and vertically 
                                                
18 Although we should avoid over interpreting the early stage of nation building, Wahhabism became a 
dominating narrative which was utilised to synchronise people independent of tribal structures . The 
modernist scholars of nation argued that the ideas of nationhood were the products of modernity and they 
emerged to replace the religious orders of the agrarian means of production. However, in the case of Saudi 
Arabia , the elite embarked on the process of nation building  using a set of pre-modern narratives of religion 
within a tribal society.  It has to be mentioned that Saudi Arabia was not the only country, which used a set of 
pre modern narratives in order to construct and sustain the nation state.  In many other more developed 
countries religion along other social constructions historically has played an essential role in creating self-
conscious communities. In Europe Christianity was the cause for creation of national churches and was 
essential for the formation of national identities. There is a wide literature available on Christianity, national 
churches and national identity. The notion of the national church in Christianity links a church with a specific 
ethnic group, nation or nation state. There have been many national churches, which acted as the milestone 
for formation of national identities in Europe. Indeed, until the present day many modern and post agrarian 
European societies are using a set of religious narratives and symbolism to enhance their national identities. 
For example, St Patrick and his associated symbols and narratives is attached to the Irish nationhood and 
state. Even in the Islamic world there are number of examples where religious narratives are used for the 
construction of self-conscious communities. In the contemporary era a collective religious conscience resulted 
in the creation of Muslim separatist movement in India, which eventually paved the way for creation of a 
distinct nation-state of Pakistan. 
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connect the state to the nation and synchronise the various social forces together. Indeed, 
after monopolising the political and military mechanisms of the state, the Saudi order had 
to monopolise the instruments of thought in society in order to portray the Saudis and their 
Wahhabi discourse as nothing less than moral and natural.  The next section will attempt to 
portray the early process of institution building, which the Saudis had to undertake in order 
to retain control and domination. 
 
Towards Institution-Building  
 
Evaluating the early processes of institution-building in Saudi Arabia is a difficult task. When 
the modern Saudi Arabia was in the process of construction, the country was extremely 
underdeveloped. 19Apart from the more cosmopolitan urban centres of Hejaz, the rest of the 
country had not much exposure to the outside world. Although many tribes were now under 
control of the House of Saud, the state had minimal resources to constitute the trans-tribal 
social organisations to psychologically condition the masses for nationhood. It was not only 
the communicational infrastructure that was underdeveloped; there was also a lack of vision 
from the ruling family, which made the process quite slow. The reign of Ibn Saud   did not 
achieve much in terms of institution building.   
 
 Ayman Al-Yassini noted:  
 
For over two decades, from its proclamation as a unified kingdom in 1932, Saudi 
Arabia survived without any major elaborate administration and institutions. During 
this period Ibn Saud ruled personally and informally. He administrated the country like 
a big household and he did not allow any concentration of power in the system.’20 
                                                
19 See,Yukihiro Takabayashi, Toward a modern Islamic kingdom : a socio-political analysis of contemporary 
Saudi Arabia ( Japan: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies,International University of Japan, 1986). 
20 Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (United States: Westview Press, 
1985). 
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Advisers who enjoyed his trust surrounded him. The advisors ‘never demanded, seldom 
suggested, and only advised when advice was actively sought.21  
 
Before the establishment of the Council of Ministers, he only established some ad hoc 
committees and structured some state organisations. For example, after the conquest of 
Mecca the Domestic Council of Mecca was established. There were about twenty-five 
members in the council. Following annexation of Jeddah, the Domestic Council was 
dissolved and the Instructive Committee was established. The three members of this 
Committee were appointed by the King and in 1927, he established the Committee for 
Investigation and Reform to review the government organisations. A Council of Deputies 
was created in 1930 to help his son, Faisal, administer the Hejaz region, and eventually in 
1953 the Council of Ministers were instituted to act as a cabinet for the King.22 (After the 
death of Ibn Saud, the Council of Ministers was subject to some further reform, which 
defined the scope of the council and created the position of deputy Prime Minster. However, 
in 1964 King Faysal took more steps for further centralisation and re-established the Council 
as the supreme organisation at the direct service of the monarch, to monopolise control over 
all socio-political affairs of the kingdom.) 23  
 
Although there were some minimal attempts to build more complex institutions to 
accommodate the emerging needs of a nation-state, most of the power was concentrated in 
Ibn Saud  ’s own household.24 In many ways, he attempted to rule the new emerging nation 
state through the parameters of tribal politics. There was extreme centrism and there was a 
minimal bureaucracy and socio-cultural infrastructure to effectively socialise the narratives of 
power. At this stage there was minimal evidence of a vision for instituting a horizontally 
bonded society where the state could derive its raison d'être and legitimacy from the nation. 
Ibn Saud   was a good warrior and accordingly his statesmanship was more about putting 
                                                
21 Ibid, 64. 
22 Ibid. 
23 In the 1960s many other agencies were established to expand the state’s bureaucracy; therefore many new 
institutions such as Centre for Research and Economic Development, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the 
Red Crescent and etc.  
24  See, Mohammed Almana , Arabia unified : a portrait of Ibn Saud  (London: Hutchinson Benham 1980). 
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down rebellious tribes rather than actively envisaging the ways in which to create national 
subjectivities for a more cohesive society. He believed himself to be on the side of the ‘truth’ 
and viewed himself as someone who had triumphed over the ‘munharifin’ (deviators). 
Nonetheless, he was unable to create effective mechanisms to promulgate his regime of truth. 
  
In the early stages of the existence of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud   continued resorting to tribal 
patrimonial politics in which power was devised by means of patrilineal descent.  Arguably, 
patrimonialism was nothing original within the Arabian Peninsula. Within the 
aforementioned chieftaincy some element of patrimonial politics always existed.  The 
relationship between the subordinate and dominant tribes was an amplification of client and 
patron ties which was extended to the modern Saudi state. In theory, patrimonialism in the 
government offices originated in the household administration of the ruler. 25 In the Weberian 
sense of the term, all political transactions which do not involve the household directly are 
nonetheless fused with the corresponding function of the court. Thus, state administrators are 
personal servants and personal representatives of the ruler. The administrators are recruited 
from amongst the dependents, slaves, serfs and others on whose obedience the ruler can 
rely.26 In return they enjoy some privileges given to them by the ruler. Nevertheless, the ruler 
is always in a position to withhold the privileges at will, in the same way that the patriarchal 
master might penalise a member of his household.27  
 
Ibn also resorted to sexual politics in order to create some short-term consent among his 
subjects. Sexual politics have been widely debated in sociology and scholars such as Kate 
Millett have developed the notion in specific ways. Nonetheless, by sexual politics I am 
primarily referring to the patriarchal attitude of the House of Saud in marrying women from 
various tribes as a mechanism of political control. Ibn Saud took many wives and concubines 
                                                
25 Richard Bendix , Max Weber an Intellectual Portrait ( London: Methuen & Co, 1966). 
26 Ibid. 335. 
27 Ibid.  
According to Weber, patrimonialism is compatible with many different economic structures.  Although the 
development of strongly centralised patrimonial order is often dependent upon trade in which the ruler 
engages as his personal prerogative, the Saudi economic infrastructure at the time would still be compatible 
with the patrimonial rule. 
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to tie his household to other tribes in his new territory. He attempted to use marriage as a 
political networking mechanism, which could connect his household to the wider tribal 
society through blood.   
 
The House of Saud’s and in particular Ibn Saud’s practices commodified women for personal 
and political interests.  The number of his wives has been a subject of amazement for external 
as well as internal observers. There are contesting accounts of the number of his wives and 
children. According to one account, by 1953 he had forty-three sons and more than fifty 
daughters.28 Some accounts suggest that he has admitted to having married more than one 
hundred and as many as two hundred and thirty-five women. Within the Islamic Shari’a, he 
was allowed to have four wives at a time. Hence, he was constantly in the process of 
divorcing a previous wife to prepare the legal conditions for marrying a new one. As 
marriage with tribal groups was part of Ibn Saud’s agenda, a series of marriages with rival 
tribes such as the Rashidi was carried out in Riyadh.29  
 
Although in Arabian tradition marriage can constitute closer ties between tribes and families, 
there is no certainty as to what extent Ibn Saud could create consent by his short-term sexual 
policies. After all, the rule of the iron fist was in place. Many tribes went along with Ibn Saud  
’s excessive marriages, because they had no choice.  Because, Ibn Saud chose his wives from 
positions of power, this humiliated the subordinated Arab tribes. In Arabian tradition, women 
are a symbol of honour; it is likely that many tribes were chastened to subordinate their 
women to the will of Ibn Saud. Possibly, at the same time there were many tribes who could 
see Ibn Saud’s ferocious appetite for marriage as a political opportunity to get closer to his 
household and enjoy his patrimonial support. Nonetheless, there is no certainty about how 
successful or how greatly resented such policies were, in the early stages of nation building in 
Saudi Arabia.  
                                                
28 James Wynbrandt and Fawaz A. Gerges, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (Checkmark Books, 2010), 194.   
29 Mawdawi Al Rasheed , Politics in An Arabian oasis the Rashidis of Saudi Arabia (I.B.Tauris, 1997), 250.  
According to Philby, those of Ibn Saud ’s wives who bore children were provided houses to bring up royal 
children; many of these children went to construct the modern state of Saudi Arabia after the death of Ibn 
Saud in 1953. 
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It is enough to point out the fact that Ibn Saud was slow in constructing the hegemonic 
mechanisms of social control through positive and productive powers. Although the ruling 
élite lacked the vision for bureaucratisation and institution building, the discovery of natural 
resources paved the way for the emergence of a more complex state mechanism. The next 
section will attempt to portray the ways in which the discovery of oil pushed the process of 
institution-building in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The discovery of oil paved the way for a 
more rigorous programme of institution-building to accommodate the process of economic 
modernisation as well as maintaining the ideological dominance of the House of Saud in the 
new era.  
 
Oil: A Determining Factor for Institution-Building 
 
Increasingly, a change of situation in modern Saudi Arabia was pushing the House of Saud to 
embark upon the bureaucratisation of the state and the systematic construction of productive 
social agencies. The discovery of oil was the major factor forcing the Saudis to abandon 
traditional ways of running the state. In fact, in the context of Saudi Arabia, we cannot talk 
about a major economic, social and political transition without talking about oil. 30Following 
Iran, Iraq and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia also discovered oil before World War II. When the war 
ended the, Saudi kingdom was producing about sixty thousand barrels of oil per day.31 At the 
beginning of World War II Abqiaq was discovered, right next to the Dammam wells.32 
Dammam is the capital of the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which is now considered the 
most oil-rich region in the world.  
 
The discovery of oil wells in Dammam, in the 1940s and 1950s, started major developmental 
projects which fundamentally transformed the economic infrastructure of Saudi Arabia. The 
                                                
30 See, Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration (London : 
Croom Helm ,1988). 
31 Matthew R. Simmons, Twilight in the Desert: the Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World economy, John 
Wiley & Sons, 2005), 31. 
32 Experts and technicians from throughout the Kingdom and the world gathered to help search for new oil 
fields and bring them on-stream. New pipelines had to be installed, storage facilities built and jetties 
constructed to handle tankers. 
  98 
discovery of Abqaiq became one of the most prolific and most reliable oil fields of all time33. 
In the1940s, American geologists concluded that potentially, Saudi Arabia had two billion 
barrels of proven reserves, five billion probable reserves and twenty billion barrels of 
possible reserves.34Although the figures were exciting for the1940s, the possible reserves 
were immensely underestimated. As Simmons puts is ‘the possible reserves were 
underestimated by more than an order of magnitude’.35 Once World War II ended, the 
drilling started and with it the economic fabric of Saudi Arabia was transformed in an 
unprecedented way. 36Soon, new fields such as Qatif, Ain Dar and Ghawar, were ready for 
exploitation, which expanded revenues. Before Ibn Saud died, he witnessed a significant 
increase in his country’s wealth, from $200,000 prior to World War I to $10,000,000 in the 
interwar period,  $60,000,000 in 1948; $160,000,000 in 1952 and $250,000,000 in 1953.37 
 
With this new source of wealth, the House of Saud had to find new measures for the 
management of affairs. There is already some detailed literature on the process of economic 
bureaucratisation and the gradual formation of key ministries. Although we cannot fully 
separate politics from economy, we cannot pay much attention to the formation of economic   
and financial institutions in the Kingdom. For the sake of this study, we pay attention 
primarily to the construction of social agencies, which were formed and sustained to socialise 
and internalise the Saudis ideological narratives. We are primarily interested in the formation 
of those agencies which helped to institutionalise Wahhabism as the official ‘truth’.    
 
 However, when the economic infrastructure being transformed with such a speed, the state 
had to systematise its mechanisms of social control beyond violence. At this point, the 
country was beginning to be exposed to the outside world, probably more than ever before in 
its history. The influx of technicians, advisers, engineers and scientists from the Western 
countries as well as the rapid change of means of production, made the politics of truth 
                                                
33 Matthew R. Simmons (2005), 31.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36  See Irvine H. Anderson, Aramco the United States and Saudi Arabia: a study of the dynamics of foreign oil 
policy, 1933-1950 (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1988). 
37 Al-Yassini(1985), 61. 
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management more essential than in any time before, in the short history of Saudi Arabia. The 
rapid emergence of the new wealth and more complex economy necessitated a more complex 
socio-cultural infrastructure to accommodate these rapid transitions.   
 
The oil economy was gradually exposing the Saudi population to the new world, which was 
often in conflict with the ideological parameters of the state.38 On the one hand the state had 
to welcome the modernisation process, and on the other hand it was afraid of compromising 
its ‘authentic’ mission, which provided religious legitimacy for the ruling family. Indeed, the 
economic development and modernisation could not come without its social ‘dangers’ for a 
system, which claimed to be puritan in implementing the will of God on earth.39 Hence, the 
state had to compensate the modernisation process with instituting effective organisations to 
bodyguard the Wahhabi character of the state. The next section will examine one of the 
institutions, which was created to standardise the religious opinions in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.      
 
Dar Al-Ifta  
 
Arguably, Dar Al-Ifta was one of the first and the most efficient agencies constructed in 
modern Saudi Arabia, to systematically target the trans-tribal religious consciousness. It 
became an important agency to disseminate the Wahhabi discourse as well as attempting to 
objectify the intellectual and moral leadership in Saudi Arabia. Dar Al-Ifta is a closet agency 
of productive power, which could promote a set of trans-tribal religious and political 
perspectives to sustain and legitimise the monopoly of power by the House of Saud. 40 
                                                
38  See, Hossein Askari  Saudi Arabia's economy :Oil and the Search for Economic Development (London : 
Jai Press, 1990). 
Steffen Hertog , Princes, brokers, and bureaucrats : oil and the state in Saudi Arabia, Cornell University Press 
(Bristol : University Presses Marketing, 2010). 
39 See, Abdelrahman Munif , Cities of Salt (Vintage, 1989). 
George Arthur Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: its people, its society, its culture ( HRAF Press, 1967). 
40 There are some other religious organisations in the region which share the same name, such as Dar Al-Ifta 
in Egypt  which according to Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen appeared in  the Egyptian national court system 
between 1880 and 1900. 
See, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of the Dar Al-Ifta 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
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The history of Dar Al-Ifta in Saudi Arabia goes back to the early 1950s, a short while 
before Ibn Saud   died. Since the Saudi Wahhabi pact in1744, muftis have practiced Ifta in 
an informal manner. As was discussed before there was no sophisticated structure for the 
dissemination of the Wahhabi discourse. The Wahhabi religious activity often depended 
upon the political position of their patrons and the general balance of power in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Towards the end of his life Ibn Saud took some measures to modernise the 
religious structure of the newly constructed Saudi Arabia. He appointed Shaykh 
Mohammed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Shaykh, one of the most recognised Wahhabi muftis, to head 
Dar Al-Ifta and other religious agencies. However, Dar Al-Ifta became a one-man religious 
agency, as Shaykh Mohammed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Shaykh enjoyed the highest religious 
authority until his death in 1969. 
 
After the death of Ibn Saud and the emergence of new economic conditions, the 
institutionalisation of Dar Al-Ifta, as a core agency to issue religious fatwas, was part of a 
wider attempt for constituting social control through conditioning the collective religious 
consciousness. Not surprisingly, the establishment of Dar Al-Ifta was not an attempt to 
diversify the sources of power in the new state. In contrast, it was a new measure for a 
further concentration of power, which would feed into the aforementioned Saudi style of 
patrimonial order. Dar Al-Ifta has been playing a crucial role in the religious life of the 
kingdom.41 Thousands of fatwas were issued after they had been solicited either by the 
subjects or by the state. The topic of these fatwas covered a wide range of topics. Most of 
them addressed orthodox ritualistic matters and some provided solutions to modern social 
developments. Dar Al-Ifta would act as a trans-tribal institution, which would fuse the 
political perspectives of the House of Saud with the religious doctrine of Wahhabism. The 
impact of Dar Al-Ifta’s religious production and interpretive policies could potentially 
synchronise the ruler with the subjects. 
 
                                                
41 See, Muhammad K. Al-Atawneh, Wahhabi Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity: Dar Al-Ifta in the 
Modern Saudi State (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
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However, there has been an obvious correlation between the leadership and the sufficiency 
of the organisation. For example, despite the rapid economic changes, Ibn Saud’s successor 
was a weak leader who influenced the operations of the organisation.   When the founder of 
the kingdom passed away in 1953, he was replaced by his oldest surviving son, Saud bin 
Abdul Aziz (1902-69), who was a crown prince since 1933. Saud’s reign is often associated 
with mismanagement and extravagance. Following the path of his father, he took an 
excessive number of wives and produced many children. However, unlike his father, he 
was not a uniting and powerful politician. He enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle and exploited 
public resources for maintaining his expansive demands. Primarily, he concentrated power 
amongst his own immediate family, when his brother Faysal who had become the Crown 
Prince became Prime Minister; he exercised greater influence in the Council of Ministers 
than his brother. 42   
 
When he was in power, the Middle East was heavily involved in the so-called ‘Arab Cold 
war’. Arab nationalism, which was led by Nasser, threatened the fledgling kingdom.  King 
Saud proved to be an uneven match for Nasser’s nationalist challenge. There was a fear that 
the corruption and mismanagement, which was undermining the kingdom to make the anti-
Saudi propaganda, made broadcasts from Egypt more appealing to Saudi subjects.  As Al-
Rasheed notes, Saud and Faysal continued their power struggle until 1962, when Faysal 
formed a cabinet in the absence of the King, who had left the country for medical 
treatment.43When the king returned, he was confronted with the new arrangements. 
However, with the pressure from the Royal family and the religious figures, he abdicated in 
favour of his brother and left Saudi Arabia until his death in 1969.44 The change of 
leadership in the House of Saud paved the way for more resources for Dar Al-Ifta. The new 
leader seemed to be more aware of the challenges that the House of Saud was facing. 
Among many other things, he paid considerable attention to Dar Al-Ifta, to make it more 
central in standardising socio-religious consciousness in the Kingdom. In 1962 Faysal 
                                                
42 Joseph A Kechichian (2001), 38. 
43 Al-Rashid (1997), 114. 
44 Ibid. 
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attempted to reform Dar Al-Ifta, to make it more in tune with the fast-changing Saudi 
society. 
 
However, damage had already been done under the previous leadership. Indeed, the rule of 
King Saud had created a crisis of legitimacy in the fledgling kingdom. Accordingly, Faysal 
needed religion more than ever before, to address the crisis of legitimacy at home and resist 
the secular Arab nationalism abroad. Of course, even under King Saud, Wahhabi Islam was 
an indispensable part of the Saudi discourse. Nonetheless, Faysal had to reform the 
religious infrastructure to harmonise the official religion with the emerging changes in the 
Kingdom. Indeed, as the political system was confronted with a wide range of 
unprecedented issues, the pressure for instituting more complex religious structures 
increased.  He realised that reform could not be implemented without the support of the 
religious establishment, especially Dar Al-Ifta. Hence, he undertook the reform programme 
to make Dar Al-Ifta compatible with his new social and political vision, which was 
represented by his Ten Point Programme.  
 
His Ten Point Programme included 1) to Establish the relation between the ruler and the 
subjects and to define the state administration 2) to regulate the provincial administrations 
3) to establish a Ministry of Justice 4) to establish an Ifta council, to reform the Committee 
for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong 7) to Improve the nation’s quality of life, 8) 
to initiate new social and economic transitions 9) to promote financial and economic 
development 10) and to abolish slavery in the Kingdom.45  
 
 His new mandate emphasised the connection between Islam and modernisation.46 
Although Wahhabism remained his main point of reference, Faysal showed an interest in 
‘modernising’ the kingdom. He would introduce modernity in a way that would 
simultaneously ‘maintain and preserve religious and moral values of Islam’.47 Hence, the 
                                                
45 Al-Atawneh (2010), 8-9.  
46 Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Unites 
States:Harvard University Press, 2010), 85 . 
47 Ibid.  
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‘modernisation’ of the religious infrastructure of the state was his priority, as he wanted to 
abort a ‘discourse of modernisation within the Islamic framework’.48Thus, the management 
of religious consciousness had to include some elements of modernisation.  
 
Reforming the Ifta council was an attempt for the bureaucratisation of the religious 
infrastructure to develop a new relationship between the state and the ulama. Faisal’s ideas 
became more tangible after 1971. At this point Faysal initiated the construction of two new 
agencies authorised to issue fatwas, the Board of Senior Ulama (BSU) and Permanent 
Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (CRLO). (These institutions make 
up the current Dar Al-Ifta in Saudi Arabia).  
 
Faysal explicitly defined the limits of the mufti’s authority and systematised the procedure 
in Dar Al-Ifta. The king was entitled to appoint and dismiss muftis at any given time and 
reserved the right for interference and exclusive treatment in his enquiries. Arguably, such 
measures redefined the relation between the ulama and the state. The Royal Decree number 
1/137, which was issued in 1971, specified that members of the High Council of Ifta had to 
be appointed by the monarch. Regarding their duties, the Decree stated that they are ‘to 
express opinion based on Shari’a regarding matters submitted to them by the wali al-amr 
i.e., the king, to recommend policy on religious matters, to guide the wali al-amr and to 
issue fatwas to guide Muslims in the areas of  aqida, ibadat, and mu’amalat.49  
 
Accordingly, at Dar Al-Ifta the monarch, BSU and CRLO are responsible for picking the 
topics for discussion. However, not too surprisingly, the King’s choice had priority. In this 
light, thousands of fatwas have been issued on various subjects.50Of course, many of fatwas 
were not political, but they reflected on the wider social sphere. It is possible to assume that 
the Wahhabi perspectives attempting to homogenise Saudi society have doctored even 
those issues which included religious practices and family life. Of course, co-operation 
between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi ulama was nothing new and it had always 
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existed from the so-called first Saudi state. Nonetheless, the aforementioned 
rearrangements bureaucratised Wahhabism in a new way. Through bureaucratising 
religious institutions, Dar Al-Ifta had to become officially accountable to the King.  
Therefore, Dar Al-Ifta’s religious publications became even more synchronised with the 
ideological mandate of the state. The patrimonial relationship between the state and the 
religious practitioners became even more systematised under the new arrangements. The 
state (patron) provided resources for Dar Al-Ifta (client) to produce various publications 
and conduct research in order to solidify the Saudi perspectives within religious contexts. 
Through this patron- client relationship vast amounts of publications have been created by 
Dar Al-Ifta, to boost the religious legitimacy of the ruling order. As Al-Yassin puts it, ‘the 
symbolic consequence of the publication and distribution of religious texts is the projection 
of Saudi rule as the propagator of Islam as well as the re-affirmation of its identification 
with Wahhabism.’51 
 
This process of religious bureaucratisation undermined the ulama’s independence more 
than ever before, and they became an integral part of the state machinery in the most 
explicit sense of the term. (It also has to be noted that the dependence of the ulama upon 
the financial support of the state is rooted in a principle of Wahhabism itself, which bans 
the ulama from receiving any financial aid from people. Hence they could not survive on 
awqaf, they had to be reliant upon the Amir).52 Clearly, this created a very uneven 
relationship in which the ulama had to be subordinate to the will of state in order to 
maintain their own wellbeing. In this light Al-Yassini argues:  
 
The creation of complex administrative institutions has led to two fundamental 
changes affecting the traditional relationship between religion and state in the Saudi 
Kingdom. First, it has increased role differentiation between the religious and 
political sphere. Second, it has routinised state control of a broad range of areas that 
were formally dominated by the religious establishment; subsequently, the ulama lost 
                                                
51  Al-Yassini(1985), 70. 
52 Ayman Al-Yassini (1985) Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (United States: Westview 
Press) ,48-49. 
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many of their traditional functions and became a pressure group exerting limited 
influence over the governments activities and policies but never acting as an 
autonomous centre of power.53  
 
Through the centralisation of religious agencies, the state aimed to control collective 
consciousness in accordance with its own parameters of ‘truth’ and their political 
objectives.  Accordingly, the state could not ignore the production of religious opinions and 
fatwas. Linguistically, fatwa means an answer to a question; the question may be rhetorical 
or actual. In Islamic jurisprudence, a fatwa means the opinion of a scholar based on that 
scholar’s understanding and interpretation of the intent of the sources of Islam, that 
scholar’s knowledge of the subject in question and the social milieu that produced the issue 
or question. The scholar’s answer or Fatwa is not a binding rule; rather, it is 
recommendation. The answer (fatwa) may be opposed, criticised, accepted or rejected’.54 
Hence, the fluid nature of fatwas, which were based on opinions, could not create a binding 
‘truth’ to affect the religious consciousness. 
 
In order to make fatwas more effective for the service of the state, there had to be a rigid 
process of standardisation and homogenisation of the agencies, which produced the verdicts 
and religious opinions. Indeed the standardisation of fatwas was an important aspect of 
truth management in Saudi Arabia. These religious opinions could act as mechanisms of 
social control. Through fatwas, the state could affect the instruments of thought, and shape 
public behaviour without much effort. Even before the formation of modern Saudi Arabia, 
the House of Saud benefited from fatwas and the engineering of religious legitimacy. For 
example, in 1926, when Ibn Saud prevailed over the Hashemites and occupied Hejaz, 
fatwas were issued by sympathetic ulama to grant him the legal ‘authority’ to take over the 
holy places. They also urged fellow Muslims to subordinate to the House of Saud, as it was 
implementing the ‘will of God’.  In 1929 the same ulama issued fatwas to crush the 
Ikhwan, killing fellow Muslims who were instrumental in many of the military expeditions 
                                                
53 Al-Yassini(1985),  59. 
54 V.A Mohamad Ashrof , Islam and gender justice: questions at the interface (Kalpaz Publications, 2007),  
282. 
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of the House of Saud 55. Controlling the production of fatwas became even more important 
in recent times. For example, in 1990-1991, King Fahd turned to the United States for 
military support and protection from the Iraqi threat. Of course, inviting thousands of kuffar 
to the birthplace of Islam would be libellous for a ruler who regarded himself as the 
defender and the custodian of the two most holy places in the Islamic world.  
 
However, in order to address this paradox, the Wahhabi ulama issued fatwa to approve the 
arrival of kuffar soldiers in Saudi Arabia. More recently, in the year of the Arab Spring, the 
Saudi regime had to turn to the ulama to issue a fatwa banning any protests against the 
establishment. As the wind of the Arab Spring reached Saudi Arabia, a fatwa was issued on 
6th March 2011 to religiously forbid any action against the regime.  The fatwa included 
praising the unification of Saudi Arabia based on the guidance of the Qur’an and Islamic 
tradition, and cited a hadith that included a serious threat against internal dissent: ‘The 
Prophet again said: 'He who wanted separate affairs of this nation who are unified, you 
should kill him with [the] sword whoever he is'.56 
 
Clearly, controlling fatwas and religious verdicts have been essential for the House of Saud. 
However, it takes more than doctoring fatwas to standardise the religious consciousness of 
the society. The following sections will address some other important agencies, which have 
been influential in constructing and sustaining the religio-political narratives of the state. 
 
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs: An Agent of Religious Clientelism  
 
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs is a key institution in the regulation of the religious life of 
the country; it also acts as one of the main religious watchdogs in the country.57 The 
                                                
 
56Irfan al-Alawi, “Saudi Arabia's anti-protest fatwa is transparent”, The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/apr/01/saudi-arabia-anti-protest-fatwa  
(Accessed May, 10, 2012). 
57 It is extremely difficult to conduct interviews with the operational managers in this ministry and it is 
difficult to have exposure to their wider unofficial activities in the country. Nonetheless, the existing evidence 
suggests that the House of Saud heavily relies on such institutions to sustain its hegemony and through that 
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ministry plays a key role for the socialisation of Wahhabi perspectives in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the important tasks of the ministry is the supervision and regulation of the 
construction of almost all mosques in the country. In the general Islamic context mosques 
have been more than a place of worship. They have been historical institutions   for the 
dissemination of political and ideological perspectives into the minds of the people. They 
also have been key institutions for the officialisation of religious narratives connected to the 
ruling establishment. They have been indispensable places in which to engage with social 
and political issues within a religious framework. They also have been vital in standardising 
religious consciousness and mobilising the faithful to pursue various objectives.  
 
In the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Muslim world, mosques have been powerful 
associational agencies which acted as agents of the state working to impose the prevailing 
perspectives, or as places for the formation of opposition to the dominant discourse. Hence, 
in absence of other associational agencies such as political parties and civic organisations, 
mosques have been the vital ground for the imposition of hegemony and the formation of 
counter-hegemony. Indeed they have been indispensable spaces in the social sphere to 
reflect the religious consciousness as well as that of the political sentiment of the society. 
Mosques play a fundamental role in bringing various segments of society together (at least 
within the same religious framework) and providing a bridge between the ruled and the 
ruler.58 In Saudi Arabia, approximately thirty per cent of all mosques are built and endowed 
by private agents for charitable reasons.59 However, all mosques are under the jurisdiction 
and supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (Unlike the Sunni mosques, the process 
for obtaining a government-required license for a Shiite mosque is reported to be unclear 
and arbitrary.60) In 2008, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs estimated it was responsible for 
                                                                                                                                               
maintain its legitimacy. Until 2004, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs supported more than 50 so-called ‘Call 
and Guidance’ centres in Saudi Arabia. These centres are employing approximately 500 people to actively 
take actions to convert foreigners to Islam. Hence many sub-agencies are operating under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to manage and control the Wahhabi perspectives. 
58 See, Mohammad Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban, Religion And Politics In Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and 
the State (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2008). 
59International Religious Freedom Report 2004, “Saudi Arabia” 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35507.htm (Accessed March 3, 2011). 
60 International Religious Freedom 2010, “Saudi Arabia”, 
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seventy-three thousand Sunni mosques and more than fifty thousand Sunni clerics 
throughout the country.61However the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina do not go 
under the jurisdiction of the ministry. They are exclusively under the supervision of the 
General Presidency for the Affairs of the Two Holy Shrines, which is directly accountable 
to the King.62 The person responsible for this position holds a rank equivalent to a 
government minister.63 
 
According to the most recently available data from 2008, the ministry employs nearly 
seventy-eight thousand clerical staff, including fifty thousand Sunni imams and Friday 
sermon leaders, who are approved by the government. Based on the size of their 
constituency, the ministry pays the imams stipends ranging from $500 to $800 (1,875 to 
3,000 riyals).64 Those who deliver Friday sermons are paid an additional monthly stipend of 
$425 (1,593 riyals).65Although their income is considered low compared with other civil 
service salaries, the stipends are considered supplemental, rather than a main source of 
personal income. Most Imams and religious personnel have private businesses or full-time 
government jobs.66 Hence, they enjoy wider support and patronage from the state. (Shiite 
clerics are not funded by the ministry and instead rely on community contributions, which 
vary widely, depending on the number of congregants they serve. Some private mosques 
employ clerics of other nationalities.) 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs also acts as a watchdog 
organisation and has its own filtering mechanisms. These systematic measures are taken to 
standardise the religious discourse through the standardisation of the religious personnel 
whose survival depends upon the state. Indeed, the ministry defines the qualifications of 
                                                                                                                                               
ttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USDOS,,,4cf2d06d36,0.html, ( Accessed  March 3, 2011). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
According to the 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom ‘Thousands of other mosques existed in 
private homes, at rest stops along highways, and elsewhere throughout the country. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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Sunni clerics and the ministry is accordingly responsible for scrutinising the conduct of 
Imams. The ministry is also responsible for investigating complaints against clerics said to 
promote intolerance, violence, or hatred.67 However, it is the state which defines the scope 
and determines the measurements for ‘intolerance’ and ‘hatred’.  In 2003, the ministry 
established a programme to control and monitor all government-paid imams. This 
complements the work of the provincial committees of senior religious scholars, who 
supervise the full-time ministry employees who monitor all mosques and clerics.68 It is 
reported that the committee summons clerics accused of preaching intolerance. If the 
provincial committees are not able to change the perspectives of these clerics, the deviant 
imams are then referred to a central committee.69 The ministry officials claim that from 
2003 to 2006, one thousand three hundred clerics were dismissed during the first phase of 
this programme. The second three-year phase ended in 2009. On March 25 2009, in an 
interview with the daily Arabic newspaper, Okaz, the minister for Islamic Affairs claimed 
that over the five years since the beginning of the programme, three thousand two hundred 
clerics had been expelled; he also asserted that some imams were brought in for counselling 
and no clerics were sacked between 2008 and 2010.70 
 
Therefore, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs expands its control over the religious life of the 
country in two ways. Firstly, through financial dependency and, secondly, through a rigid 
monitoring system. Since the ministry pays the salaries of the imams and the other people 
who work in the mosques, the state promotes a form of self-censorship. Their financial 
survival directly depends upon the state. Thus, any deviance from the official discourse can 
deprive them from the privileges which they gain from the state.   
 
Figuratively speaking, if the imams were selling religious products, they would only have 
one client, which is the state. If they undermined this relationship, it would be extremely 
hard to resort to other sources for the continuation of their business activities. This explicit 
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dependency and the unequal relationship between the state and the religious practitioners 
constitute what I would like to call religious clientelism. Clientelism is a complex concept 
and it can be contextualised in various ways.71As Mario Caciagli puts it, it is ‘probably one 
of the most pregnant and utilisable categories in the contemporary political analysis.’72   
 
The way clientelism functions in various political systems can be different from country to 
country. Arguably, a degree of clientelism exists in most political systems. We have seen 
clientelist relations in former Communist states, or former military states in Latin America 
or in the current theocratic and authoritarian states in Iran and the wider Middle East; 
clientelism could also be functioning in democratic societies. There is a large literature 
available, examining the various manifestations of the concept within different socio-
economic and political frameworks.73However, for the purposes of clarification, we can 
refer to definition, which was put forward by Clapham, which simply suggests, 
‘Clientelism is a relationship of exchange between unequals.’74 In general, the concept 
refers to informal hierarchical power relations, which entail the uneven distribution of 
power. This relationship is mostly between individuals or groups in unequal positions, 
based on an exchange of benefits. A person with higher authority provides resources for 
someone or a social group with lower status. In return the beneficiaries have to reciprocate 
the favour and directly or indirectly serve the interests of the person in a higher position 
who provided them with resources. 
 
   According to Ben Aston: 
 
                                                
71  See, Steffen W. Schmidt, Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political Elientelism (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1977). 
72 Junichi Kawata, Compering Political Corruption and Elientelism, (Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 157. 
Also see, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic 
Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
73  See, Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu , Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism ( Washington: D.C. : 
World Bank, 2005). 
ashraf Sad al-Dīn Ibrahim (1996) al-Mujtama al-madani wa-al-taḥawwul al-dimuqraṭi fi al-waṭan al-Arabi ( 
Cairo: Markaz Ibn Khaldūn). 
74 C. Clapham, Clientelism and the State, in Clapham (ed) Private Patronage and Public Power: Political 
Clientelism in the Modern State (London: Pinter, 1982) .4. 
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The exchange between patron and client is reciprocal although not necessarily even. 
The patron needs the client’s support to maintain their position and the client receives 
the benefits from supporting their patron. Patrons, therefore, in order to maintain the 
reciprocal arrangement, must be in a position of power or at least wealth in order to 
reciprocate the support of their clients.75  
 
Aston also suggests that, although there is no official written contract obliging the parties 
involved, there is ambiguity which sustains the relationship as both client and patron look 
to continuously gain advantages from each other.76  He adds:  
 
Clients are free agents and are rational, self-maximising individuals. If they believed 
they would benefit more greatly from a different patron, they could seek their patronage. 
In terms of clientelism in political hierarchies clients, who in the system of clientelism 
are aspiring politicians, may have more than one patron and may switch mentors in order 
to increase their chances of climbing the political ladder.77 
 
This general account of clientelism can summarise the edifice of the relationship between 
the religious practitioners and the political establishment. However, the Saudi clientalis 
culture may still differ in a few aspects. Firstly, the main agents of religious thought have 
only one main patron in Saudi Arabia. They cannot simply switch their patrons to speed 
their own advancement. Of course, within the framework of the state, there is some 
factionalism and there are various agents and institutions which may offer minor 
alternatives, but the choices are often within the state framework and the state is 
increasingly pushing for further homogenisation. Moreover, there is not much ambiguity 
over the relationship between the religious practitioners and the state. The state explicitly 
                                                
75 Ben Aston, “Are the political systems of developing countries intrinsically clientelist?” 
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has attempted to control the religious agents and it has practically officialised the 
relationship through creating explicit financial dependency. 
 
The religious agents do not gain support and resources in return for conformity in an 
unsystematic context. In fact the relationship is highly systematised and is ‘official’ in the 
real sense of the term. The agents disseminate the state ideology and officially receive 
resources for their services. The King and his Household require legitimacy and good 
public relations in a religious context, and in return the establishment provides resources 
and protection.  
 
Although often clientelism is an unofficial tie between unequal parties, the Saudi 
establishment has attempted to regulate the dependency and make it as explicit as possible. 
In this light, some of the main agents of the social sphere have become an integral part of 
the state. The clientalist relations between the state and the religious practitioners are the 
ultimate example of monopolising the instruments of thought to reproduce a set of 
narratives to serve as the ideological ammunition of the state.Indeed, in the Saudi context 
religious institutions can no longer be perceived as the agents of civil society. They are 
almost completely operating to sustain the state’s hegemony.  The Imams who are playing 
key roles for dispersal of social and religious ideas need to go through a governmental 
process to obtain ‘qualifications’ for their jobs. Hence, ideologically they are scrutinised 
before being allowed a social platform. 
 
However, as was mentioned before, despite the heavy control of the mosques, they cannot 
be completely dominated by the state. Despite the infiltration of the state, mosques still can 
provide ad hoc platforms for counter-hegemonic activities. The religious root of the sawha 
movement, which opposed the Saudi monopolisation of the religious sphere, is an 
indication of the fact that the state has not been able to fully homogenise mosques. Hence, 
mosques in Saudi Arabia enjoy a hybrid nature, which is capable of enforcing hegemony 
and counter-hegemony at the same time.  
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It is also possible to argue that both Dar Al-Ifta and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs are 
active in addressing practical issues that are connected to the religious sphere of the 
country. However, in addition to these practical operations, the state relies on symbolic 
institutions, which can boost the legitimacy of the House of Saud. The next section will 
briefly examine the role of symbolic entities, which are providing a raison d'être for the 
monopoly of power by the House of Saud. Indeed, through controlling the practical engines 
of religious life and claiming symbolic capital from historical religious entities, the House 
of Saud has been attempting to officialise Wahhabism as the only undeniable religious 
‘truth’. 
  
Symbolic Capital: The Guardianship of the Holy Sites   
 
‘Symbolic capital’ is a notion which was developed by the French sociologist Bourdieu.  
Siisiäinen explores Bourdieu’s theory that the concept of social capital puts the emphasis 
on conflicts and the power function (social relations that increase the ability of an actor to 
advance her/his interests). Social positions and the division of economic, cultural and social 
resources in general, are legitimised with the help of symbolic capital. From the 
Bourdieuan perspective, social capital becomes a resource in the social struggles that are 
carried out in different social arenas or fields.78 
 
For Bourdieu, ‘social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.’79 He does not 
exclusively talk about the values of religious sites and their symbolic association with the 
people in charge of them. Nonetheless, he talks about resources available to individuals and 
social groups on the basis of honour, prestige or recognition, and functioning as an 
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authoritative embodiment of cultural value. Such values can assign legitimacy and 
distinction to individuals and social groups in society. For Bourdieu, symbolic power rests 
on recognition. For example, someone who is perceived as a war hero enjoys symbolic 
capital, enabling him or her to run for political office. Symbolic power rests on legitimate 
recognition. In other words, those with legitimate control of symbolic power can give 
recognition. For example, some secular agents may not have the legitimate control of 
symbolic power to assign religious recognition to the House of Saud, for their guardianship 
of the holiest sites in the Islamic world, but the ulama, with socially recognised religious 
credentials, can.   
 
Arguably, from the early stages of the establishment of the modern Saudi order, the House 
of Saud has shown a great awareness of the symbolic capital of their actions. They have 
taken calculated measures to gain necessary legitimacy through their symbolic actions. 
They have used many opportunities to build institutions and establish an apparent 
connection between their political dominance and the narratives of ‘truth’ in Islam. For 
example, in 1926 Ibn Saud chose the Grand Mosque of Mecca to proclaim his new position 
as the King of Hejaz. There has been a constant attempt to portray the Saudi dominance 
through symbolic actions, which involve Islam. From the early days of the Saudi Kingdom, 
the House of Saud had considerable ideological and religious interest in the holy places in 
Mecca and Medina. Historically, the various political establishments and caliphates gained 
legitimacy from the guardianship of such significant places in the Islamic world. The 
Ottoman Empire was the last major establishment, which vested its Islamic legitimacy in 
protecting the holy sites.  
 
According to James Piscatori : 
 
The Ottomans in the mid-16th century carried out a major redevelopment that gave the 
holy places the form that Saudi Arabia, the current custodian of the sanctuaries of 
Mecca and Medina, inherited. They also undertook to build a railway from Damascus 
to Medina, to facilitate the pilgrimage but mainly to support Ottoman garrisons in 
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Arabia. Its strategic value was recognised in the Arab Revolt of 1916 that pitted the 
local rulers, the Hashemites, against the Turks, and today the Saudis have announced 
their intention to rebuild some of the lines that were destroyed then.80 
 
Clearly, the custodianship of these sites has considerable symbolic value as people securing 
these sites are seen as housekeepers of the most important physical places in the umma. 
This is where the ‘final truth’ of Islam becomes symbolised in a physical manifestation. 
There are many transcendental narratives assigned to these physical places. Hence, the 
Ka‘ba metaphorically is perceived as the home of ‘the truth’, a place where millions of 
Muslims return in order to pray and practice the most important rituals of their faith, as 
turning in the direction of the Mecca they attempt to connect to the Ultimate Being.81 
Regardless of their location in the globe, they have to pray in that direction and if 
consciously they do not turn to Mecca, their prayer may not be accepted. Hence, Mecca is a 
physical place with a transcendental function. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire and 
the subsequent defeat of the Hashemite tribe in Hejaz, the House of Saud became the 
custodian of Mecca and Medina.  
 
From the early stages of Saudi dominance in Hejaz, there have been attempts to regularise 
the pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina.82 Accordingly, controlling and institutionalising the 
hajj became one of the first priorities of the House of Saud to prevent any infiltration from 
the rival tribes such as the Hashemites who were previously the guardians of the holy 
places. In November 1926, the son of the new ruler Prince Faysal issued a decree, nizam, to 
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form a comprehensive set of regulations to control pilgrimages in Hejaz. 83The decree 
provided regulations for various aspects of hajj including logistics.  
 
Article I of the decree defined mutawwifin as ‘persons of the population of Makkah 
nominated by His Majesty of the King from among people of religion and trustworthiness, 
to provide for all those who come for the hajj and to each of them will be assigned a group 
of Pilgrims’. Of course, this was partly about regulating the financial part of the process, 
but at the same time by providing a license system the government attempted to enforce its 
own religious agenda. hajj was the ultimate opportunity for exposure to the wider Wahhabi 
discourse. The House of Saud recognised this opportunity from a very early stage. The 
current regulations for hajj are based on number of decrees starting from 1938, and in 1965 
all the regulations were brought together into a single act Royal Decree, marsum.84 
 
The hajj has been subject to rigid institutionalisation for two main reasons; revenue and 
legitimacy. The fact that one of the pillars of Islam is a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina 
provides a guaranteed source of revenue for the state. In November 2009 Saudi Arabia 
accommodated approximately twenty-five million Muslim pilgrims from different corners 
of the world.85 The pilgrims visit the country throughout the year to perform the Umra, 
which is considered as a lesser pilgrimage, and to visit holy sites there and in Medina.86  
 
The guardianship of these sites contributes to Saudi hegemony. The Saudi connection to 
these secret sites provides religious legitimacy for the ruling order. The Saudi state heavily 
banks on their role as the guardians of such places; in various official publications the 
Saudi establishment portrays itself as the ultimate housekeeper, who provides essential 
services for Muslims worldwide.  For example, the official website of the Saudi embassy in 
the United States  states that: 
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The vast financial and human resources Saudi Arabia has committed to the hajj 
reflect the dedication of the leadership and citizens of the Kingdom to the service of 
Islam and the holy sites and to preserving them as a haven of peace for all Muslims. 
To Saudi Arabia, caring for the holy cities of Makkah, the birthplace of Islam and the 
Prophet Muhammad, and Medina, the Prophet's burial place, is a sacred trust 
exercised on behalf of all Muslims. Recognising the unique and historic tradition 
these holy sites represent, King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz adopted the official title of the 
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques as an expression of his deep sense of 
responsibility toward Islam.87 
 
The official website of the Ministry of Hajj states that: 
 
In the late King Fahd's reign, this tradition was maintained and, with the benefit of 
increased revenues, a program of expansion and refurbishment on an unprecedented 
scale was implemented. Of all the projects with which the late King Fahd was 
personally identified, none was closer to his heart than the expansion of the Holy 
Mosques in Makkah and Madinah. To emphasise the monarchy's commitment, and 
his own, to this responsibility, in 1986 King Fahd adopted the title of Custodian of 
the Two Holy Mosques in preference to the title of His Majesty. On the death of King 
Fahd on 1st August, 2005, the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques was 
assumed by King Fahd's successor, King Abdullah.88 
 
As already mentioned, the person in charge of the Two Holy Mosques is only and directly 
accountable to the King and has a kind of ministerial status. Today, as well as in the past, 
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his title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques provides an indispensable legitimacy for 
the King and his household.89 
 
The House of Saud has regarded itself as the only genuine protector of  ‘authentic Islam’ 
through adapting the teaching of Wahhabism. It is possible that their role in controlling the 
most important sites in the Islamic world is giving them the religious legitimacy they need 
for the monopolisation of power in Saudi Arabia. Although there is no way to measure the 
exact influence of these symbolic positions in gaining legitimacy, the custodianship of 
these holy sites is providing the House of Saud with an indispensable context for any 
religious claims. Controlling the most important places in the Islamic world has helped 
them to authenticate their narratives. This symbolic significance maintains the role of the 
Ministry of Hajj as an essential institution for the management of truth in Saudi Arabia.  
  
Ulama  
 
In the broadest sense of the term, refers to Islamic scholars engaged in the study and the 
arbitration of Shari‘a law, legal fiqh (jurisprudence) hadith and tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis). 
Within different Islamic legal traditions, there is a relatively well-defined hierarchical 
structure to rank the position of ulama within religious establishment as well as socio-
political framework. Clearly, to reach the higher ranks requires years of reading and 
education in various fields and subfields of Islamic studies. Socially and politically, they 
are not monolithic social groups, as they have diverse socio-political orientations. Within 
Saudi Arabia and the wider Islamic context ulama have diverse relations with the ruling 
system. Some are integral parts of establishments and some are in opposition to the ruling 
order.90 
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There are about thirty to forty alims who constitute the core of ulama leadership in Saudi 
Arabia.91 These alims who are appointed by the king have direct access to the king and 
other senior members of the ruling family. The king and minsters consult them about 
religious as well as important political affairs of the state, so they have capability to 
influence policy making in the country.92 Within all the above Saudi state institutions (Dar 
Al-Ifta, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Hajj) the ulama play a 
significant role in maintaining the official status of Wahhabism as the religion of the state. 
The role of ulama in socialising and sustaining the religious narratives of the state has been 
indispensable. Hence, it is imperative to pay more attention to their role in Saudi Arabia. 
Clearly, the special relationship between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi ulama goes 
back to the early days of Saudi-Wahhabi co-operation in the eighteenth century. Previously, 
this special relationship was analysed in the context of religious clientelism, which entails 
an unequal relationship between the House of Saud and the religious practitioners. 
Nonetheless, not all Wahhabi ulama are the clients of the state. Indeed, one cannot 
homogenise all the ulama into a singular and static social category, which has been 
subservient only to the will of the House of Saud. Not all Saudi ulama are Wahhabi and not 
all Wahhabi ulama are alike. At times the ulama have confronted the House of Saud. For 
example, before, the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom there were many ulama who 
disagreed with the Saudi claim for power and opposed the Wahhabi reading of Islam.  
 
Even after the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom, the House of Saud failed to completely 
standardise the ulama’s religious and political orientation. During the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s, even some of the Wahhabi ulama opposed the state’s policies. They disagreed with 
some of the modernising policies of the state such as introducing education for women. 
More recently, many important figures such as those ulama involved in the sahwa 
movement disagreed with the Saudi élite and criticised the role of the state ulama in Saudi 
                                                
91 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia: Society, Government and the Gulf Crisis: Society, Government and the Gulf 
Crises ( London: Routledge, 1993),10. 
92 Ibid. 
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Arabia. The sahwa (awakening) movement emerged in the 1990s, which provided some 
challenges for the state and disputed some of the official policies of the Kingdom.93 Indeed, 
the sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia became a Salafi assembly line and ulama such as 
Safar bin Abdul-Rahman al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah worked on increasing the 
political and Islamic awareness of the youth.94 This involved criticising various social and 
political policies of the state. 
 
The ulama have been the loudspeakers of the definitive interpretation and yet some 
members of the same social group have questioned the official narratives and proposed 
alternative perspectives. Hence it is difficult to explain the functionality of ulama within a 
theoretical framework. We know their role in the formation of Saudi hegemony has been 
essential. But as the implication of the aforementioned sahwa movement implies, a social 
group, which has been vital in sustaining hegemony at certain times, can deviate and 
constitute an effective counter-hegemony against the state.95 Therefore, it is possible to 
argue that for the House of Saud the ulama have been their best friend and yet their worst 
enemy for the management of official narrative. So how can the role of ulama be 
explained? Are they simply the state clients serving the religious interests of their patrons? 
Are they functioning as intellectuals? Or are they forming a unique social category? 
  
In Saudi Arabia, there are different categories of ulama. We have to remember that, when 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established, a considerable proportion of the population 
of Saudi Arabia had not been socialised into the Wahhabi understanding of Islam. 
Accordingly, there were religious leaders who represented schools of thought other than 
Wahhabism. There were ulama in Hejaz who did not subscribe to the Hanbali madhhab. 
However, there are grounds for the argument that, in the ‘battle of ideas’, the non-Wahabbi 
                                                
93 See, Stephane Lacoix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
94 Jarret Brachman , Global Jihadism : Theory and Practice ( London: Routledge , 2008), 55. 
95 As was explained, this pattern can apply to the general Islamic truth management at the micro level. 
Historically, various political establishments have officialised certain narratives in order to gain legitimacy. 
Hence, their legitimacy depended upon the institutionalisation of what they portrayed as official Islam. Yet, 
always competing narratives emerged to contest the official truth. Although the political establishments could 
monopolise the official religious infrastructure, they could not completely homogenize Islamic narratives.   
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ulama were ideologically pacified. In theory, they were independent of the state and its 
ideological framework; nevertheless they largely accepted the supremacy of the prevailing 
order and did not oppose it directly. In this light, they still had historical ‘continuity’ in 
spite of the challenges and discriminations they may have had to face. Despite their 
perceived independence from the state, they have been largely conservative.This 
conservatism, as well as their inability to constitute any tangible ideological resistance, has 
served the interests of the state. In effect, we can regard the minority ulama as traditional 
actors who do not necessarily share the perspectives of the ruling class, but they have 
reached a compromise with the state and its ideological apparatus, in part because of 
institutional pressure and financial incentives. On the other hand, the role of calibrating 
Wahhabi ulama can be understood in the context of patron-client relations, which are 
essential for the socialisation of the prevailing ideology. However, the critical Wahhabi 
ulama constitute the greatest danger for the religious legitimacy of the state. For example in 
the case of the aforementioned sowha movement the ulama used the same religious 
language and ideological instruments to undermine the state. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Historically, Wahhabism has functioned as the ideological engine of the House of Saud. 
Before the creation of the nation-state, Wahhabism provided the House of Saud with an 
indispensable sense of religious mission, which motivated and mobilised the Saudi forces. 
It provided the House of Saud with a sense of religious purpose and identity, which would 
effectively distinguish them from their rivals. The foundational elements of the creed were 
based on binaries of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Wahhabism claimed to be 
the representation of the ‘truth’ and the House Saud claimed to be the instrument to 
disseminate it.   
 
This sense of religious mission was important for the House of Saud since it provided a 
‘legitimate’ context for claiming power. In 1932, when finally the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was declared, the mandating machine of Wahhabism did not lose its significance for 
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the House of Saud. As a matter of fact, it became even more instrumental in helping the 
House of Saud to build a new nation-state. The House of Saud wanted to make Wahhabism 
officially the ‘national’ creed of the state. They wanted to turn Wahhabism into a national 
frame of reference to synchronise the existing tribes with the ruling family. However, the 
official recognition of Wahhabism as the national belief could not occur in the abstract.  
 
The regime needed effective trans-tribal institutions to socialise their narratives and 
establish their authorities transcript. This process of top-down socialisation could not 
emerge in the absence of a necessary infrastructure, which would effectively translate direct 
repression based on brute power to indirect control based on consent. By necessary 
infrastructure, I referred to a set of social agencies, which were developed and employed by 
the ruling order to promote and promulgate its own ideological perspectives for gaining 
legitimacy. Thus, through various socialising and associational agencies, the state has 
attempted to synchronise its subjects with its own legitimising narratives. Accordingly, as 
has been demonstrated, the new state took measures to construct a horizontally bonded 
society in which they could be perceived as the natural possessors of power within an 
‘organic’ territory in which the state and the nation were ‘naturally’ connected.    
  
This chapter examined the formation of some specific institutions and ministries, which 
were created by the House of Saud to recondition the national religious consciousness in 
accordance with its official regime of ‘truth’. This chapter addressed the construction of 
those national institutions that have attempted to control religious consciousness through 
the lens of official truth. This chapter argued that Dar Al-Ifta was one the most significant 
institutions built to systematically target the trans-tribal religious consciousness in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It became an important institution for the promotion of official 
‘truth’ through producing and doctoring fatwas and religious opinions. Dar Al-Ifta’s 
religious productions and interpretive policies have been essential in synchronising the 
ruling class with their subjects. This chapter also examined the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
which functions as one of the main religious watchdogs in the country. The ministry played 
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a significant role in socialising the official truth in Saudi Arabia. One of the important tasks 
of this ministry is to supervise the activities of almost all the mosques in the country.  
 
The ministry employs nearly all clerical staff, including over fifty thousand Sunni imams 
and Friday sermon leaders, who were approved by the government. All of these Imams and 
religious practitioners receive their salaries from the state. The ministry has been taking 
systematic measures to standardise the religious activities of their employees. The ministry 
is actively responsible for scrutinising the conduct of the imams who are responsible for 
instilling the ‘right’ religious values in their constituencies. This chapter argued that the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs expands control over the religious sphere in two ways: firstly 
though financial dependency and, secondly, though a rigid monitoring system. This explicit 
dependency and the unequal relationship between the state and the religious practitioners 
have constituted what I called religious clientelism. Although often clientelism is an 
unofficial tie between unequal parties, the Saudi establishment has attempted to regulate the 
dependency and make it as explicit as possible. In this light, some of the main agents of the 
social sphere became an integral part of the state. The clientelist relation between the state 
and the religious practitioners is the ultimate example of monopolising the instruments of 
thought to reproduce a set of narratives to serve as the ideological ammunition of the state. 
 
This chapter also paid attention to the Ministry of Hajj and the symbolic value of the most 
holy sites of Islam, which are now under custodianship of the House of Saud. As was 
demonstrated, from the early days of the Saudi Kingdom, the House of Saud had a 
considerable ideological and religious interest in the holy places in Mecca and Medina. 
Clearly, the custodianship of these sites has considerable symbolic value as those people 
securing these sites are seen as the housekeepers of the most important physical places in 
the umma. This is where the ‘final truth’ of Islam becomes symbolised in a physical 
manifestation. The guardianship of these sites has contributed to Saudi hegemony. The 
Saudi’s connection to these secret sites provides religious legitimacy for the ruling order.  
The Saudi state banks heavily on their role as the guardians of such places. In various 
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official publications the Saudi establishment portrays itself as the ultimate housekeeper 
who provides essential services for Muslims worldwide.  
 
Finally, this chapter assessed the role of the ulama in Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi ulama have 
been indispensable agents in disseminating the official’ truth’ in the kingdom but the state 
failed to homogenise all the ulama into a single and static social category, which is 
subservient to the will of the state alone, since not all Saudi ulama are Wahhabi and not all 
Wahhabi ulama are alike. Although there have been religious leaders who represented 
schools of thought other than Wahhabism, in the ‘battle of ideas’ the non-Wahhabi ulama 
have been ideologically pacified. Their conservatism, as well as their inability to constitute 
any tangible ideological resistance, has served the interests of the state. On the other hand, the 
role of the orthodox Wahhabi ulama can be understood in the context of the patron-client 
relations, which are essential for the socialisation of the prevailing ideology. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
EDUCATION 
Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to examine the process of socialisation of the Wahhabi regime of truth and 
its challenges, through both pedagogic action and the educational mechanisms, which were 
constructed after the formation of the Saudi nation-state. In order to scrutinise modern Saudi 
education effectively, it is necessary to provide a historical context. This can help us to 
analyse the historical continuity of the use of education for the dissemination of the religio-
political perspectives of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, which developed between the Saudi 
state and Wahhabism. Of course, within the first and second Saudi emirates, education lacked 
structure and was a highly irregular and unsystematised activity. Nonetheless, the notion that 
education was a vehicle that existed to spread and solidify Wahhabi perspectives took root.  
 
Before the declaration of the kingdom in 1932, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance was prone both to 
continuous conflict and to friction.1 Accordingly, the intellectual basis of Wahhabism was 
influenced by conflict and ideological confrontation. The polemical nature of Wahhabi 
education in these periods of conflict reached on into the modern era. As part of the 
organisation of the nation-state, education started to be more systematic, with a defined scope 
and clear objectives and the discovery of oil, which shifted the political economy and paved 
the way for the further institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of various sectors, including 
education.  
 
In this light, a more complex educational infrastructure emerged in order to accommodate the 
socio-political particularities of the new polity. From the early stages of building the 
educational infrastructure, the ulama played an active role in creating a single subjective 
                                                
1 See, Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: a Critical Essay, (Unites States: Islamic Publications International, 2002). 
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national vision from the base to the peak of Saudi society, which accorded with the religio-
political mandate of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In this light, a modern educational 
mechanism was built so that the Wahhabi mission for the management of the official truth in 
Saudi Arabia could be continued. It became an instrument for ideologically cleansing 
‘innovations’ and spreading the ‘true’ teaching of Islam. Thus, education was used as a 
powerful instrument of social control to standardise the collective consciousness in 
accordance with the Saudi-Wahhabi narrative.  
 
The Saudi education system is a large and complex mechanism, which cannot be covered in 
its entirety. This chapter will only look at some of the specific subjects and textbooks, which 
are taught at elementary and secondary school level in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, there will 
be two interrelated sections analysing the teaching of religious studies and history across the 
education system at school level.  
 
For centuries, the main pedagogical activities were primarily limited to Islamic studies within 
the Arabian Peninsula. There was hardly any serious scholarship on any ‘secular’ subjects, as 
the main focus was often on the memorisation of Qur’an, Qur’anic exegesis, study of the 
hadith and Islamic jurisprudence. Although the introduction of modern educational structures 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia modernised the education system, Islamic studies still 
continued to be the core subject to study. From the inception of modern schooling in Saudi 
Arabia, the state had a considerable interest in the subject and vast amounts of resources have 
been devoted to Islamic studies. Hence, it is essential to pay special attention to religious 
studies and the way in which it articulates the narrative of power in a religious context in the 
Kingdom.  
 
Along with religious studies, history has been the most significant subject to be doctored 
within the official education system. The function of history as a mechanism of ideological 
enforcement goes back to ancient times. Throughout the ages and within various differing 
socio-political frameworks, history has been part and parcel of the time and has been 
employed to aid the articulation of prevailing social perspectives. Since history is a living 
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narrative and it has powerful indoctrinating properties, those who are in charge of controlling 
the reflections of the past are in a position of great power. It is indeed the power of 
representation. Saudi official historiography has been very much aware of this empowering 
tool of representation. Accordingly, the official history, which is taught across the education 
system, is tailored to create a ‘natural’ historical context for the existing power complex in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the study of history and the ways in which historical 
narratives are constructed and conveyed require special attention in this chapter. 
 
Following the same analytical approach, this chapter will continue by addressing the role of 
higher education in Saudi Arabia. There will be a critical discussion of the role of 
universities and their involvement in the politics of truth management in Saudi Arabia.  
Finally, this chapter examines the educational reform agenda, which was initiated after 9/11.  
The alleged involvement of a number of Saudi nationals in terrorist operations in New York 
and Washington raised many questions about the sources of motivation of the hijackers. After 
9/11, many scholars and policy makers started to scrutinise the social, religious and cultural 
environment of Saudi Arabia to find possible factors that could provide an inspiration for 
extremism. In the fierce climate of the ‘War against Terror’, the Saudi educational system 
was accused of producing people like Muhammad Atta, who carried out a major terrorist 
action in the US. During these intense years, new education reforms were introduced to 
harmonise Saudi foreign policy symbolically with its internal socio-political dynamics. This 
chapter attempts to critically scrutinise the scope of the reform agenda and its implication for 
the Saudi politics of truth management.  
 
On Education  
 
Indeed, when we are talking about the process of truth management and the role of 
socialisation in that process, we cannot ignore the educational agencies and social 
mechanisms which build the necessary edifice for the packaging and branding of ideas as 
‘truth’. Of course, as already put forward, ‘truth’ does not come from the possession of pure 
knowledge, which is objective and static. The construction of ‘truth’ happens over time and 
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indeed it is not an undemanding procedure. The accepted ‘truth’ can be objectified and 
internalised to the extent that one may completely cease to see that these metaphors are 
constructed and do not actually represent what they claim. Berger and Luckmann refer to this 
process as ‘sedimentation’. The perpetuation of Saudi dominance has been partly dependent 
upon this attempt at the inter-subjective sedimentation of certain interpretations of the’ truth’, 
which in turn enforces a theoretical justification for a model of the distribution of 
power favourable to the House of Saud.  
 
Historically, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance has been based on an amalgamation of power and 
knowledge. Arguably, the brute power of Saudi forces has been a precondition for the 
promotion of the Wahhabi narrative and equally Wahhabi perspectives to provide a 
‘legitimate’ context for the application of that force. Hence, power and knowledge have 
always complemented one another in sustaining and perpetuating a historic alliance, which 
has lasted until the present day, and therefore education, as a productive means of the 
management of knowledge, is important to the House of Saud. Thus, before analysing the 
educational strategies of the country, it is imperative to have a broad theoretical 
understanding of education as the historical means for the social transition and management 
of knowledge.  It is therefore beneficial to provide a wider context for education and its 
multi-faceted features before addressing the Saudi educational policies.   
 
Although education as a practice and concept is part and parcel of all societies, it is difficult 
to define it as a monolithic notion. According to Scott and Marshall, ‘Education is a 
philosophical as well as sociological concept, denoting ideologies, curricula, and pedagogical 
techniques for the inculcation and management of knowledge and the social reproduction of 
personalities and cultures.’2From the age of antiquity to modern times, education has been 
seen as an instrument for social transition. Many visionaries and thinkers regarded education 
as the best means of attaining ‘ideals’. We can even trace these ideas back to ancient times. 
                                                
2 John Scott & Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
205. 
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For example, the way, in which education was theorised by Plato, influenced people’s 
understanding of education for many centuries to come.3 
 
Within the Platonic world, the ‘right’ education to create the ‘right’ men was seen as a 
precondition to create the ‘ideal state’. As later writers and thinkers were to do, he 
sees education as an effective means of social engineering, which would create and sustain a 
utopian state. This perception of education as an agent of change travelled through the ages 
and shaped various social and political frameworks throughout history.4 Indeed, many social 
systems have recognised education as a means of providing ‘liberty’ and ‘emancipation’ from 
worldly impediments. (Many of these narratives conceptualise education within a framework, 
which today is recognised as objectivist. Objectivist education implies that knowledge is 
independent of the learner. In other words, there is a distinction between knowledge and the 
knower, so that knowledge and ‘truth’ are out there for the learner to go and discover.) 
 
Of course, the appreciation of education as an agent of change and transition has not been 
limited to western civilisation. In fact, education as a powerful means of social engineering 
has been adapted within various socio-cultural frameworks and often there 
are interconnecting links between their approaches and methodologies. Accordingly, 
education is profoundly valued within the Islamic context as well as in the West. Islam 
mirrors the Platonic approach in seeing education as a means of attaining ‘ideals’.5  
                                                
3 Plato’s philosophy puts forward both the theoretical and practical scope of education. His theory of education is 
primarily accommodated within two Dialogues, The Republic and The Laws. For Plato, philosophical objectives 
within a full education enable people to transcend their desires in order to reach true knowledge. For him, 
arriving at’ true’ knowledge was the only way to break the chains, which hold back man’s perception of the true 
forms. Thus, he refers to education as a means of reaching an ideal society. He provides practical and theoretical 
details for his educational programme. Plato notes that in his ideal state, the guardian class supervises 
matters since they have received the right education. 
4 For example Plato’s emphasis on the gravity of education was disseminated by Rousseau in Émile (1762), 
and in his other influential classic, ' The Social Contract ‘. In Émile, Rousseau was seeking a strategy to 
employ education as a powerful social device able to emancipate man from ethical and social erudition. As 
William Boyd notes, Rousseau explores a system of education, which would enable the natural man whom he 
identifies in The Social Contract to overcome a corrupt society. See, William Boyd, The Educational Theory 
of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Longmans, (Green and Co, 1911) 127. 
5 Indeed, there are many hadith assigned to the Prophet of Islam, emphasizing the role of education and the 
importance of accumulating knowledge. It is not without benefit to point out a few important hadith regarding 
education, to highlight the institutional importance of the notion in Islam. ‘Seek knowledge though it be in 
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In the same way as many other belief systems, Islam proclaims as sacred a set of definitions 
and   normative knowledge, both of which are prescribed for the faithful to internalise in 
order to reach personal salvation and create the ‘ideal state’. Of course, Islam’s understanding 
of true knowledge is objectivist. Hence, there are independent ‘truths’ out there for the 
faithful to discover. Thus, a faithful follower is expected to embrace the Qur’an, which is 
described as independent knowledge, directly descended from God. Hence, the spread of 
Qur’anic words and Islamic knowledge, through formal and informal education, has been an 
important way of perpetuating the religion. This is a classic example of ‘inter-subjective 
sedimentation’, by which knowledge is passed from one generation to another.  
 
Arguably, in the same way as in the Platonic utopian vision, which idealises ‘perfect 
knowledge’, in Islam Qur’anic knowledge is considered as final, thus enabling the believer to 
reach perfection and understand its ideals. There are many verses in the Qur’an which 
emphasise the importance of travelling along the path of knowledge in order to find the way 
to paradise. Islam, as well as many other belief systems, envisages a utopia, which can be 
reached through the adaption of ‘true knowledge’. Through the internalisation of true 
knowledge, the faithful follower could adopt the ‘right’ set of practices, which would help 
him or her to reach the ideal state. Hence, there is a connection between utopia and education 
in Islam as well. It is through education that a believer evaluates his worldly journey and 
apprehends the truth, which is the only key to the ideal Islamic position.6 
                                                                                                                                               
China’ is one of the Prophet’s defining sayings about education, which is used as a motto for the promotion of 
education in the Islamic world.  It is reported that the Prophet stated that ‘The seeking of knowledge is a duty 
incumbent on every Muslim, man and woman’ and ‘An hour's contemplation and study of God's creation is 
better than a year of adoration’. Uthman also has reported on the Prophet stating, ‘The best among you is he 
who learns and teaches the Qur'an’. 
6 Abu al-Faz̤l Izzati and A. Ezzati suggest that the main objective of religion according to the Qur’an is 
education, hence in the early days of Islamic history new provisions were made for educating recent converts. 
Converts had to learn some of the Qur’an, which was considered as the ultimate revelation of truth, and they 
had to be trained in the Islamic creed and practices. This process started from the time of the Prophet himself 
and was adapted by the following Islamic rulers. Umar assigned teachers in every land where Islam 
had penetrated. Abu al-Faz̤l Izzati and A. Ezzati also suggest that the importance of Islamic education was so 
significant that soon it became an independent responsibility. Thus, education played an important role in 
widening the boundaries of Islam. Hence, as the geographical boundaries of Islam expanded, the Islamic 
imperial administration sought ways to socialise the new subjects into the prevailing belief system. This 
policy or approach resulted in a successful programme of Arabisation, which linguistically and 
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Indeed education, whether conducted formally or informally, is the product of accumulated 
human experience and is the historical locomotive for the transition of ideas from one 
generation to another. Within the context of any civilisation, cultural framework or belief 
system a practice, which is often identified as education, is responsible for the standardisation 
of collective consciousness. It carries a set of normative and ideological perspectives that are 
vital for the maintenance of collective consciousness. In this light, education has been 
associated with social engineering. Although social engineering can be a by-product of 
education, it can be manifested through other social agencies as well.  
 
Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander and Rob Shields summarise social engineering as 
‘arranging and challenging environmental and social forces to create a high probability that 
effective social action will occur. The word 'engineering 'suggests the designing and erecting 
of structures and process in which human beings serve as raw material'.7 
 
Usually, the notion of social engineering comes with negative connotations and we often 
associate the term with states, which are obviously ideologically based. Nonetheless, 
ideology is a part and parcel of all nation-state projects, and a degree of top-down social 
engineering to create and sustain a unified subjective national consciousness, must exist 
within the socio-political framework of all nation-states.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
doctrinally harmonised most of the new subjects into the official narrative of the Islamic Empire. Within a 
short time, most subjects spoke the language of their rulers and subscribed to the official creed of the empire. 
Hence, spreading the religion of the empire as the narrative of power through the language of the 
rulers helped to harmonise the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Clearly, through 
the homogenisation of the means of communication and the standardisation of the collective 
consciousness, there could be a broader scope for cultural hegemony, which would maintain the hierarchy of 
power.   
 
For more information see:  Abu al-Faz̤l Izzati, A. Ezzati , The spread of Islam: the contributing factors, 
(Islamic College for Advanced Studies Publications, 2002) 346. 
7 Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander, Rob Shields, Social Engineering (Carleton University Press, Canada, 1996), 
1. 
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However, the interference of the political powers in shaping the social sphere and affecting 
the collective consciousness is not necessarily a Westphalian product. Such practices are not 
limited to a specific space and time and they go back to antiquity. Despite its long history, the 
notion of social engineering did not become the subject of rigid academic study until the end 
of World War II. The modern study of the notion, as in the social science discipline of socio-
technics only began in the 1950s. Socio-technics emerged as a general theory of how efficient 
methods for inducing collective action work.8 
  
Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander and Rob Shields suggest that the state, in the form of 
various organisations and social agencies, embarks on major interventions in the name not 
only of national interest and strategy, but of social order and morality.9 In the context of the 
twentieth century, many totalitarian states imposed their top-down policies using the pretext 
of creating a better social order. These states claimed to have the best vision of the future and 
thus of the ways to shape it. They framed their intervention within an ethical framework and 
they acted as if they were the only people who could distinguish good from evil in the social 
sphere.10 According to Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander and Rob Shields, ‘They also claim 
to have the technical knowledge necessary to attain what is good and eliminate what is bad. 
The latter holds priority; their first task is to eradicate evil.’11 
 
In order to broaden our understanding of social engineering, we can examine it as a 
mechanism of social control. In every social framework, there are various mechanisms of 
social control, which Berger defines as ‘various means used by a society to bring its 
recalcitrant members back into line’.12Mechanisms of social control vary and the social 
situation and the character of the groups condition them.  However, in general one can define 
them as formal or informal measures patterning and regulating individual behaviour.13 This 
                                                
8 Ibid. 4. 
9 Ibid. 2. 
10 Ibid.3 (Although this chapter primarily looks at top-down social engineering, the practice also can take 
place from the bottom up). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Anchor, 1963), 69. 
13 James J Chriss , Social Control: an Introduction (Polity Press, 2007), 1. 
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direct control can entail regulations, laws and punishment, while indirect control is about 
shaping and reshaping patterns of behaviour through socialising agencies such as education. 
Edward Ross argued that:  
 
Society is not a magical super-organism or a social mind, neither is it a mere 
assemblage of human beings. The true constitution of human society is to be found 
somewhere between the lone individual and the social group. For him, there are sources 
of influence and control whereby individuals are transformed into social beings. These 
distinct forces create patterns of association between members of society.14  
 
Accordingly, individuals are socialised into their roles and there are certain social 
mechanisms such as education, which control and enforce this. There is a vast body of 
literature consisting of hypotheses and theories that deal with social control.15 For example, 
one can touch briefly upon the notion of symbolic violence by Pierre Bourdieu who extends 
                                                
14 Ibid. 15. 
15 In order to clarify the concept, I refer to Peter Berger’s definition, as it is relatively precise and 
comprehensive. In his classic Invitation to Sociology, he articulates six mechanisms of social control.  The 
first category is violence, which consists of physical force and the threat of violence.  (The following chapter 
will exclusively deals with violence as a defining mechanism of social control in Saudi Arabia) The second 
category is economic pressure. For example, before an individual adheres him or herself to a nonconformist 
codes of conduct might have the fear of being fired and fear of not being hired. The economic consequences 
of certain actions can standardise his or her scope of activities to at least accept if not respect the status quo. 
The third mechanism is the verbal and mental pressures, which include persuasion, ridicule, social 
marginalization, ostracism and fraudulent claims and the fear of losing one’s social status.  This pattern of 
control is very much applicable to the Saudi’s treatment of religious minorities, in particular Shiites. The state 
actively responds to religious and ideological nonconformity through ostracism and spreading ideas that the 
Shiites are ‘innovators and ‘deviants’ from Islam.  The fourth category is morality, custom and manners. They 
are also part of a written or unwritten social contract, which is the product of social construction that 
conditions human behaviour. Although some are legal, most are enforced informally. As will be discussed 
later, through this category Saudi Arabia attempts to enforce its hegemonic narratives to condition the 
collective behaviour. Fifth is the occupational control. This includes the formal rules and regulations of 
employers and ‘professional codes of conduct’. The final category is family and personal friends, which can 
have considerable psychological influence on our objectification and evaluation of social reality. All the 
above instruments enforce social conformity, which condition the individual’s modes of thought and 
constitute patterns for their behaviour. Hence, if these standardising mechanisms are challenged, it will cause 
some repercussions.  The behaviour of the individuals and the groups that are challenging these standardizing 
mechanisms are seen as unordinary and nonconformists.  However, the mechanisms of social control cannot 
completely eliminate the minority influence. Minority Influence, which is also a theory in social psychology, 
advocates that, as long as the minority group is consistent, there is always scope for their impact and influence 
on the majority. Therefore, despite the social cost, there are always platforms for minority militants and 
nonconformist to exercise influence.  
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the notion of violence to incorporate various mechanisms of social control. This notion is 
particularly helpful in scrutinising those education systems with an implicit ideological 
mandate. For Bourdieu, symbolic violence is the mostly unconscious form of domination 
which social habits maintain over a subject‘s consciousness. Bourdieu notes that:  
 
Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the 
dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when 
their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge 
that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated 
form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural; 
or, in other words, when the schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate 
themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, 
white/black, etc.) Are the product of the incorporation of the (thus naturalised) 
classifications of which their social being is the product.16 
 
Richard Jenkin summarises Bourdieu’s symbolic violence as: 
 
The imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning (i.e. culture) upon groups or 
classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate. This legitimacy obscures the 
power relations, which permit that imposition to be successful. Insofar as it is accepted as 
legitimate, culture adds its own force to those power relations, contributing to their 
systematic reproduction. This is achieved through a process of misrecognition: the 
process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a 
form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder... the mainstay of the 
exercise of symbolic violence is pedagogic action, the imposition of a cultural arbitrary, 
of which there are three modes: diffuse education, which occurs in the course of 
interaction with competent members of the social formation in question (an example 
might be the informal peer group), family education, which speaks for itself, and 
institutionalised education (examples of which might be age-set initiation rituals, on the 
                                                
16  P. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, United States: Stanford University Press, 2000), 170. 
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one hand, or school, on the other). The symbolic strength of any pedagogic agency—its 
capacity successfully to inculcate meaning—is a function of its weight in the structure of 
power relations.17 
 
Indeed, in this context, pedagogic action represents the interests of the dominant class. By 
reproducing culture it is reproducing the power relations, which legitimise its own 
operation.18 Pedagogic action selectively excludes or includes ideas and values in accordance 
with the interests of the prevailing group.19Hence, the set of ideas and perspectives, which are 
included, are portrayed as being natural and ideologically uncontaminated. Indeed, pedagogic 
action has been an indispensable part of the politics of truth management in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Education in Saudi Arabia: An Overview 
 
Before the establishment of Saudi Arabia as a nation-state, education was primarily an 
informal activity within the territory. From the time of the arrival of Islam in the Arabian 
Peninsula, more cosmopolitan cities such as Mecca and Medina accommodated some Islamic 
schools and scholars. As was mentioned before, Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the 
Wahhabi creed, received part of his education in Hejaz where he studied the science of hadith 
and jurisprudence. However, despite the fact that it accommodated the holiest sites in the 
Islamic world, the Arabian Peninsula was never a major educational centre in the Muslim 
world. 
 
After the Ottoman occupation of the Peninsula in 1517, some other educational institutions 
were erected in Mecca and Medina.20 Some of these early institutions included the school of 
the Sultan Qayt Bay, the Sultan of Egypt, the Sultan Gayath al-Din and the Sultan of 
Bengal.21However, most of the Ottoman schools primarily provided education for the 
                                                
17 Richard Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu (London:  Routledge, 1992), 65-66. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mahmoud Abdullah Saleh, “Development of Higher Education in Saudi Arabia”, Journal of Higher  
Education,Volume 15, Issue 1-2, (1986) 17-23. 
21 Ibid. 
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families of the colonial officials.22 During the period of Ottoman rule in the Hejaz, the 
colonial government provided a six year education programme which included geography, 
history and even art along with general Islamic studies, but the programme was not in the 
students’ native language, as the courses were taught in Turkish. Along with language 
problems, many parents refrained from sending their children to these schools, as they feared 
they would be conscripted into the Ottoman army.23 
 
Hence, it is possible to assert that, even by colonial standards, the country did not benefit 
much from the Ottoman educational heritage.24 The main providers of education were the 
kutabs, which were ungraded Qur’anic schools attached to the mosques.25 These kutabs 
remained popular in Saudi Arabia until they were gradually replaced by the modern school 
system. However, even in terms of orthodox Islamic education, they were limited and they 
did not provide any dynamic scholarship. The main function of the kutabs was to memorise 
the Qu’ran and other religious texts. The memorisation and recitation of the Qur’an and other 
basic texts continue to be the defining feature of much of the educational system of Saudi 
Arabia even today, and can be traced back to the practices in the kutab schools. 26 
 
Thus, through the centuries, the main centres of Islamic education moved to other parts of the 
Muslim world such as Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus and Najaf. There can be many reasons for 
this lack of educational development in pre-modern Saudi Arabia. Arguably, the isolation of 
the land minimised wider exposure to the developing world and led to educational bodies 
stagnating. Of course, there is also a connection between power and education as there is 
interdependence between power and the production of knowledge. Historically, major 
Islamic educational bodies mushroomed within the centres of power. For example, in 
Andalusia cities such as Cordoba provided world-class education, and during the Abbasid or 
                                                
22 Wayne H. Bowen, The history of Saudi Arabia (United States: Greenwood Press, 2007), 12. 
23 William A. Rugh, “Education Saudi Arabia: Choices and Constraints”, Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, no. 2, 
(2002). 
24 see, Abd al-Raḥman al-Shamikh, al-Taʻlim fī Makkah wa-al-Madinah akhir al-ahd al-Uthmani, (Riyadh:  
al-Shamikh, 1973).  
25 Mahmoud Abdullah Saleh (1986). 
26 William A. Rugh, (2002) 
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Fatimid domination, Baghdad and Cairo both became major centres of Islamic 
scholarship. Clearly, within these centres of power, schools and scholars were able to find 
patrons to fund their activities while Arabian peninsula lagged behind in educational 
development, as it remained politically insignificant for centuries. 
  
However, from the early stages of their emergence as a major religio-political entity, the 
Saudi-Wahhabi alliance gave attention to education, so that it could promote their 
perspectives and expand their religious constituency. During the first Saudi emirate (1744–
1818) the Saudis set up four madrasas in al-Diriyah where Shaykh Muhammad’s four sons 
taught. It is reported that, the Saudis provided support for teachers and pupils from poorer 
backgrounds.27 The Saudi educational mandate went beyond the capital and covered other 
towns in the wider region of Najd as well. It is also reported that some of the early Saudi 
rulers ordered the governors of towns to select ten to fifteen young students to be trained 
and educated at the treasury’s expense.28 In theological classes, the ulama under Saudi 
control taught Abdul Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid and focused on one of his treatises that 
discredited the critical perspectives of his opponents.29 For the Qur’anic exegesis, the ulama 
taught the works of al-Baghawi, Ibn Kathir, al-Tabari and al-Baydawi.  
  
For legal theories and Islamic jurisprudence, Wahhabis taught and studied classic works by 
Hanbali authors like Ibn Qudama and al-Hujawi.30 For the Wahhabi ulama, the Qur’anic 
exegesis was instrumental in authenticating their views. They also paid considerable attention 
to the selection of hadith, which tallied with their own interpretation. After all, Kitab al-
Tawhid which was the defining text by Ibn Abdul Wahhab, was a mere selection of hadith 
and Qur’anic verses without any major philosophical debate. Despite the efforts of the Saudi-
Wahhabi alliance to promulgate their regime of truth, educational development was still 
minimal and unsystematic. There are two possible explanations for the slow educational 
development in this period. Firstly, the constant tribal warfare and conflict with the Ottoman 
                                                
27 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 124. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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Empire had its effect in preventing the formation of a solid educational infrastructure. 
Secondly, the Saudis were dominant in the region of Najd, which was historically isolated 
and undeveloped. The lack of a major educational heritage, as well as the necessary social 
capital in the region, made the construction of an infrastructure more difficult. For these 
reasons, the expansion of Wahhabism in this period had to rely primarily on conflict and 
warfare to reach other corners of the territory.      
 
During the second Saudi emirate (1824–1891), the Wahhabi educational framework was a 
continuation of the same educational pattern as that of the first emirate. Following the first 
Saudi emirate, education failed to be a major hegemonic force in systematic and 
comprehensive socialisation of the Wahhabi interpretation. Education continued to be 
unstructured, irregular, uncoordinated and inconsistent. However, within this disorganised 
framework of education, there were some additional materials to cover in the Second Saudi 
emirate. The main addition was the polemical and rather acerbic treatise by Bad al- Latif ibn 
Abd al-Rahman and Abdullah ibn Aba Butayn aimed at arming Wahhabi students with 
arguments against the traditional Ottoman ulama.31This new addition was added as a 
response to the increasing pressure on the Wahhabi narrative from contesting ulama both 
within and beyond the peninsula.  
 
The news of the controversial actions of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, such as the massacre of 
Shiites in Karbala and the bloody occupation of Mecca, reached the far corners of the Muslim 
world. Thus, increasingly more ulama began to refute the Wahhabi creed.32 As there were 
more refutations from the opponents, the Wahhabi ulama became more polemical and 
defensive in response.  This polemical and self-justifying pattern in Wahhabi educational 
materials, continued into the twentieth century. (As mentioned before, from the beginning of 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Refutation of Wahhabism started as soon as Abdul Wahhab started to promulgate its views. One of the 
earliest opponents of his views was his brother, Sulayman ibn Abdul Wahhab, who wrote a book, Divine 
Thunderbolts of Wahhabism. He criticized his brother’s dogmatic approach to Islam . He accused his brother 
of adding sixth pillar to Islam, which was ‘Anyone who does not follow me is not Muslim’. 
 
 For more information see: Wyche Fowler Jr. and Mark Weston, Prophets and Princes (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008), 93.   
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the Wahhabi mission, many ulama refuted the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab, among Sunni 
scholars who rejected Wahhabism we can mention Sayyid Dawud Ibn Sulayman, Mawlana 
Khalid al-Baghdadi, al-Halabi al-Makki al-Hanafi, Muhammad Ma'sum al-Sarhindi and 
Muhammad Ibn Sulayman al-Madani.) Clearly, criticisms by such ulama added to the 
defensive nature of Wahhabi scholarship.The more the traditional ulama criticised the 
teaching of Wahhabism, the more self-justifying the Wahhabi ulama became.  
 
 In the early decades of the twentieth century, the civil war between the House of Saud 
and tribal rivals such as the Hashemites and House of Al-Rashid, delayed the establishment 
of modern schools. As previously mentioned, the emergence of a modern bureaucracy and its 
institutions coincided with the discovery of oil, and the new oil economy became a major 
push for the systematisation of the education system. Although, the new state started 
to establish some schools in the thirties and forties, the development was still far from the 
production of an effective hegemonic force.  
 
By the 1950s, there were fewer than twenty elementary schools in Saudi Arabia outside the  
region of Hejaz (six in Najd, six in al-Ahasa, five in Asir). Hejaz had four secondary 
schools.33 In order to justify these schools to the Wahhabi ulama, their curricula primarily 
focused on religious studies and Arabic. Accordingly, as much as 80% of class hours were 
dedicated to these subjects. Only in the fourth year of school did Qur’anic instruction consist 
of fewer than ten hours per week.34The Kingdom started to mandate elementary schools for 
boys in 1954.35 In fact, the country’s first department of education started in 1926, but for the 
aforementioned reasons its progress and development was limited.36 In 1938, the Directorate 
issued regulations confirming that it had control over all the educational matters in the 
kingdom except for the military academies. 37In 1953 during the reign of King Saud 
the Department of Education turned into a ministry and Prince Fahd, who later became King, 
                                                
33 David Commins  (2006), 125. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Wayne H. Bowen (2007),12. 
36 Since the 1920s, a small number of private schools offered limited secular education for boys, but it was not 
until 1951 that a major programme of publicly funded secondary schools was initiated. 
37 William A. Rugh (2002). 
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was appointed as the minister.38 The structure created in 1925-6 provided six years of 
elementary and five years of secondary schooling. However, in 1958, the Saudi state along 
with other members of the Arab League, agreed upon a uniform educational system which 
provided for a 6-year elementary, a 3-year intermediate and a 3-year secondary cycle with a 
separate higher education programme.39 The Educational Policy Document was issued by the 
Council of Ministers in December 1969; this has been the fundamental frame of reference for 
the principles, goals and objectives of education in the country. This comprehensive 
document put a lot of emphasis on Islamic teachings. 40  
 
According to the Education Policy Document, it is the responsibility of the State to provide 
education at all stages. Furthermore, Article 233 of the Educational Policy stated that all 
types of education at all stages should be free and that the State should not charge tuition 
fees.41These provisions started to pave the way for more widespread education in the 
country.42 
 
Although the foundation of the Saudi state was based on Wahhabism, many ulama were still 
hesitant about the formation of modern schooling. Their reluctance was based on the fact that 
they would lose their monopoly over education. Within the pre-modern Saudi Arabian 
context education was synonymous with Islamic studies. Hence, most of the ulama regarded 
education as an inseparable segment of their territory.  
 
As learned men of religion, they wanted to preserve their traditional role in delivering 
education. Yet, the state represented itself as the enforcer of pure Islamic teaching and still 
required substantial support from the ulama to enforce its policies. Despite the attempt to 
                                                
38 Mahmoud Abdullah Saleh (1986). 
39 “Educational System in Saudi Arabia Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (Washington: Ministry of Higher 
Education Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission200), http://www.sacm.org/Publications/58285_Edu_complete.pdf,  
(Accessed March 16, 2011). 
40“World data on Education”, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
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41 Ibid. 
42 See, Abd-el Wahab Abd-el Wassie,  Education in Saudi Arabia: a History of Fifteen Years Effort to Spread 
Education in a Developing Country, an Orthodox Diagnosis, and Some Proposals for a Better Future 
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standardise schooling, the state granted the Wahhabi ulama many unmatched privileges to 
shape the new education system. For example, at some point King Faysal appointed a leading 
Islamic scholar Shaykh Hassan Al al-Shaykh as the Minister of Education. Hence the 
ministry became a stronghold of conservative bureaucrats.43 In 1970, King Faysal established 
a general directorate of the religious institutions and colleges, which the state utilised in its 
creation of a religious system of education. Later, in 1975 when Prince Fahd rearranged the 
government, the Ministry of Higher Education was created and Shaykh Hassan was 
appointed as its head.44 
 
Indeed in the modern Saudi state, education became the indispensable bridge, which 
connected the ulama to the wider state bureaucracy. The education system also started to 
symbolise the profound interdependence between these two groups.  Through the powerful 
socialising agency of education the ulama were put at the forefront of creating a national 
vision of the state’s values, which tailored the official narrative of the state. From the early 
stages of the institutionalisation of education, the ulama played a leading role in writing 
school materials and preparing the textbooks exactly in accordance with the religio -political 
parameters of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance. Having said that, the Wahhabi ulama were never a 
monolithic group. Although the Saudi state adopted Wahhabism as its official creed, many 
ulama were still uncomfortable about the emergence of bureaucracy and with it modern 
education institutions. Nonetheless, the necessary synergy was in place to implement the new 
state policies. The state’s resources were fundamental in creating and sustaining the 
‘mainstream’ Wahhabi ulama who were a part of the policy-making and its enforcement.   
 
In addition to his modernisation policies, co-operation between the ulama and the House of 
Saud harmonised under King Faysal.45Although he tried to bureaucratise the ulama and bring 
them under his control by rigidly defining their institutional role, he gave them the power to 
control the education system. From time to time the conservative Wahhabi ulama were 
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angered by his educational policies, but in the end compromises were made and the special 
relationship between the House of Saud and ulama was preserved. A classic example of one 
of these compromises was the introduction of female education in the Kingdom, which 
infuriated many orthodox Wahhabi ulama.46 
 
The idea of education for women, put forward by King Faysal, sparked controversy among 
the orthodox Wahhabi ulama. Many ulama argued that, education for women breeds 
immorality by corrupting their thoughts and turning girls away from their traditional roles as 
good mothers and wives.47 These ulama were afraid that a major societal transition could 
be sparked off by female education and they resorted to various interpretational strategies to 
offset the plan. Despite their determined resistance, Faysal enforced the policy. 
The traditionalists were then galvanised into demonstrating at the gates of schools expressing 
their anger with the state, and blaming the parents who registered their daughters for 
education. The disturbance had to be curbed by the National Guards.48 However, in order to 
prevent any further damage in the special relationship between the ulama and the House of 
Saud, Faysal offered two major concessions. 
 
Firstly, the government pledged to introduce female education strictly within the socio-
cultural framework of the country so that, for example, rigid gender segregation in school 
was enforced.49 Secondly, the government introduced a special body called the General 
Presidency for Girls‘ Education, which had special responsibility for female schooling.50 It 
has to be noted that the negative attitude towards female education was reflected in the ratio 
of school-age boys to girls in primary school enrolments. In 1960, only 22% of boys and 2% 
of girls were registered in schools. Nevertheless, within a few years the public’s perception of 
female education changed, and the general population became more supportive of the idea.  
For example, in 1981 enrolments were 81% of boys and 43% of girls. In 1989 the number of 
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girls registered in the public school system was close to the number of boys: almost 1.2 
million girls out of a total of 2.6 million students, or 44%51. Arguably, this achievement could 
not be reached without the support and legitimising role of the mainstream ulama. These 
rapid shifts in public perception are partly an indication of the political pragmatism shown by 
the ulama in accommodating the policies of the King. Although many of them were 
disheartened by these unprecedented social transitions, they were capable of continuing in 
their loyalty to the King. Secondly, the cost of reaching compromise was the creation of an 
educational apartheid, which would enforce the two-tier system in the country, which lasted 
for decades.  
 
Through the creation of the two-tier system the ulama could socialise the state narrative in 
accordance with the student’s gender role as laid down in the Wahhabi moral and social 
framework. Thus, two organisations oversaw almost all education institutions in the 
kingdom.52 The Ministry of Education was responsible for education of boys, special 
education programmes for the handicapped, adult education, and junior colleges for men. 
Girls' education was administered and strictly supervised by the Directorate General of Girls' 
Education.53  Primarily, the ulama constituted the personnel of this organisation, 
collaborating with the Ministry of Education. The Directorate General supervised the general 
education of female students, and women's literacy programmes, as well as colleges of 
education and junior colleges for girls.54 The organisation acted as a mechanism to filter and 
standardise the female education system in accordance with the religio-political model 
recommended in the Wahhabi teaching of Islam. The division of labour among the above 
educational organisations made the enforcement of ideology on target bases. However, the 
General Presidency was merged with the Ministry of Education in 2002 after an incident in a 
girls’ school in Mecca in which 15 girls died.55 Since then the Ministry of Education has been 
the main body responsible for delivering and monitoring education in the Kingdom.  
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Among all the Saudi rulers, Faysal was the one who more than anyone else had an appetite 
for modernisation, and it is possible to assert that he was the first effective Saudi ruler who 
understood the importance of education as an instrument of state hegemony.56 With the new 
oil revenue, he wanted to make a leap forward into the future and by it to shift the country to 
a new stage. His aforementioned modernisation policies required a wider 
educational establishment in the country. However, did he simply need a more educated élite 
to help him to push the country into its next phase of development? Of course, one cannot 
deny that the major allocation of public expenditure into education was due to a genuine 
modernisation drive aimed at qualifying the workforce to meet the new developmental 
demands. Nonetheless, the highly ideologised character of the education system also 
indicates that education has been adapted as a mechanism of social control. 
 
Indeed, Faysal used the education system as a new frontier to combat the secular ideas of 
Arab nationalism, which were undermining the conservative nature of his Kingdom.57It 
seems that, in the sensitive years of the Arab Cold War, he saw in education the opportunity 
to spread his Islamic discourse so that he could immunise his kingdom against the threatening 
ideologies. 58When Arab nationalism mobilised the masses in the region, he retreated to 
Islam. By blending the Islamic narrative with some aspects of economic modernisation, he 
attempted to offer a third way and the education system was the best medium in which to 
spread the philosophy behind his policies. When he became the crown prince in 1961, he was 
supportive of the foundation of the Islamic University of al-Madinah al-Munawarah, a 
university focusing on Islamic studies. He encouraged the enrolment of foreign students in 
this university so that Saudi Islamic discourse could be widely disseminated. Even today, the 
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vast majority of students at this university are foreigners studying Islam through the lens of 
Wahhabism.  
 
Faysal also founded many other educational, cultural and political institutions to act as the 
engines driving his policies.59 Some of these organisations had a wider international 
dimension.  For example, in 1962 he established the Muslim World League. This 
organisation became involved in various cultural and educational projects. Although Faysal 
used this organisation as a form of soft power to gain legitimacy, the organisation was also 
penetrated by the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brothers) who had recently escaped from 
persecution in Syria and Egypt.60 During the Arab Cold War he gave sanctuary to Muslim 
refugees escaping persecution from secular states. Although this policy was meant to be more 
symbolic in boosting his notion of pan-Islamism, later on some of these refugees penetrated a 
number of educational institutions and had a debatable impact on the general discourse of 
education.61 He also initiated the Organisation of Islamic Conference 1969 and 1972.  The 
Muslim World League mainly targeted the grassroots, while the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference was more concerned with interstate relations. He also founded some smaller 
agencies to promote Islamic education and culture beyond the Saudi borders. 
 
He was determined to provide a minimum education for every Saudi and he accelerated the 
expansion of vocational schools secondary and higher education.62 The raising of revenue 
through oil in the 1960s and 1970s helped to accelerate the development of the education 
system.63  Even after the death of Faysal, his aspiration for the expansion of the education 
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system was adopted by his successors. By 1989, the total number of students in  school had 
risen to 2,650,000, which was about 40% of the population – 1,160,000 of whom were 
girls.64 Despite the low population of students in 1953, only 33,000, the state made significant 
progress in expanding the realm of education in the country.65  
 
After 1989, education continued to be important for the state, and the further growth of the 
education system was projected by the Kingdom’s 5th development plan of 1990-95.66 By 
1989, Saudi Arabia had established a sizeable education system with more than 14,000 
education institutions, including seven universities and eleven teacher-training colleges, as 
well as schools for vocational and technical education, special needs, and adult literacy. The 
system was enlarging so fast that in 1988-89 alone, 950 new schools were opened to 
accommodate 400,000 new students.67  
 
All teaching, books, and health services were given to students by the state, which assigned 
about 20% of its public expenditure, or US$36.3 billion, to human resources under the Fourth 
Development Plan, 1985-90.68 The Fifth Development Plan, 1990-95, proposed a total 
expenditure of about US$37.6 billion.69 It is also relevant to note here that the political 
economy of the Kingdom corresponded to a rentier state model, which entails ‘rent’ in terms 
of free state services in place of representation and accountability.  The state provides free 
health care and education to give legitimacy to its indisputable monopoly of power.70  
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The state used its vast resources from its oil revenues to produce containment. Hence, the 
idea of free education provided by the state was part of a greater effort for political control. 
Thus, it is possible to assert that the ideological nature of the education system as well as its 
rentier character, portray the two dimensions of social and political control promoted by the 
enrolled in grades 1 through 12 had reached almost 4.11 million. Male students supervised by 
the Ministry of Education constituted 2.16 million (52.5% of the total). There were also 
12,000 in special education (for blind, deaf or retarded children) and 108,000 in adult 
education. The number of teachers in grades 1 through 12 was 333,000, of whom 157,700 
were at boys’ schools agency of education in Saudi Arabia) .71 
 
Today, the government continues to invest heavily in general education.  The upward trend of 
budgetary allocation indicates the state’s conviction of the importance of the education sector 
in the country. In Saudi Arabia, public spending for education is estimated at 5.7% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), comparable with the UK (5.3%), Germany (4.3 
%), and South Korea (4.2%)’72 By comparison with many states in the region and beyond 
Saudi Arabia spends a vast amount of its resources on education. However, as it will be 
considered in the following sections the nature of the Saudi education is highly ideological 
and this may indicate that the heavy investment in education is more about the dissemination 
of Saudi-Wahhabi narratives than investing in key skills and training which could benefit the 
economy in long term.  See Table 1. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
consent. The generated income from oil sustains the country’s welfare system, which provides many free or 
highly subsidised services for people. In absence of democratic mandate or taxation, the state’s welfare 
system helps the regime to main its legitimacy. Many scholars have argued that the rentier state model is 
indispensable for the survival of the Saudi regime.  See, Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier 
State: Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, Vol 2, ( London: Routledge, 1987). 
71 William A. Rugh, Education in Saudi Arabia; Choices and  Constrains, Middle East Policy, Vol IX, NO. 2, 
JUne 2002 
72 U.S.-SAUDI ARABIAN BUSINESS COUNCIL 
http://www.us-sabc.org/files/public/Education_Brochure.pdf,  (Accessed March 12, 2011)  
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TABLE 1: EDUCATION BUDGET 73 
Fiscal 
Year 
General State 
budget 
Male education 
budget 
Female education 
budget 
Education budget as 
% of State budget 
1999/00 185,000 20,249 23,909 23.8 
2000/01 215,000 21,172 21,695 19.9 
2001/02 202,000 21,724 25,129 23.2 
2002/03 209,000 22,471 25,775 21.1 
In million of Saudi Riyal. 
 
TABLE 2: MALE AND FEMALE STUDENT ENROLMENTS74 
 Male Female Totals 
Primary 1.19 mn 1.09 mn 2.28 mn 
Intermediate 582,000 491,000 1.07 mn 
Secondary 390,000 366,000 756,000 
Subtotal 1-12 
 
2.16 mn 
 
1.95 mn 
 
4.11 mn 
 
Special Ed. 8,000 4,000 12,000 
Adult 34,000 74,000 108,000 
Year 2000. 
 
 
 
                                                
73  UNISCO Institute for Statistic “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/archive/Countries/WDE/2006/ARAB_STATES/Saudi_Ara
bia/Saudi_Arabia.htm, (Accessed October 21, 2011)   
74 William A. Rugh, Education in Saudi Arabia: Choices and Constrains, Middle East Policy, vol. IX, nO. 2, 
JUNE 2002. 
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Religious Studies: The Wheel of Truth Management in the Education System  
 
As already mentioned, for centuries pedagogical activities were limited primarily to the 
Qur’anic and Islamic studies within the Arabian Peninsula. There was hardly any serious 
scholarship on any other subjects, as the main foci were often recitation of the Qur’an, study 
of hadith and Islamic jurisprudence. Although the introduction of modern educational 
structures in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia diversified education, Islamic studies still remains 
the key subject to study. The state has considerable interest in the subject and vast amount of 
resources are devoted to Islamic studies so that the subject has to have the maximum effect 
on the religio-political consciousness of pupils and students across the Saudi education 
system. 
 
Religious studies have been mandatory in public schools at all levels in Saudi Arabia. 
Regardless of students’ religious background and religious persuasion, they have to study 
Islam as seen through Saudi-Wahhabi perspectives. Muslims adhering to any versions of 
Islam other than Wahhabism are banned from teaching in schools.75 Although students in 
private international schools are not required to study Islam, non-Saudi Muslim students still 
have to receive permission from the Ministry of Education to attend private international 
schools. The authorities do not permit the establishment of any private religious schools 
which aim to promote anything other than the official state’s discourse. Hence, educational 
structures are fully sheltered from any religious pluralism.76 Indeed, religious pluralism is the 
                                                
75Robert Murray Thomas, Religion in Schools: Controversies Around the World (Praeger Publishers, 2006)  
183. 
76 From the beginning of Saudi-Wahhabi rule, the Shiites’ religious and educational institutions have been 
severely restricted. In 1927, the Wahhabi ulama published a fatwa calling upon the Shiites to convert to 
Islam. Some Shiite notables submitted to the rule, while others left the country. Publication, education and 
circulation of Shiite religious books were forbidden, the Shiite call to prayer was banned, and centres of 
religious studies. Therefore, the Shiites religious schools ( hawzas) were allowed to exist until the mid-1940s. 
After the closure of the Shiites learning centres, the role of Shiite ulama was undermined to a greater degree 
than at any time before. Many had to leave for the Shiite cities of Iraq such as Karbala and Najaf. From 1990s 
onwards, some of the historical restrictions on Shiism have relaxed. Nonetheless, the Shia ulama did not 
achieve a social position to have a full educational freedom. Some Shiite ulama such as Fouad Ibrahim and 
Shaykh Hasan al-Saffar, attempted to oppose the Saudi establishment through direct confrontation after 1979. 
Nonetheless, they never had the capacity to challenge the Saudi establishment either through direct 
confrontation or counter-hegemonic activities. For more information see: Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Shiites of 
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antithesis of the Saudi educational mandate. According to the establishment, there is only one 
‘truth’ which has to be fully disseminated by education mechanisms across the country. 
 
Schools and universities are unique platforms for religious and ideological socialisation. They 
are unique because they are predominantly in the monopoly of the state, so the state is free to 
create every aspect of education in accordance with its own ideology. It is also a platform 
which can facilitate a gradual religious socialisation in this way; it is more effective than 
many other socialising agencies, such as the media, which people are exposed to on an 
unstructured basis.  In a similar way to most other countries, formal education is a long 
process in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it starts at the time of infancy, continues into the 
formative years of adulthood. Hence, the long and structured exposure to the education 
system creates an indispensable platform for dissemination of the ideological perspectives of 
the state.  
Clearly, the religious nature of the state’s ideology makes religious studies a very sensitive 
subject in the long educational process in Saudi Arabia. As the state claims to gain its 
legitimacy from its religious mandate, any agency, which is responsible for teaching religion, 
is micro managed. There are rigorous mechanisms in place to monitor Islamic studies.  
Although the state may not have direct control over the primary socialisation of students, it 
uses the educational platforms to shape the religious consciousness of students in accordance 
with the prevailing narratives of the state.  
 
As mentioned before, the Wahhabi ulama have played a central role in managing education 
in Saudi Arabia. There is a widespread belief that the state has made concessions to the 
ulama to control the cultural and educational spheres in return for their support in other areas 
of policy-making in the country. After the Mecca uprising in 1979, which galvanised the 
House of Saud, the state reinforced Islamic education in the country. It seemed that the state 
believed that the lack of religio-political conformity, which led to the uprising, was the result 
of incomplete Islamic education. There was a belief that the education system failed to 
                                                                                                                                               
Hudson Institute, “Saudi Arabia”, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiites-of-saudi-arabia, 
(Accessed March 12, 2011) 
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synchronise the people’s religious views with those of the establishment. Accordingly, some 
radicals took arms to challenge the state and its religio-political mandate. The uprising, which 
was led by Juhayman al-Utaybi, resulted in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 
Hegghammer and Lacroix regard the incident as ‘on of the most spectacular and tragic events 
to befall the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, if not the whole Muslim world, in the twentieth 
century’77. 
 
 Juhayman al-Utaybi, used an Islamic narrative to give legitimacy to his actions and to 
question the religious authority of the House of Saud. He declared his brother-in-law, 
Muhammad Abdullah al-Qahtani, to be the redeemer of Islam, the Mahdi, whose Messianic 
arrival was foretold in a hadith. The religious nature of the uprising shook the regime to its 
foundations; armed religious opposition was not supposed to confront the state, which 
claimed to be the implementer of the purest Islamic teaching. The siege, which ended 
violently after two weeks, paved the way for a more systematic approach to Islamic studies, 
to standardise the religious consciousness of the nation.  
 
Accordingly, the state provided more resources for Islamic education to prevent a further 
crisis of legitimacy. In addition to general Islamic education, which was provided during the 
term time, schools started to run summer courses to strengthen students’ faith in Islam and 
the official creed of the state. However, one has to note that the expansion of religious 
education was more than merely increasing the general study of Islam in the curriculum. As 
the state attempted to be more selective in the usage of Islamic materials, every aspect of 
Islam had to be rigorously standardised by specific Wahhabi perspectives. In other words, the 
rapid ‘Islamisation’ of the education system was nothing more than the ‘Wahhabisation’ of 
educational materials, which were tailored to rationalise the existing power structures.  
 
By ‘Wahhabisation’ of Islamic education, I simply refer to the process of reshaping 
educational materials in accordance with rigorous Wahhabi teaching. This process intensified 
                                                
77 Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroxi, The Meccan Rebellion (Bristol: Amal Press, 2011), vii 
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the normative character of the education system socially, culturally and politically to engineer 
society in accordance with the monocratic ideology of the state. The violent uprisings of 1979 
convinced the élite that they had to invest heavily in education, not only as a mechanism of 
social control, but also as a tool of survival to perpetuate a ‘legitimate’ context for the 
monopoly of power by the House of Saud.78 Wahhabism has traditionally sustained this 
monopoly of power. Thus, at a time of crisis, the state had no choice but to give more ground 
to the Wahhabi ulama so that it could protect cultural and social spheres from nonconforming 
voices.  Indeed, the fluctuation of ‘Wahhabisation’ has always been dependent on the 
strength of the state, as at a time of crisis the state often intensified its Wahhabi character.  
   
The process of devoting a vast amount of resources to Islamic education continued during the 
mid-1980s, when the state’s income from oil fell significantly.79 In this light, by 1986 more 
than 16,000 of the kingdom’s 100,000 students were enrolled in Islamic studies. By the early 
1990s, one quarter of all university students were studying in religious institutions.80 Indeed, 
Islamic studies have been omnipresent across the education sector. In all stages of education, 
‘Islamic studies’ is prevalent; this is now structurally embedded in the system.  
 
According to a report conducted by the UNESCO, International Bureau of Education, one of 
the main objectives of elementary education in Saudi Arabia is ‘instilling the correct Islamic 
creed in the spirit of the children and providing them with comprehensive Islamic education 
and feelings of belonging to the Islamic nation’81 For example, in grade I, out of twenty-eight 
total weekly hours, nine hours are devoted to Islamic studies, while only two hours are given 
to mathematics and no time is spent on science and geography.  In grade VI, out of thirty-one 
total weekly hours only five hours are given to mathematics and three hours to science while 
                                                
78  Yaroslav Trofimov , The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine (Knopf Doubleday 
Publishing Group, 2008). 
79  Michaela Prokop , “Saudi Arabia: the Politics of Education”, International Affairs, Vol 79, no1 (2003).  
80 Ibid. 
81The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” , , 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/archive/Countries/WDE/2006/ARAB_STATES/Saudi_Ara
bia/Saudi_Arabia.htm, (Accessed May 11, 2011). 
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Islamic education takes nine of the total number of hours more than any other subject.82 
Some of the main objectives for Intermediate and secondary education are identified as 
‘Stimulating the students’ ambition to restore the glory of the Islamic nation to which they 
belong and resume the march on the path of dignity and glory’ and ‘training students to use 
their time for useful reading and in religious activities and to employ their efforts in 
strengthening and advancing their Islamic character.’83 Accordingly, the amount of hours 
given to Islamic Studies exceeds those given to any other subject in the timetable. See Tables 
3, 4 and 5: 
 
TABLE 3: ELEMENTARY EDUCATION FOR BOYS84 
Elementary education for boys: weekly lessons timetable 
Subject  Number of weekly periods in each grade 
I II III IV V VI 
1st semester 2nd semester 
Islamic education 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Arabic language 12 11 9 9 9 8 8 
Mathematics  2 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Science  - 1 2 2 2 3 3 
History  - - - - 1 1 1 
Geography  - - - - 1 1 1 
Civics  - - - - 1 1 1 
Physical education  3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Fine arts  2 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Total weekly periods  28 28 28 28 31 31 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 World Data on Education 2010-11, "Saudi Arabia”, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002116/211628e.pdf, (Accessed March, 12, 2012). 
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TABLE 4: INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION FOR BOYS85 
Intermediate education (lower secondary) for boys:  
weekly lessons timetable 
Subject  Number of weekly  
periods in each form 
I II III 
Islamic education 8 8 8 
Arabic language 6 6 6 
English language  4 4 4 
Mathematics  4 4 4 
Science  4 4 4 
History  2 2 2 
Geography  2 2 2 
Civics  1 1 1 
Fine arts  2 2 2 
Physical education 1 1 1 
Total weekly periods  34 34 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
85 World Data on Education 2010-11, "Saudi Arabia”, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002116/211628e.pdf (Accessed March, 12, 2012). 
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TABLE 5: GENERAL SECONDARY EDUCATION FOR BOYS 86 
General secondary education for boys: weekly lesson timetable 
Subject Number of weekly periods in each form 
I 
Religious 
Education 
and Arabic 
Administratio
n and social 
sciences 
Natural 
sciences 
Technical 
science 
II III II III II III II III 
Islamic education 5 12 12 6 6 5 5 5 5 
Arabic language 6 9 9 4 4 3 3 3 3 
History 1 1 1 2 2 - - - - 
Geography 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - 
Phycology  - 1 - 1  - - - - 
Sociology  - - - 1 1 - - - - 
Management  - - - 2 3 - - - - 
Economics  - - - 1 1 - - - - 
Accounting  - - - 2 2 - - - - 
Sciences and 
technical sciences  
- - - - - - - 14 14 
Physics  2 - - - - 4 4 - - 
Chemistry  2 - - - - 4 4 - - 
Biology  2 - - - - 4 4 - - 
Earth science   - - - - 1 1 - - 
Mathematics  5 - - 4 4 6 6 5 5 
English language 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Computer 
science  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Library and 
research  
1 1 1 1 1     
Civics  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Physical 
education  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Activities  2 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Total weekly 
periods  
35 34 34 34 34 36 36 35 35 
 
The schoolbooks, which are provided free by the state, are explicitly anchored in 
Wahhabism. The supremacist and exclusionary religious perspectives, which were put 
                                                
86 World Data on Education 2010-11, "Saudi Arabia”, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002116/211628e.pdf, (Accessed March, 12, 2012) 
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forward by Ibn Abdul Wahhab in the eighteenth century, are omnipresent in official 
textbooks in Saudi Arabia. The Book of Unity, which is the central book written by the 
founder of the creed, casts its shadow over almost the entirety of official Islamic education in 
the country. These textbooks openly reduce almost any Islamic interpretation other than 
Wahhabism to ‘innovation’ and ‘falsehood’. Accordingly, Muslims who adhere to any other 
interpretations than Wahhabism are denounced as ‘unbelievers’. Until recently the official 
textbooks used derogatory terms for Shiites and openly called for their destruction.87Until 
1993, schoolbooks blatantly used the derogatory term of rafida to describe Shiites. The 
students were warned against mixing with the ‘innovators’ unless it was to advise them, as 
mixing with them could put them in contact with a dangerous influence.88 These statements 
were officially taught in a state where a large segment of the population adhered to the beliefs 
of Shiism.89  
 
After a lot of internal and external pressure, some modest revisions were made in 1993, and 
the term rafida is no longer used in official school materials. Since then, false religious 
practices are no longer attributed to one specific Islamic sect. Nevertheless, Shiite beliefs 
continue to be denounced in books circulated at Saudi-financed mosques both within the 
country and beyond the Saudi borders.90 (Places such as Mosques which provide informal 
education, are often more antagonistic in their views of religious minorities such as Shiites.)  
 
Although the notion of rafida is no longer used, textbooks have maintained their strong 
critique of Islamic interpretations other than Wahhabism. Some of the divisive Wahhabi 
perspectives, which call for religious hatred, are openly taught in schools. Shiites are often 
reduced to Mushrekin (polytheists), against whom it is a duty to lead jihad.91 Students are 
warned against mingling with the ‘innovators’ unless it is to guide them to the sirat al-
mustaqim (the straight/true path), which is offered by the official religious establishment in 
                                                
87 Michaela Prokop (2003). 
88 Ibid. 
89  See, Fouad Ibrahim, The Shi’is of Saudi Arabia ( London: Saqi, 2006). 
90 Ibid. 
91 Michaela Prokop (2003). 
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the Kingdom. The state exercises a considerable amount of power over the representation of 
minorities.  In the official state’s representation of them, non-Wahhabi Muslims are portrayed 
as people who have corrupted Islam by their bad practices.  
 
Their deviation from the true path is blamed for many of the problems that the umma had to 
face through the centuries. The textbooks actively attempt to galvanise students to be 
defensive of their creed, which they are told is the only ‘true path’ to salvation. The textbooks 
provide a rigorous exposure to Wahhabi norms and practices and forbid rituals, which are 
considered as ‘innovations’ by Wahhabism.92 For example, the celebration of the Prophet’s 
birthday, which is a common practice across the Muslim world, is portrayed as ‘innovation’ 
and ‘deviation’ from the ‘true path’. The official Islamic textbooks cover a wide range of 
topics for every grade within the formal education.  
 
The textbooks at elementary school provide some basic discussion about Islam’s role. As 
early as grade I, the supremacy of Islam over other religions is established and there is open 
criticism of people who choose a religion other than Islam.93 In grade IV, in the book of 
Monotheism and Jurisprudence, the discussion of true belief and its characteristics are 
covered.94 Accordingly, as early as grade IV, strong binaries are established to portray 
Wahhabi Islam as the only true interpretation of Islam. 
 
In grade V (first Semester) in the book of Monotheism, hadith, Jurisprudence, and Qur’anic 
Recitation  there is a discussion about some of the ‘friendships’ which Muslims are suppose 
to avoid, to remain true to Islam. The textbooks give instructions for students to develop an 
enmity towards nonconformists. For example, this textbook openly states, ‘Whoever obeys 
the Prophet and accepts the oneness of God cannot be loyal to those who oppose God and His 
                                                
92 Hudson Institute, “2007-2008 Academic Year Excerpts from Saudi Ministry of Education Textbooks for 
Islamic Studies”, 
http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Excerpts_from_Saudi_Textbooks_715.pdf. (Accessed 26. March 
2011). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid.  
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Prophet, even if they are his closest relatives’.95 In this light a faithful Muslim is forbidden to 
love and aid the unbelievers. This book covers some of the Islamic legal rulings on loyal 
friendship and the impermissibility of love for unbelievers.  
 
Accordingly, the book provides religious and legal instructions for the approach that true 
Muslims should take towards people who are officially recognised as ‘innovators’ and 
‘infidels’. Of course, the textbook materials also cover a wide range of issues regarding 
rituals, practices and norms. For example, in the grade VI, in the book of ‘Monotheism, 
hadith, Jurisprudence, and Qur’anic Recitation’ there is a wide discussion about rituals such 
as prayer, which are elucidated from the strict Wahhabi perspectives. 
 
According to an investigation conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation, there is 
some explicit evidence of inciting violence, against Jews, homosexuals and other Muslim 
nonconformists. According to the report, one of the textbooks prescribes execution as the 
penalty for gay sex, and outlines differing opinions as to whether death should be by 
immolation by fire, by stoning or by throwing offenders off a cliff.96 Within the textbooks 
various punishments prescribed by Shari‘a law for theft, including amputation of hands and 
feet are discussed. These Saudi textbooks generated a lot of controversy when they were 
found to be also taught at Saudi-backed schools and clubs in the UK. Indeed, these violent 
and homophobic references appear in many official textbooks in various grades in Saudi 
Arabia. For example,‘ The grade IX book of hadith, published by the Ministry of Education, 
states that, ‘The act of the people of Lot (Sodomy) leads to many harms and evils including: 
The severe punishment on earth which is death, being subjected to serious diseases such as 
AIDS and Herpes and others.’97  
 
                                                
95 Ibid.  
96 “Lessons of Hate at Islamic Schools in Britain”, New York Times. 
  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/world/europe/23britain.html ( Accessed , 14 May, 2011).  
97 Centre for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute, “Ten Years On: Saudi Arabia’s Textbooks Still Promote 
Religious Violence ”, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SaudiTextbooks2011.pdf, (Accessed, 01 May, 
2011). 
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These Saudi official educational materials have been under a spotlight since the events of 
9/11.98 Despite criticism from important capitals across the western world, these materials 
continue to be used with little or no revision. For example, the religious textbooks, which 
were in use in 2010-2011, continue to promulgate intolerance toward other creeds. In some 
cases, the official educational materials openly advocate violence against people belonging to 
other religions. For example, some high school texts give legitimacy to violence against 
apostates and homosexuals and label Jews and Christians as the enemies of the believers.99In 
addition to explicitly intolerant statements against Jews and Christians, there are various 
antagonistic references to Shiites and other religious Islamic minorities.100  
 
The newer textbooks actively encourage prejudice in students saying, that must violently 
contain and even physically eradicate the ‘other’.101 The ‘other’ is identified as anyone who is 
an innovator, an infidel, or a polytheist (this includes Shiites, Muslim apostates, converters to 
other religions, blasphemers, and those who ‘doubt’, Baha’is, Armadas, adulterers and 
homosexuals).102 These categories of people are repeatedly demonised and classified as 
morally corrupt people who are not only a liability to the Saudi state but are endangering  
‘true’ Islam and Muslims as a whole. Many of the Shiite practices and rituals are constantly 
attacked and denounced as ‘corruption’. For example, the grade XII Book of Monotheism for 
Boys asserts that those who worship in tombs and shrines commit apostasy by action. The 
text goes on to state that once the finding of apostasy has been confirmed, legal consequences 
apply, including the sanction that if the apostate refuses to repent, he must be killed.103Many 
religious minorities, and in particular Shiites, constantly find themselves condemned for the 
religious ‘crimes’ of blasphemy and apostasy in the official textbooks. 
                                                
98 See, Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Corobaid , National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, 
and Challenges ( Praeger Publishers Inc, 2005). 
99 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2011.  
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/ar2011/saudiarabia2011.pdf, (Accessed May, 02, 2012). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Centre for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute, “Ten Years On: Saudi Arabia’s Textbooks Still Promote 
Religious Violence ”, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SaudiTextbooks2011.pdf, (Accessed, 01 May, 
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In 2010-2011, the textbook instructs the believers to confront the ‘polytheists’ and ‘infidels’ 
under certain conditions. Some of these conditions relate to the medieval dhimmi 
arrangement regarding conquered non-Muslim communities.104 Some of the other conditions 
depend upon the strength of Muslims and whether the guardian of the faith, for example the 
Saudi king, permits the confrontation.105The grade XII Book of Monotheism, which was 
published in 2010-11 by the Ministry of Education, openly states that ‘Fighting the Infidels 
and the Polytheists has certain conditions and controls, including: That if they be invited to 
Islam and they refuse to enter it and refuse to pay jizya [tax], that Muslims have the power 
and the capacity to combat, that this be with the permission of the guardian and under his 
banner, that there be no guarantee between them and the Muslims not to combat.’106   
 
The notion of apostasy, and the qualities that define a person as an apostate, is almost 
omnipresent in many educational textbooks at the various stages of education. The grade X 
Book of Jurisprudence provides a general typology of apostasy. For example, there is the 
category of apostasy by belief, which is the case of believing in anything that is contrary to 
the indisputable principles of Islam. Then there is apostasy by doubt, which doubts the 
validity of the reporting of the Qu’ran or the truthfulness of the Prophet. There is also a 
category of apostasy by utterance, which is to pray to someone other than God or to ridicule 
something of the Prophet’s religion. And finally there is apostasy by action, which includes 
sacrificing to someone other than God and genuflection before idols.107 
 
The discussion of jihad is also generic in official Saudi educational materials. Of course, 
jihad as a defining Islamic concept has several meanings and it is fair to say that, the official 
                                                
104 A dhimmi is a non-Muslim subject of a state governed in accordance with the Islamic law. Dhimmi law 
allows rights of residence in return for taxes for Christians and Jews.  
 
For more information see:  Bat Ye'or and D. Maise, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam (Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1985). 
105 Centre for Religious Freedom Hudson Institute, “Ten Years On: Saudi Arabia’s Textbooks Still Promote 
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materials do discuss the multidimensional nature of jihad.  For one of the textbooks clarifies 
the idea that the notion of jihad can be understood in two ways.  One is the struggle to obtain 
what Allah loves from faith and good deeds, and to prevent what God hates, infidelity, 
immorality and disobedience. It also elaborates the other meaning, which is to ‘fight for the 
sake of God to spread Islam and defend it.’108 However, there are many references in official 
materials that call for pro-active campaigns to spread the ‘true’ faith and correct the beliefs of 
people who are still ignorant. For example, grade XII book states: ‘jihad for the sake of God 
is a profitable trade and saves people from painful punishment. It aims at spreading Islam and 
defending it and correcting the beliefs of people and directing them towards the worship of 
God Almighty. It also aims at preventing injustice and corruption and rooting out its origins 
from earth.’109 Not only does the education system establish the unquestionable supremacy of 
official narratives, but it also provides instructions for believers so that they can correct the 
beliefs of those people who are not lucky enough to be blessed by Wahhabism. Students are 
constantly reminded about the characteristics of true belief and the worldly and unworldly 
punishments which are awaiting those who deviate from the truth.   
  
As already stated, the state’s ideological narrative overshadows every aspect of the 
educational materials designated for religious studies in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, religious 
studies functions as the central subject with the capability of synchronising students with the 
official regime of religious truth. Of course, some segments of the materials are general and 
neutral Islamic teachings, but the state takes active measures to connect orthodox Islamic 
studies with its own exclusionary perspectives. These perspectives constitute sharp binaries 
of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ which are practically self-serving narratives to disseminate Wahhabi 
‘supremacy’. Through the long process of education, the state portrays Wahhabism as the 
final truth, so that it makes it the obligation of students to be loyal to the governing 
mechanism, which is the only trustworthy protector of the faith.  Throughout all the education 
materials, the notion of obedience to the House of Saud is emphasised.  
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The textbooks provide a rigorous religious context, which makes obedience to the rulers as 
almost one of the foundations of the faith. The rulers are portrayed as truthful guardians to 
whom loyalty and obedience is an obligation. Some Qur’anic versus are used to religiously 
demand devotion and allegiance to the ruling family’s authority (i.e., ‘Obey Allah and his 
Prophet and those with authority.’) Accordingly, loyalty and obedience are portrayed as 
things, which would benefit the faithful, both in life and afterlife. In this life they pave the 
way for unity, stability and reassurance, and in the afterlife they provide both rewards and 
blessings from God.110 
 
The textbooks put forward the case that disobedience results in fitna, dissension; therefore it 
has to be avoided at all cost. Hence, as long as the ruler is perceived to implement the will of 
God he should be obeyed in order to prevent fitna and disunity.111 Through these religious 
proscriptions, which are disseminated in the formal education system, the state attempts to 
homogenise the masses and to use religion as a means of discrediting any political or social 
opposition. Indeed, religious studies are used to promote a conformity, which prevents 
students from questioning the authority of the rulers. In this light, ‘unearthly’ narratives are 
heavily employed to sustain the ‘earthly’ survival of the ruling family. Islamic studies more 
than any other subject attempts to create religious authenticity for a ruling mechanism, which 
carries no accountability to its subjects. Through the articulation of a certain model of ‘truth’, 
the system attempts to excuse itself from any answerability to its people. The system claims 
to be the purest implementer of God’s law, hence it is only accountable to the sources of the 
law, and the education system is commissioned to convey this understanding. The claim of 
the Saudi state for its connection with the unquestionable implementation of the God’s will 
has multiple implications. The obvious implication is a classic attempt to gain religious 
legitimacy for the ruler, but the less obvious one is to justify its lack of accountability to its 
people. The implementers of the laws are only accountable to the source of the law.    
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Rewriting History:  Contextualising the ‘Truth’   
 
After religious studies, history has been the next most important subject to be doctored by the 
official education system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. History, as a subject, has been one 
of the main instruments of disseminating Wahhabi perspectives. Of course, the usage of 
history as a tool of ideological enforcement goes back to ancient times. From time 
immemorial, organisations of social control such as cults and religions have often been 
contextualised within an historical framework. Throughout the ages, history has been part 
and parcel of the present and it has been used to aid the articulation of prevailing social 
perspectives. Indeed, the practice of manipulating history for indoctrination has been shared 
within various societies to meet both long- and short-term political objectives. Since history 
is a living narrative and thus has powerful indoctrinating properties, those who are in the 
position of reflecting the past are in a position of power. 112It is indeed the power of 
representation. As is commonly acknowledged, history is collective memory as well as 
collective forgetfulness. Through selecting and constructing historical narratives, one is 
exercising a creative power, which has deep social and political implications.  
 
However, the arrival of the Westphalian phenomenon and the emergence of the nation-state 
model did not change this timeless practice, and history started to be at the service of the new 
prevailing political entities. Nation-state models thrived on this ‘authenticating’ tool, which 
was used to portray the ‘inevitability’ of states and nationhood. In this way, the past became a 
frame of reference for the creation of national myths, legends and narratives, to boost the 
collective identity within the new frameworks. 
 
Like any other models of control, the nation-state has also been based on hierarchical 
structures which preserved the ‘right’ of the minority élite to dominate and subjugate the 
majority. Hence, creative mechanisms of social control have been essential to sustain a 
desirable division of power for the élite. To a degree, controlling the past is connected to 
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controlling the present.  The modern state of Saudi Arabia also appreciated this power of 
representation. Like many new nation-states, the country recognised the indoctrinating 
properties of history and used it as a creative instrument to justify the new hierarchy and the 
distribution of power.   
 
From the early stages of state building, the new ruling system showed interest in the 
formation of an official historiography, which could provide a historical context for 
their current dominance. As Al-Rasheed notes: 
 
The historical narratives of the Saudi state perpetuate particular representations of the 
past that aim to bind rulers and ruled. These narratives are not concerned with historical 
accuracy or facts, but with establishing obedience to the rulers. Official narratives 
portray the ruling group as a hegemonic force in the history of the country. State 
historiography has become the medium through which this is achieved.113 
 
In general, the social construction of the past is an essential element in the process of 
domination, subjugation, resistance and collusion.114 Once the state represents the past, it 
simultaneously exercises power over the collective consciousness. Hence, the institutional 
power to reframe history is a source of power.  As George C. Bond and Angela Gilliam 
suggest; 
 
The representations may frame relationships of inequality, and be intimately related to 
structures of power and wealth. They contain ideological and hegemonic properties that 
represent historical and sectional interests. In no way simple, they express a high 
degree of social and poetic complexity.115 
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The history of the Arabian Peninsula is almost entirely Islamised in Saudi Arabia. Every 
historical episode is interpreted and articulated within a fully Islamic framework. According 
to Joseph Nevo: 
 
 Saudi textbooks discuss history first and foremost in Islamic terms; they stress the 
achievements of the Islamic culture (even at the expense of Arab culture) and depict the 
Ottoman period favourably, referring to the sultan as the khalifa and the guardian of the 
holy places rather than as an oppressor of the Arabs. Even Arab nationalistic activity, 
such as the struggle for independence by local liberation movements against European 
colonialism, are usually described as jihad movements and the religious nature of their 
actions is stressed.116 
 
Not surprisingly, in Saudi Arabia, the point of departure for official historical narratives 
is early Islamic history, which constitutes a major part of the newly-arranged curriculum. 
There is much emphasis on the Golden Age of Islam, and the advent of the religion marks the 
beginning of a tailored historical narrative. The Golden Age of Islam lasted about two 
centuries. At this period Islam was at the core of global affairs, while other collectivities had 
a lesser share of power and prestige. During this period the empire, which promulgated Islam 
as its official religion, covered much of the known world. Areas including North Africa, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Spain were part of this empire. This period is often 
associated with the advancement of science and arts in the Islamic world.  The peak of the 
period occurred during the rule of al-Mamun, who died in AD 833.117 Although this period 
symbolises the imperial and scientific achievements of the Islamic civilisation, by no means 
does it represent the entirety of Islamic history. Of course, within any national education 
system there is an emphasis on the glorious past in order to enhance the sense of national 
pride. However, in Saudi Arabia the glorious past is an inseparable part of the state’s 
ideology and constitutes the major bulk of historical texts in schools. This can be seen as an 
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attempt by the state at a collective forgetfulness of the past, to meet current ideological 
objectives.  
 
As previously stated, pedagogic action represents the interests of the dominant class. By 
reproducing culture, it is reproducing the power relations which legitimise its own operation.  
Pedagogic action selectively excludes or includes ideas and values in accordance with the 
interests of the prevailing group. Hence, the prevailing social hierarchy and power relations 
are portrayed as natural and free of ideological contamination. Accordingly, the Saudi 
education system, among other things, has been using history to justify the prevailing 
dynamics of power in the country. As Al-Rasheed notes, in Saudi Arabia the ‘Islamic history 
is projected as a succession of episodes, each leading to the strengthening of Islam and 
Muslims and the flourishing of Islamic civilisation in all its artistic, intellectual, scientific and 
military manifestations. A sense of a nostalgic past permeates these representations of Islamic 
history’.118 Of course, the construction and utilisation of the politics of nostalgia is nothing 
new, as it has been an important ingredient in nation-building projects throughout the world.  
By politics of nostalgia, I refer to a top-down, systematic effort to promote and circulate a 
selective and sentimental understanding of the past in order to provide a justifiable historical 
context for the status quo. For example, within a monarchical system there may be more 
emphasis on the role of legendary and inspirational kings and queens who courageously 
shaped the fate of the nation for the better.  
 
This is an effort to redesign and reflect the past to portray a ‘natural’ historical continuity, 
which has produced the current state of affairs. Saudi Arabia has also utilised the politics of 
nostalgia in order to inspire the new collectivity to subscribe to a version of history which 
would correspond with a political system that advocates the totality of Islam and the finality 
of the Qur’an. After all, Saudi Arabia bases its claim of power on representing the true Islam; 
it uses the religion as its frame of reference and the Qur’an as its constitution. Hence, there 
has been more emphasis on the kind of historical narratives which highlight the greatness, 
and the supremacy of the form of Islam that has now reached Saudi Arabia. 
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Even if some of the inner conflicts of Islamic history are portrayed, official narratives 
highlight the factors, which correlate with the current Saudi-Wahhabi perspectives. For 
example, some of these historical texts shed light on the issues of succession after the 
Prophet, an issue that is at the heart of Wahhabi ideology.119 The official historical narratives 
emphasise the ‘negative’ implication of sectarianism in Islam and the emergence of 
competing interpretations of the religion. These sects are identified as firaq monharifa 
(deviated sects) and they include Saba’yya, Khawarij, Bantiyya, and Ism’iliyya.120By 
reducing various branches of Islam to the status of ‘heretic’ or ‘deviant’, the Wahhabi 
narratives seek to claim supremacy for their own interpretation.  
 
For the 1993 editions of the Saudi textbooks, the Ministry of Education commissioned a 
history professor at King Saud University to write several volumes, which comprise a 
significant portion of the history curriculum.121Although the materials in the school textbooks 
were simplistic, they re-enforced the bias of the official historical narratives.122Saudi national 
history begins with the emergence of a Saudi-Wahhabi alliance in the eighteenth century.123 
The adoption of this approach deliberately aims to portray a historical purpose for the House 
of Saud and its adopted creed. Arguably, by excluding other influential forces from the past, 
the House of Saud justifies its current lack of tolerance for other claimants of power. The 
official narratives have a minimum amount to say on the internal conflicts before the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia. In general, the view of the country before the emergence of a 
Saudi-Wahhabi alliance is very negative. According to Al-Rasheed:  
 
The texts emphasise that salvation comes with the Wahhabi reform movement and its 
adoption by the Saudi rulers. The latter are projected as saviours, who in the process of 
restoring their ancestors’ rights over the territories of the Arabian Peninsula managed to 
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deliver the rest of the population from a state of ignorance. In this historical narrative, 
loyalty to the ruling group is celebrated. As local regional history is ignored, one cannot 
expect the development of loyalty to land or people.124 
 
The texts also have attempted to sediment the idea that the region of Najd, which was the 
birthplace of Wahhabism, is an area with the most vital preconditions for the religious 
reforms, which eventually resulted in the establishment of the modern Saudi state. Hence, an 
area which was historically insignificant and isolated is described as the cultural and 
religious heart of the country.125 This is a good example of the re-conceptualisation of space 
and land in order to construct a nationally subjective vision. In general, lands can retain 
cultural and political meanings, symbolically encoded in their spatial relations and built 
environment.126 Spatial meanings are engineered to represent various political agendas. Najd 
was the cradle of the modern Saudi state and the ground, which seeded the historical 
foundation of the current state. Thus, it is portrayed as the natural ground for the cultivation 
of a ‘true’ Islamic interpretation.  
 
This symbolic re-construction of space entails the mythologisation and idealisation of the past 
in order to recreate a legitimising historical context for the people right at the top of the 
power pyramid. Arguably, the active romanticisation of Najd as the region affiliated to the 
House of Saud undermines the historic importance of other regions with their tribal 
affiliations. For example, the current texts avoid highlighting the important role of 
Hashemites in the region of Hejaz, which lasted for centuries. The texts describe the pre-
Wahhabi Arabian Peninsula as nothing less than the age of jahiliyya (ignorance). 
 
When referring to the geography of the Arabian Peninsula, the texts divide the territory into 
four regions, Hejaz, the Southwest, the east and Najd.127 Not surprisingly, before their 
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exposure to the Wahhabi teachings, people within these regions are described as morally 
deviant. Just in the same way that Islam was a waking-up point for the people of jahiliyya, 
Wahhabism portrayed as the renaissance for the re-apprehension of the truth. Therefore, the 
texts imply that the people of modern Saudi Arabia owe their current moral richness to 
Wahhabi teaching and its enforcement by the House of Saud. Through the circulation of 
these narratives, the House of Saud gains the credit of being the saviour tribe, which not only 
brought unity and prosperity, but also paved the way for the return of the ‘Islamic 
enlightenment’.    
 
Furthermore, Ibn Saud ’s victories are listed as historical facts without any scrutiny of their 
consequences and without providing any room for the claims and the perspectives of the rival 
tribes such as Al Rasheed and the Hashemites.128 Hence, modern historical narratives provide 
nothing more than a list of achievements by the House of Saud and a statement of how 
beneficial they were for Islam and for the nation. In general, the books portray the 
establishment of the state as an indigenous achievement without taking other international 
factors into account.129 In reality, if it were not for the support and the blessing of Britain, the 
victory of Saudi-Wahhabi alliance would be greatly in doubt. The disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire and the withdrawal of British support from the Hashemite family and the 
regional geo-politics at the time were all-important contributing factors, which paved the way 
for the dominance of the House of Saud.130 However, this historical background is ignored in 
the official teaching of history in the Saudi education system. 
 
The textbooks depict the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia as a watershed in bringing a 
period of prosperity and modernisation not only to the Kingdom but also to people within the 
region. For example, the grade VI, History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia states that: 
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Abdul-Aziz made great efforts to unite the country, ensure its security, and lay the 
foundation for progress. Thanks to the rulers who came after him, development and 
prosperity were achieved in various areas. Yet the efforts of the Kingdom's leaders, 
from its foundation upwards and through the present time, have not been limited to 
internal reforms. They have also made great efforts in the international arena. First and 
foremost among these, and an object of the Kingdom's ongoing engagement, are the 
issues of Palestine and international and regional organisations and bodies.131 
 
The texts also portray a dynamic and vital image of the country and its rulers in recent 
history. In many ways the country with its Wahhabi characteristics is introduced as the 
champion of Arab causes and the texts describe the ways in which Saudi rulers played and 
still play a vital role in the global Muslim identity. 
 
According to the grade VI, History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Aziz tried to 
convince the leaders of the great powers to save the Palestinians from injustice. A division of 
the Saudi Army was deployed to join the Arab armies and help the Palestinians in the war 
against the Jews. The Kingdom has provided ongoing material and moral support to the 
Palestinians and their just cause’ 132 The grade XII Studies from the Islamic World states that 
‘jihad for God is the only road to liberate Palestine. For the Muslims did not enter Jerusalem 
except by jihad. The Crusaders were not kicked out of Palestine except by jihad and the Jews 
will not leave Palestine except by jihad.’133 
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In this light, the history textbooks portray a very demeaning image of the Jews to reinforce 
Saudi foreign policy towards the state of Israel.  For example, one of the official textbooks 
openly states: ‘Judaism all together had no significance in the world for more than twenty-
seven centuries. It was never counted amongst colonisers, powerful in government and army, 
but its work in colonisation was that it was hiding behind it, paving the way for it, and 
depending on it in exploiting peoples and sucking their blood’.134Most of the official material 
that is taught on Jews is a replication of the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which reduce 
Jews to a static and singular group of people who are responsible for most of the world’s 
problems. For example, one of the official textbooks asserts that:  
 
The Zionist movement aims at reaching one main goal, and that is Jewish domination 
of the world and controlling its destiny, achieving this through sub goals: 1. Igniting the 
fighting spirit of the Jews, and their religious and ethnic fanaticism, to stand up to 
religions, nations and peoples. 2. Igniting the flames of hated rivalry between the 
powers so they would fight, and igniting the flames of war between States, to weaken 
all States so their State stands.3. Establishing their government on the Promised Land, 
which extends   from the Nile River to the Euphrates River.135 
 
The textbook claims that World Zionism has been achieving its objectives through 
underground and secret organisations. Thus the Freemasons, Bnai Brith and, the International 
Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs, it claims, are all Jewish-led organisations working in the dark 
to maximise Jewish interests, which include undermining Muslim societies.136These 
totalising narratives are not articulated in a vacuum. However, like most other things, the 
Saudi education system contextualises these perspectives within a rigid Islamic framework 
.The articulation of these ideas through Islamic language is a way of authenticating their 
claims. By using selective Islamic Qur’anic and hadith sources, they attempt to find solid 
ground for their assertions.  In other words, by religiously framing these ideologically tainted 
ideas they attempt to make their policies indisputable because they are backed up by so-called 
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divine sources. For example, the grade X textbook, History of the Prophets and Story of the 
Prophet and the Spread of Islam, rails against the Jewish claim of being ‘chosen people’. 
‘The vanity of the Jews and their arrogance in dealing with others, and their claim to be 
God’s Chosen people, although God Almighty, impugned them and pitched upon them 
humiliation and wretchedness and led them astray and made some of them apes and 
swine.’137 The textbooks go deep into Islamic history in order to seek Islamic justifications 
for current Saudi policies. For example, according to the grade IX, History of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia: 
 
 The incontrovertible truth is that the Jews lived all their lives without a homeland. 
Wherever they settle, the peoples hate them and cast them away. They do not relate to 
any community that they live in except in a relationship of material benefit and interest 
through extorting money by usury and gambling and bribery in addition to being callers 
for sedition and people of the schemes and conspiracies that they are brought up with. 
And what the Jews of Medina did to the Prophet (PBUH) in many situations shows 
their malicious intentions and their evil spirits. In their book the Talmud, [is written] 
that which encourages them to harm anyone who is not a Jew. They also have traditions 
and lowly maxims, which are rejected by every human being who respects himself. An 
example of those maxims is: The End justifies the Means.138  
 
 According to the textbook the Jews do not deserve the land because they have deviated from 
the ‘truth’. Hence, a relation to what is considered as the divine truth qualifies or disqualifies 
claims over land. According to a grade XII textbook, ‘Palestine is an Islamic land owned by 
those who submit their faces to God and the Jews have diverted from the true religion of 
Moses and distorted the Torah and they are the source of corruption and corrupting.’139 The 
textbook also provides an explanation for the weakness of Muslims and their unsuccessful 
resistance against the Jews. This textbook provides reasons for Muslim defeat by the Jews: 
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 1. Adjudication without God’s law whereas most of the Arab states apply positive 
laws. 2. Spread of many vices among the people. 3. Distancing Islam from the circle of 
struggle with the Jews and the appearance of invalid calls and slogans such as Arab 
Nationalism and Socialism, and the ignorance of many of the children of this nation of 
the truth of our struggle with the Jews which is purely a struggle of beliefs. While, the 
Jews derived their teachings from their distorted books.140  
 
Clearly, these explanations imply that it is Muslim deviation from the truth which is 
weakening them against the so-called enemies of Islam. This reasoning implies that Saudi 
Arabia is the only state compliant with God’s law, but other Arab states are corrupted 
because of their man-made laws. Hence, indirectly the text implied that all Muslims should 
embrace the Saudi authorities transcript, which is not based on positive laws, and once the 
Muslim belief is strengthened by the truth, Islam will prevail over its enemies.  
 
As the above text suggests, the state has been very antagonistic towards ideas and ideologies 
such as Arab nationalism and socialism which were popular across the Arab world in the 
fifties, sixties and seventies. The textbooks imply that all these ideologies have failed because 
of their alienation from God’s laws. These man-made ideas are identified as sources of 
corruption and weakness in the Islamic world, emphasising that that’s why they all failed. 
However, the text implies that Saudi Arabia has remained strong because it has distanced 
itself from these man-made laws and has embraced the truth. 141 
 
Thus, the state has been employing history as a tool to give its official narratives and policies 
a context. Accordingly, history has been rewritten to authenticate the existing status quo. A 
historical ‘immunity’ has been provided for the ruling family to protect them from any blame 
or wrongdoing. Therefore, the official historical narrative provides a legitimate context for 
the prevailing power structures, and it finds a raison d'être for the imposing of a regime of 
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truth in the country. Through the power of representation, the enemies of the House of Saud 
are demonised and the country is portrayed as the beacon of faith and prosperity.  
  
Higher Education: the Continuation of Wahhabisation  
 
On 23 September 2009 when the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology was 
officially opened, there was a great sense of national pride in the country. The King invited 
hundreds of distinguished national and international figures to join him in celebrating the 
opening of this major new university. The University even provided online facilities for 
people around the world to participate in the opening event. For many observers who 
followed the event and the construction of this major university it was hard to believe that 
higher education only arrived in the country in the mid 1950s. It was 1957 when the Saudi 
state took its first step towards starting university education in the country. Hence the first 
university was established. The institution was originally named Riyadh University, but in 
1982 it was renamed King Saud University. In 1975, a segment of the Ministry of Education 
became a separate entity, and was re-named the Ministry of Higher Education, with the 
purpose of dealing exclusively with higher education.142The Higher Education Council is the 
supreme authority for post-secondary education affairs with the task of supervising and co-
ordinating its institutions, with the exception of military education.143 
 
The first university began to operate with an enrolment of only twenty-one students and a 
staff of nine.144 Within three decades, by 1982, there were already seven established 
universities with 63,563 students and a staff of 6,906.145 This major expansion was the result 
of major state investment in the sector, as Saudi Arabia is seen as one of the countries with 
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the highest public expenditure for higher education per student in the world.146 By 2006, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had about 11 major universities (109 colleges and 9 institutes) 18 
primary teacher's colleges for men, 102 primary teacher's colleges for women, 40 colleges 
and institutes for health 24 technical colleges and 9 private universities and colleges.147 
 
The Saudi Higher Education institutions provide different programmes of study. For 
example, some of the institutions such as the King Saud, King Abdul Aziz and King Faysal 
Universities and King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, offer more ‘secular’ 
courses. While some of the other institutions such as the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud   
Islamic University and the Islamic University of Medina and Umm University  al Qura 
primarily offer various branches of Islamic studies. 148  
 
As the institutions of higher education spread in the kingdom, the Wahhabi ulama started to     
lobby for the establishment of religious universities to balance what they considered as 
secular education in the country.  In response, in 1961, The Islamic University of Medina was 
established. As Commins notes, this university also served a foreign policy objective by 
offering a religious alternative to the secular nationalist universities in the Arab world as the 
institution opened its doors to a large number of non-Saudi Arab students.149 By 1985, this 
university accommodated 2,798 students including a few hundred graduate students. The 
Islamic University also offered a college preparatory course, which specialised in teaching 
Arabic and religious studies; in 1985, 1,835 students were registered at the university, all but 
279 of them foreign.150 This university provided an educational platform with which 
to disseminate the Wahhabi interpretation outside its native constituency. Many students who 
were educated at this university, became educators themselves and promulgated the 
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core precepts of the Wahhabi belief system. The state provided facilities and support to 
encourage further enrolments at this university.   
 
Another key higher education institution to promote the Wahhabi narratives has been Imam 
Muhammad Ibn Saud University, which is a very conservative university, developed in 
Riyadh from a cluster of colleges for theology and law first established in 1953. A special 
section to educate Shari’a court judges started in 1965, and a faculty for Arabic language 
studies followed in 1970. These various bodies were combined into a single entity in 1974.151 
This university became one of the key Wahhabi institutions in the country, producing 
theologians, teachers, judges, and preachers. Many students specialised in Arabic language 
and Islamic studies with a significant focus on Wahhabi teaching. The university also offered 
subjects such as State policy in Islam, Islamic sects, and Islamic culture and economics.  By 
1986, about 12,000 students were registered with an additional 1,000 in graduate 
programmes. More than 1,500 of these students were women.152 
 
Regardless of the institution and the course of study, all institutions in Higher Education 
include a great deal of Islamic studies. In this light, even the most non-religious universities 
accommodate departments of religion as well as including rigorous programmes of Islamic 
studies during the course of a degree; these are compulsory for all students. Many ‘secular’ 
subjects still cover a substantial amount of material related to Islam and students are required 
to memorise substantial portions of the Qur’an in order to graduate.153 
 
Indeed, across the Higher Education sector, the most popular subjects have been in the field 
of Islamic studies. Unlike many other countries in the region, colleges of arts, letters and 
humanities are not widespread, and there are only few colleges of business and political 
sciences. Moreover, less than one-third of students gain degrees in science or technology; this 
is the lowest percentage in the Arab world. 154 
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Questions can be asked if this disproportionate demand for religious studies is generated 
organically, or if the state actively paves the way for wider Islamic education in the country. 
One can argue that there is a combination of both factors, and that these are interrelated.  In 
many ways the state imposes and encourages religious studies across the Higher Education 
sector. For example, there is a belief that graduates from Islamic studies universities and 
Islamic education background are preferred for employment in the governmental sector, 
because of their religious education.155 Hence, many students may see Islamic studies as an 
educational opportunity to gain the right credentials for getting the benefits of employment in 
the public sector.   
 
At the same time, the state’s top-down policies of social engineering, have created a highly 
Islamised society.  In other words, the over-Islamification of the society by which everything 
is given its perspective through Wahhabi lenses has made religion omnipresent in every 
aspect of life. Hence, it may not be unusual that many students respond to this highly 
Islamised society by taking their education further in the field of Islamic studies. When there 
is a social framework which holds Islam as the main frame of reference for addressing any 
issue, it is understandable for the majority of people to want to seek their education in a 
subject which is perceived to be the most essential for the maintenance of their society. 
Hence, state policies as well as the highly religious character of society, pave the way for 
mass enrolment in Islamic courses across the country. 
 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that, in line with the aforementioned ideological character of 
the Saudi education system, the universities have enforced policies that put  the corner stone 
of the Wahhabi belief system at the forefront of their organisational methods . Some of these 
policies have resulted in systematic discrimination against religious minorities who are 
considered as ‘innovators’ if not kuffar under the official religious creed.  Accordingly, the 
Shiites are treated differently in many areas of Higher Education. For example, in the 
selection process for students, professors, and administrators at public universities, the Shiites 
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are an estimated 2% of professors at a leading university in al-Ahsa, an area with a 
population which is at least 50% Shiite.156The current discrimination against the 
Shiite population indicates that Wahhabi principles are still part and parcel of the policy-
making mechanisms of the state.  It is possible to assert that, in addition to modernising the 
workforce through higher education, the expansion of universities has created even more 
grounds for the enforcement of Wahhabi principles, as most universities have to constantly 
comply with the Wahhabi regime of truth. These rigid rules and regulations are a 
continuation of the state ideology’s aim that is to harmonise learners with the religio-political 
character of the state.  
 
Paradoxes of Reform and Dilemmas of the ‘New’ Educational Direction  
 
The events of 9/11 and their repercussions in many ways sparked a shift in the international 
system and the internal policies of many states.157The atrocities in New York and 
Washington raised many questions about the possible motives of the people who carried out 
that suicidal mission.  As soon as the news reached the public about the considerable 
involvement of Saudi nationals in the operation, scholars and policy makers started to 
scrutinise the social, religious and cultural environment of Saudi Arabia to find any possible 
factors which could provide the motivation for such actions. Accordingly, the Saudi 
educational system went under the spotlight and many observers claimed that the Saudi 
educational system contains elements which could expose its youth to radicalisation and a 
phobia of the west. Claims were made that the religious and ideological nature of the Saudi 
education system allegedly was capable of producing people like Muhammad Atta who 
reportedly took action to kill thousands of individuals in the World Trade Centre.     
 
As soon as it became apparent that most suicide hijackers were Saudis, the Saudi state 
expressed its eagerness to be on the side of the United States in the ‘War against Terror’. The 
regime also claimed to be a victim of terrorism itself and offered its support to Washington to 
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combat extremism.158 Despite these measures, the country was still under fire from the 
Western press and consequently its education system was blamed for spreading radicalism. 
Under this intense pressure, the Saudi state pledged to take measures to reform the education 
system. 
 
As has been shown, from the establishment of the modern Saudi state, education was used as 
a mechanism of social control and an instrument for disseminating the Wahhabi discourse. 
However, after 9/11 the thing, which had helped the House of Saud to sustain its power 
internally, became an external liability. In order to address Western concerns, the Saudi state 
started a programme of reform to prevent extremism. In this light, the state launched a 
campaign contesting the very thing it had itself promoted for decades. The state took an 
active role in removing some of the extreme statements, which were particularly sensitive to 
Western ears. Some of the pejorative and derogatory references about Jews were removed, 
and the state claimed to monitor those teachers and preachers who were still keen to 
circulate orthodox ideas.  
 
The debate over religious intolerance in Saudi schools led to some minimal revision in at 
least one text prepared for the academic year of 2003–2004, some of the extreme references 
about Christians and other kuffar were removed from the textbooks. In addition, the new 
edition of the text removed entire sections that instructed students to regard non-Muslims and 
non-Wahhabi Muslims as enemies.159 Instead, it highlighted the common heritage that Islam 
shares with these people by referring to a Qur’anic verse that regards the Torah, the Psalms 
and the Gospel as divine revelations.160 
  
Furthermore, the idea of educational reform was debated in three National Dialogues initiated 
by the ruling élite in 2003– 2004, in order to boost national solidarity. However, there are 
grounds for the argument that the external implications of these initiatives were more 
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important than their internal impact. By orchestrating these conferences, the Saudi regime 
aimed to convince the key allies that it was moving in the right direction to prevent the 
radicalisation of its subjects. During this time, many Western papers criticised the 
controversial invasion of Iraq and accused Saudi Arabia of being the main source of terrorism 
in the region.161 In the intense climate of the ‘War against Terror’ and the repercussions of 
the invasion of Iraq and the consistent pestering of the Western press, the regime had to take 
measures to offset the pressure. Although the measures were more cosmetic than 
concrete, the Saudi state at least symbolically had to show more harmony between its foreign 
policy and its internal socio-political dynamics.  
  
In these conferences some unprecedented issues were discussed. For example, the 
conferences recognised religious pluralism in the country. Although these developments were 
artificial and still only limited to verbal recognition, they gave the religious hard-liners 
enough ammunition to react against the state. There was no easy way out of this problem. On 
the one hand, the regime had to retain what it had advocated itself for decades and on 
the other hand the state had to curb the intense pressure from the western capitals. Many 
hard-liners reacted to the new reform agenda and reduced it to obvious submission to the 
west and the United States. In 2004, Safar al-Hawali, a major ultraconservative figure, 
supported a petition to contest the educational reforms. He saw the policy as the raising the 
white flag to a Washington, which aimed to ‘deviate’ the country from its Islamic path and 
reduce it to ‘the infidel camp’.162 Salman al-Awda attended a National Dialogue session in 
2003 and met with Shiite religious leader Shaykh Hassan al-Saffar. Nonetheless, Safar al-
Hawali refused to meet with Shiites, still regarding them in traditional Wahhabi terms as 
infidels.163 Through decades of the Saudi rule, the regime had allocated vast resources to 
sediment and socialise its regime of truth, but now amending it and harmonising it with the 
prevailing political expediency of the time proved to be strenuous. 
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 While the regime had to maintain the ideological fabric of its society, the King took further 
measures by instructing the Council of Senior Scholars to include scholars from all four 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence in 2009.164 From the advent of the modern Saudi state, the 
government only adhered to the Hanbali school of law as the state declared two Hanbali 
sources as the only legitimate references for Saudi judges.165Although most scholars and 
judges are still Hanbali, the re-organisation of the council can be seen as the first official 
recognition of the other three schools in the country. Although, this step has not changed the 
status quo yet, theoretically it has created possibilities with which to challenge the nature of 
Wahhabism in the future, but the process of change continues to be extremely slow. Yet the 
top- down initiatives to reform the education system continued to arrive. For example, in 
February 2007 the state allocated $2.4 billion to facilitate a six-year pilot programme for the 
modernisation of the education system. Furthermore, the Minister of Education signed a five-
year collaboration agreement with the King Abd al-Aziz Centre for National Dialogue to 
promulgate religious and cultural understanding in the classroom through teacher training 
programmes.166Nonetheless, despite the apparent attempts by the Saudi state to initiate 
change, the education system is still functioning as an ideological instrument. For example, 
the 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom states that: 
 
Although some overtly intolerant statements in textbooks have been removed or 
modified following the stated government intention to reform educational materials to 
remove or revise such statements, textbooks continued to contain overtly intolerant 
statements against Jews and Christians and subtly intolerant statements against Shia 
and other religious groups. For example, during the reporting period they continued to 
state that apostates from Islam should be killed if they do not repent within three days 
of being warned and that treachery is a permanent characteristic of non-Muslims, 
especially the Jews.167 
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Some educational materials, which were published in 2010-2011, continue to openly 
advocate those radical Wahhabi perspectives, which were taught in previous decades.  
Religious and historical contexts are continually provided to demonise social groups who are 
considered the ‘enemies’ of ‘true Islam’. One can still read calls for jihad for ‘spreading 
Islam’ by ‘fighting unbelievers.’ in official education materials.168As in the past, books, 
which were circulated in 2010-2011, continue to be preoccupied with Jews and conspiracy    
theories.  In this light Jews are constantly dehumanised, and targeted for violence. Historic 
accounts continue to be wildly distorted and with many inconsistencies and factual errors 
blaming Jews for all the world’s problems. For example, Darwin, who is seen as the satanic 
father of the theory of evolution is identified as a ‘Jew’ conspiring to undermine 
monotheism.169A grade XII book in the same academic year stated that: 
 
 For since the Jews were scattered sundries they never knew peace with a single nation 
because of their proclivity for deceit, lying and conspiracy. Nothing proves this more 
than the Muslims’ experience with them in Medina as the Prophet (PBUH) deported 
them and recommended that they be driven out from the Arabian Peninsula and as 
happened with them in other countries such as Germany, Poland, Spain and others.170 
 
The Centre for Religious Freedom, in its report in 2011, concluded that: 
 
 The Saudi educational system for grades I through 12 rejects critical thinking and 
independent reasoning. Under the Saudi Education Ministry’s method of rote learning, 
these dogmatic teachings are tantamount to indoctrination. This starts in First Grade 
and intensifies in number and virulence in middle school and high school. By 
occupying much of the school day, the Wahhabi religion courses crowd out ones on 
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math, science and the humanities, leaving students poorly prepared for work in the 
modern world and vulnerable to the messages of terrorist recruiters.171 
 
In this light, two points can be highlighted about the reform programme. Firstly, the process 
has been very slow and in many areas intangible. Secondly, the question can be asked, if that 
limited reform will do more good than harm for the state. The consequences of the reform 
agenda could easily antagonise that conservative segment of the state and society who 
genuinely believe in the Wahhabi framework of teaching and learning. Indeed, the current 
programme of reform can be seen as an act of submission to the Western superpowers by the 
hardliners. The portrayed defeatism and the lack of strength from the state could potentially 
create fertile ground for the cultivation and circulation of conspiracy theories to undermine 
the state’s hegemony. Some hardliners have already perceived this as a deliberate American 
policy to corrupt the birthplace of Islam. In the past, similar narratives have been used by the 
ultra conservatives to mobilise and radicalise youth against those state policies which 
accommodated American interests.  
 
After all, the American intervention and the Saudis’ consent for the US military presence in 
the country have been the single most effective cause of alienation among conservative 
Saudis.172 These policies have created the ground for counter-hegemonic struggles against the 
regime. Some hard-liners have used these policies to declare that the House of Saud is the 
enemy of Islam as it allowed American troops into that holy land.173The late Bin Laden and 
his supporters used the similar narratives to undermine the claim of the House of Saud to be 
the ‘servant of Islam’.174 Hence, such policies can result in the emergence of dangerous 
counter-hegemonic narratives, which could undermine the self-
claimed transcendental legitimacy of the House of Saud.  
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Indeed, there is a limit as to how far the regime can commit itself to change without 
undermining its hegemonic infrastructure. There are tangible pressures and the Saudis are 
aware of them. For example, in August 2009, there was unprecedented media criticism of the 
government’s educational reforms. A popular television series,’ Tash ma Tash’, broadcast a 
controversial programme that concentrated on educational reform. This TV show pictured the 
attempts of ultraconservatives to block educational reform and showed the Minister of 
Education ordering a delegation of religious conservatives out of his office.175 Some 
newspapers reported on this controversial episode.176This event is quite telling since the 
media is heavily monitored in the country. These repercussions reflect on the sensitivity of 
the reform agenda and what the state really has at stake. 
  
 As was argued, Saudi Arabia by definition is an ideological state and depends upon its active 
programme of truth management to sustain the status quo and like most ideological states 
cannot afford to undermine its own official narratives. The House of Saud has an existential 
dependency on Wahhabi Islam. Hence, pluralism and national dialogue are valuable as long 
as they serve the external objectives and do not compromise the dominance of the official 
creed.  
 
The hegemonic influence of the mainstream Wahhabi ulama has been essential for 
the maintenance of the status quo.177Hence, there is a limit as to how far the ruling élite 
can use the Wahhabi ulama to justify a reform agenda that refutes some of their own 
teachings. Of course, there are historical precedents for the Wahhabi to favour state 
expediency at the expense of their own dogma. There have been many occasions when ulama 
have produced pragmatic verdicts contradicting their own principles, in order to serve the 
state. The aforementioned fatwa to legitimise the US military’s entry into the country is the 
most obvious one.178 Nonetheless, the superficial nature of the changes indicates that the state 
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is very much   aware of its limitations. Limitations in terms of implementing reform without 
losing hegemonic control and limitations in terms of state controlled socialising agencies to 
legitimise the reform.  Accordingly, the reform agenda has been a mere scratch on the surface 
for external political consumption. Although there have been some revisions and adjustments 
in the system, the old hegemonic forces are still in place and the ideological scope of the state 
is still largely intact. Wahhabism continues to be the main frame of reference and the 
education system is still an effective mechanism for the politics of truth management in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Thus, as long as rents are paid in place of accountability, and a transcendental legitimacy 
used in place of a democratic mandate, the House of Saud cannot abandon its mechanisms of 
social control. As long as the Saudi establishment claims to be only accountable to God, it 
requires a highly ideologised education system to sustain its religious legitimacy. Within this 
system, education will remain a vital instrument to standardise the collective consciousness 
and justify the current hierarchical order, distribution of power and wealth in the country .The 
Wahhabi ulama are the cornerstone of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it is very unlikely 
that they are going to lose their monopoly of the socio-cultural sphere in the near future. The 
ideologised education system sustains the current status quo. Thus, as long as there is no 
concrete plan for political transition, the education system remains at the service of the ruling 
élite.  Education cannot be separated from politics in the Kingdom. The only precondition for 
major educational reform is political reform.  As long as the political system remains resistant 
to change, one cannot expect a major change in the nature of education in the country.   
  
Conclusion 
 
Pedagogical action has been one of the main instruments of sustaining and promulgating the 
official narratives in Saudi Arabia. Like many other states, which seek to gain legitimacy 
from ideology rather than a democratic mandate, the Saudi state has been heavily dependent 
upon socialising agencies to perpetuate the applicability of its ideology in everyday life.  In 
other words, if the state’s raison d'être depends upon an ideology, the ideology has to be 
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continuously reproduced and implemented in order to prevent a crisis of legitimacy. Subjects 
constantly have to be reminded about the authenticity of the ideology and develop a sense of 
trust that the state is the best implementer of that authentic and empowering ideology. For the 
Saudi state, Wahhabism is an indispensable ideology, which rationalises the status quo in the 
country, so it has to be reinforced through productive social mechanisms on a daily basis.   
 
In this light, the modern state has invested heavily in education to effectively synchronise 
people with its own ideological mandate. For decades, considerable resources have been 
devoted to build up a wide educational infrastructure to reshape the collective consciousness 
in accordance with Wahhabism.  Accordingly, education always has been in the monopoly of 
the state in order to cleanse the competing perspectives and train subjects who would obey 
the prevailing order. All ideological education systems rationalise the structures of power in 
society and they use various narratives to make the existing order look ‘natural’ and organic.  
Saudi education undertakes the same process of rationalisation, but it does it in a crafted 
religious framework. The Saudi education system intensified its Islamisation policies, 
particularly after the Islamic uprising of 1979, the uprising which had resulted in the seizure 
of the Holy Mosque at Mecca. Through the disproportionate Islamisation of the education 
system, the state attempted to standardise the religious consciousness of people so that this 
would result in homogeneity and conformity. As has been discussed, the Islamisation of the 
education system did not necessarily expand general Islamic education in the curriculum. 
However, it was an attempt to expand Islamic studies within the ideological framework of the 
state.  In other words, the Islamisation of the education system was nothing more than the 
Wahhabisation of those educational materials, which were tailored to rationalise the existing 
power structures.  Historically, the education system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
used the power of representation to regard any sign of nonconformity as sacrilegious and 
blasphemous. Through re-writing history, the education system has attempted to demonise 
competing perspectives and canonise those historical narratives which correspond with the 
core teaching of Wahhabism today. Through manipulation of history, an organic historical 
context is provided for the domination of the House of Saud. Accordingly, every historical 
narrative that does not correspond to the socio-political particularities of Saudi Arabia has 
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been eliminated in textbooks. Official historiography has become a continuation of the war 
against those incompatible forces standing against the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. 
 
 As the national education system is highly ideological, the state cannot afford to undertake 
reform without possible consequences. As long as there is no concrete plan for political 
transition, the education system will be used to legitimise the existing power structures. As 
long as the political system remains resistant to change, one cannot expect a major change in 
the ideological nature of education in the country. In this light, the education system will 
remain as an indispensable instrument of ‘truth management’ in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
ON VIOLENCE  
Introduction  
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that truth management depends upon the interrelated 
factors of leadership, narrative construction, socialisation and violence. In the previous 
chapters I have attempted to analyse the various socio-political agencies which have been 
tailored to disseminate the Wahhabi narrative in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  This chapter 
will specifically deal with violent mechanisms of social control and examine the functionality 
and the capacity of violence to enforce the state’s regime of truth. Although the state has 
heavily invested on the creative measures to standardise the collective consciousness in 
accordance with Wahhabism, there is no sign of a comprehensive conformity. Therefore, the 
state has continuously relied upon violent mechanisms of social control to impose its 
ideological vision. Although the system has already developed sophisticated social, 
educational and religious agencies to spread its rationalising narratives, it is still heavily 
dependent upon violence to accommodate its policies of social engineering. 
 
 Modern Saudi Arabia is an ideological state by definition. It claims to have a religious 
mandate to create the ideal Islamic state. Like many other ideological states, the Saudi 
kingdom has relied on violence to enforce its social engineering programmes. In a similar 
way to communism in the former USSR, Maoism in China or the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Saudi Arabia justifies the use of violence as a necessity with which to homogenise the nation 
in accordance with its ‘true’ doctrinal characteristics. Like many other ideological states, 
Saudi Arabia has a utopian model of social and moral standards and of governance, which it 
asserts, is morally supreme and ‘final’. Hence, the system wants to mobilise the rest of the 
nation to share in its utopian vision. To this effect, it creates sharp ideological binaries and by 
doing so, it claims to be on the side of truth. Accordingly, the system uses various 
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instruments of violence to eliminate those incompatible forces who are not on the side of’ 
truth’. 
 
As was shown in detail in the first chapter, violence does not only refer to the limited 
definition of physical harm and death, violence is multidimensional and it can be 
conceptualised in many ways. In the first chapter violence was referred to as ‘the intentional 
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or 
against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in 
injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or depravation.’1 Indeed the inclusion of 
‘power’ in addition to the ‘use of physical force’ widens the definition of violent acts, and 
expands the conventional understanding of violence to include those acts which result from a 
power relationship, including threats, intimidation and discrimination. The ‘use of power’ 
also serves to include neglect and all forms of physical, sexual and psychological harm. 2   
 
As was discussed before, there are many forms of ideological violence, which include 
religious hatred, racism and sexism; these may not necessarily result in bodily harm, but they 
can psychologically damage the victims. We also referred to structural violence which is seen 
as that systematised or even rationalised violence, which can be embedded in various social 
organisations. It is ‘expressive of the conditions of society, the structure of social order and 
the institutional arrangements of social order, and the institutional arrangements of power that 
reproduce mass violations of personhood 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Such violence is 
accomplished through policies of informal and formal denial of civil, criminal and basic 
human rights for people.’3. In this light, this chapter has a very broad understanding of 
violence and the ways in which it helps the Saudi state to enforce its policies.  
 
First and foremost, Saudi Arabia is a nation-state and accordingly we cannot talk about 
violence without considering the characteristics of nation-states and the ways in which they 
accommodate, rationalise and legitimise violence. Thus, this chapter will begin by briefly 
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addressing violence in the context of a modern nation-state. In the current international 
system, there is a universal understanding suggesting that the state is the only legitimate 
entity holding the monopoly of violence. Although the King, as the head of state in Saudi 
Arabia, enjoys a monopoly recognised by the international system, he enjoys an additional 
source of legitimacy, which permits him to exercise power and monopolise the use of 
violence.   
 
After all, Saudi Arabia, as well as being a member of the society of states, is a religious polity 
where religion constitutes the main source of legitimacy. Indeed Wahhabism bases the broad 
authority of the King on the notion of siyasa shar’iyya, a significant legal doctrine in Islamic 
jurisprudence, which constitutes the relationship between the ruling system and its subjects in 
an Islamic state.  This gives the King a unique authority to employ violence in enforcing his 
state’s policies. After briefly re-highlighting the conflictual strategies that led to the formation 
of the Saudi nation-state, there will be a discussion on the ways in which the state has used 
the various categories of violence to pave the way for a homogeneous society based on its 
official regime of truth. In order to demonstrate these cases, the state’s official policies 
towards ‘incompatible’ religious minorities, such as Shiites and Ismailis, will be examined.  
 
In any consideration of the violent mechanisms of social control in Saudi Arabia, one cannot 
ignore the instrumental role of the Mutawwi‘in (religious police). The Mutawwi‘in are a 
powerful socio-political force that acts as the vanguard of the Wahhabi state. Its members are 
portrayed as the ‘guardians of morality’, monitoring public as well as private spheres to 
standardise collective behaviour in accordance with Wahhabi ideology. This chapter will 
argue that although the religious police attempt to enforce the official mandate, in reality they 
symbolise the politics of fear, which the state depends upon for its continuity. This chapter 
suggests that operations of the religious police are a constant reminder that the state is 
vigilant in confronting any sign of nonconformity, as religious nonconformity is seen as more 
than mere moral negligence. Religious nonconformity is seen as a symbolic act, which 
questions the moral prescriptions of the state. Accordingly, violent strategies are used to 
repress any act or conduct which does not correspond with the official narratives of the state. 
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This chapter also examines the wider implications of violence in the ways in which women 
are ideologically targeted in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Some of the policies that 
constitute a ‘sexual apartheid’ in the country are identified, and their relationship with the 
official narratives will be examined. This chapter puts forward the argument that these 
policies correspond directly to the official ideology of the state. In the absence of a 
democratic mandate, the state promises to establish an unsullied society where the ‘purest’ 
Islamic principles are observed. Enforcing such policies portrays an uncompromising 
commitment to uncorrupted Islamic tenets. Such heavy-handed policies reinforce the state’s 
claims to be committed to the ‘truth’, regardless of the consequences. Furthermore, by 
enforcing such policies, the House of Saud perpetuates its historic relationship with the 
conservative ulama, who have been fundamental in the survival of the regime. Hence, in spite 
of the socio-economic costs of these policies, the state has invested heavily in forcing them to 
stay true to its religious mandate. 
 
State and Violence: An overview  
 
It would be inconceivable to imagine a state without violence. The state’s mechanisms of 
law and order, instruments of social control and hierarchical structures are sustained and 
perpetuated by violence. As Trotsky said at Brest-Litovsk, ‘every state is founded on 
violence’4. It does not matter how ‘civilised’ a state is, its law enforcement and wide 
programmes of social control rely on violence or the threat of violence. From the 
beginning, the construction of the nation-state has been heavily dependent upon violence. 
Indeed, violence has been instrumental in constructing and sustaining political units, and 
thereby maintaining their tailored territorial integrity. Fernando Coronil, and Julie Skurski 
note that ‘violence pushes the limits of the permissible, opening up spaces where customary 
and unexpected meanings and practices are brought together in unprecedented ways, 
illuminating hidden historical landscapes in a flash and leaving behind the opaque memory 
of ungraspable territories. In the crisis of meaning that violence conceives, the territoriality 
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of nations and corporeality of people became privileged mediums for recognising the body 
public and forcibly controlling the movement of persons and ideas within the nation’s 
material and cultural space.’5   
 
Max Weber was a defining political sociologist in the twentieth century who provided some 
influential perspectives on the state and violence. What he suggested continues to enforce 
the status quo as he justifies the monopolisation of violence by the state. For him, a state 
without the monopoly of violence by state order can never be achieved. Weber notes that ‘if 
there were structures in which violence as a means was unknown, then the idea of the state 
would have disappeared and anarchy in its literal sense would appear.’6He suggests that 
violence is not the normal means of the state, but it is specific to the state. Hence, Weber 
established an intimate relation between the state and violence. He noted that in the past 
physical force was perceived as a wholly normal means of control by most bodies, starting 
with kinship groups.  
 
Now in contrast, territory is considered as a characteristic of the state, and the human 
community within the territory accepts the monopoly of violence as the state’s legitimate 
right.7 Hence, the state is the main source of authority in controlling the use of violence. 
Any individual or social group that wishes to employ violence should receive a legitimising 
sanction from the state. Any use of violence outside the parameter of the state is considered 
illegitimate. The state is the only structure, which possesses the ‘right’ of exercising 
violence. 8  
 
Clearly, this model of the distribution of ‘rights’ to exercise violence is only designed for a 
state system, since it would not be applicable to a feudal or tribal society where violence is 
exercised by multiple agencies. Within tribal and feudal systems, where various political 
units are constantly in competition over power and resources within the same territory, 
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violence cannot be monopolised. In fact, violence becomes a transformative means, utilised 
by competing actors, in order to change the balance of power in their own favour.  
 
For Weber, this transformative means of violence, which is constantly utilised by the 
competing agencies, creates anarchy. Thus, the use of violence has to be in the monopoly of 
a single organisation (the state) in order to prevent anarchy. The state as the main 
instrument of ‘legitimate violence’, or what is seen as ‘legitimate’, is supported by 
Herrschaft’s relationship (the domination) of human being over human being.9  
 
Thus, for a state to exist, it has to force people to obey the authority of the dominating 
class. Hence, without the employment of force, the state cannot homogenise the political 
landscape and compel subjects to obey the hierarchical order. In this light, violence is used 
to enforce a mechanism of the distribution of power favourable to the dominant class. 
Although Weber justifies the state’s monopoly of violence to prevent anarchy, state 
machineries have undertaken most major examples of violence. Whether that violence has 
been exercised through interstate conflicts, civil wars or internal oppression, states have 
been responsible for instigating and perpetuating the most catastrophic violence in the 
known history of humanity. The Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, paved the way for the idea 
of national sovereignty based on territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents 
in the domestic affairs of states. Therefore, states have used their sovereignty to impose 
violence upon their subjects with often minimal interference from external agents. Many 
atrocities have taken place within the boundaries of nation-states. Although the idea of 
absolute sovereignty is no longer an acceptable notion within international customary law, 
states continue to enjoy immunity when it comes to their violent programmes of social 
control. Even after the atrocities of World War II, when the international system pretended 
to be more attentive to the prevention of extreme state violence against citizens, 
humanitarian interventions have often been limited and controversial. 
 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
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There is no super-state mechanism to effectively curb a state’s violent policies against its 
own citizens, and existing international bodies, such as the Security Council within the 
United Nations, have proved to be ineffective. Although Westphalian sovereignty in its 
original form may not be accepted, states continue to enjoy immunity with minimal 
interference from external agencies so that violence and the threat of violence remains the 
main instrument for enforcing the status quo in the society of states. Modern Saudi Arabia 
has enjoyed similar privileges of immunity. As a sovereign state it has removed historic 
competing tribal claimants of power within its territory and has monopolised the right of 
exerting violence with minimal interference from external agencies. Unlike under the First 
and the Second Saudi Emirates, the universally accepted structures of the modern nation- 
state have given the House of Saud the legitimate means to extend their control and enforce 
its ideology within a defined territory, which is internationally recognised as their fiefdom.   
 
The Use of Violence and the Saudi-Wahhabi Alliance   
         
In the previous section, there was an attempt to explain the role of violence within the 
boundaries of the nation-state. Modern Saudi Arabia shares most of the features of the 
states described in the first chapter. The modern state emerged and asserted its monopoly of 
the use of violence and accordingly disfranchised other agencies from sharing the ‘right’ to 
use violence.10 This is how a pre-modern narrative like Wahhabism used a modern entity 
such as the nation-state to flourish and expand its dominance. Perhaps without the 
empowering characteristics of the nation-state, Wahhabism as a pre-modern phenomenon 
could not have attained its present position of pre-eminence. Therefore, in one way or 
another, modernity and its legacies has been a lifeline for the continuity of a pre-modern 
phenomenon. Despite the claim of Wahhabism to challenge the cultural values of 
modernity and its products, these very phenomena have played indispensable roles in its 
survival. 
    
                                                
10  See, Nestor Sander, Ibn Saud  :  King by Conquest, (Hats Off Books, 2011). 
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The House of Saud claimed that national sovereignty was based on territoriality. It also 
prevented external agents from interfering in the territorial organisation of its politics. 
Hence, by creating the statecraft, the House of Saud started to enjoy a widely accepted 
justification for the exercise of power through violence and the threat of violence. 
However, there are grounds for the argument that the Saudi raison d’être for the monopoly 
of violence goes beyond Westphalian sovereignty, which assigns to the state the authority 
of using violence.  
 
In addition to state sovereignty, the House of Saud has contextualised its authority to 
employ violence within a religious framework. From the early days of the Saudi-Wahhabi 
alliance, religious narratives were utilised to legitimise a means of control and expansion. 
These legitimising religious narratives became inseparable aspects for the organisation of 
politics by the regime  within the first and second Saudi emirates.  
 
However, the transformation of political structures in the twentieth century, and the 
creation of the nation-state did not undermine the importance of these narratives. After the 
construction of the modern nation-state, religious perspectives continued to be incorporated 
in order to rationalise the prevailing hierarchy and to claim the monopoly for the use of 
violence as the right of the dominating tribe. As well as using that prevailing norm in the 
international system, which gives the state the exclusive right to exercise violence within a 
territory, the House of Saud used its religious ‘mandate’ to disfranchise competing agencies 
from resisting its authority.   
 
As previously stated, Wahhabi doctrine asserts that Islam is not only a religion, but also a 
comprehensive way of governing, and Islamic law is an absolute moral code, which 
provides guidelines for every dimension of governance. For this reason, the way in which 
political authority is contextualised in Saudi Arabia is different from that in classic nation-
state sovereignty, which holds the Prince or the ruler as the ultimate monopoliser of power. 
Although Wahhabism incorporated itself within the boundaries of a nation-state, it believes 
authority belongs to the ulama as well as to the King. Hence, one could argue that there is a 
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hybrid system of sovereignty managing the affairs of the state in Saudi Arabia. Of course, it 
goes without saying that, in most areas the King is in absolute control. Nonetheless, his 
legitimacy depends upon the ulama who give him the religious mandate to govern the state.  
  
Classic Wahhabi political thought affirms that the main function of government in Islam is 
to preserve and enforce the Shari‘a law.11 To enforce this law, a temporal ruler is needed 
and subordination to him is a religious obligation. Nonetheless, the ruler needs to consult 
those ulama who have the authority to clarify the principles of the Shari‘a. 12 The founder 
of the Wahhabi sect divided the authority of government between the ulama and the ruling 
umara.13 Thus, within an ideal state there are umara (princes) with the power of enforcing 
the Shari‘a and there are authoritative ulama who would feed the ruler with advice and 
consultation. However, as Atawneh notes, in classical Wahhabi thought there is neither a 
standard model of co-operation between the ulama and the umara, nor is there a structure 
and/or defined functions for the Wahhabi state.14  
 
After all, Wahhabism was a pre-modern religio-political narrative, which was not 
concerned with the organisation of politics within the nation-state model. Hence, there are a 
lot of ambiguities concerning precisely how power should be distributed in the Wahhabi 
state. Despite the uncertainties the contemporary Wahhabi ulama continue to endorse the 
traditional division of authority between the ulama and umara. This principle is evident in 
modern Wahhabi fatwas and writing. 
 
For example Ibn Baz, who was a defining Wahhabi scholar in the twentieth century, noted, 
‘The authority holders are both the ulama and umara of the Muslims, who must be obeyed 
                                                
11 See, Aḥmad ibn Ḥajar Al Abu Ṭami al-Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab: Aqidatuhu al-Salafīyah wa-
Daʻwatuhu al-iṣlaḥiyah Wa-thana al-Ulama Alayh, al-Amanah al-Ammah lil-Iḥtifal bi-Murur Miʼat Am ala 
Taʼsis al-Mamlakah, (Riyadh, 1999). 
12 Muhammad Al Atawneh, Wahhabi Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity, Dar Al-Ifta in the modern 
Saudi State, (Leiden, Brill Press, 2010), 38. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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on condition that their decrees match the will of God and do not contradict it.’15 Therefore, 
as long as the ruler and ulama are in conformity with Shari‘a law, there should be no 
resistance to them and there should be no attempt to challenge their power. However, even 
if their ruler deviates from the sirat al-mustaqim or the true path, he should not be 
overthrown. Ibn Baz suggests that even when the ruler avoids his duties, his Muslim 
subjects should not actively oppose him, but rather should remind him to stay faithful to the 
laws of God. Therefore, the ruler’s diversion from Islamic law does not automatically 
provide a license to take arms to resist him. Arguably, this interpretation denies any major 
form of resistance to the ruling mechanism on religious grounds. Therefore, no one can 
challenge the king by exercising violence as he has religious immunity, as long as he 
corresponds with the Shari‘a. The religious state strengthens his monopoly over violence to 
enforce order and comply with Wahhabi laws. In other words, the monopoly of violence by 
the Saudi regime is justified on the grounds of statehood and religion at the same time. 
 
Wahhabism bases the broad authority of the King on the notion of siyasa shar’iyya, a 
significant legal doctrine in Islamic jurisprudence, which delineates the relationship 
between the ruling system and its subjects in an Islamic state.16 The doctrine reflects the 
position of the Wahhabi jurists since it is closely connected with Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-
Qasim, both of whom played a significant role in shaping the doctrine of siyasa shar’iyya 
from ancient precedents.17 As Frank E Vogel notes that ‘siyasa shar’iyya declares that the 
ruler may use any acts, including legislation to supplement the Shari‘a and create new 
courts, that are needed for public good (maslaha amma) providing that the Shari‘a is not 
infringed thereby, or, in another formulation, as long as the Shari‘a has  ‘no text’ (la mass) 
on the matter’.18 
 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 38-41 
17  Frank E. Vogel, Law and legal system: studies of Saudi Arabia, (Leiden, Brill Press, 2000) 173.  
18 Ibid. 
See, ibn Taymiyya, al-Siya 
asa al-Sharʻiyya fî Islâh al-Râʻî wa-l-Raʻiyya, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʻrabiah, 1966) 
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The notion of siyasa shar’yya is considered to be an indispensable tool in the hands of 
Saudi rulers for exercising power in the state. The Basic Laws of the Kingdom reflect the 
King’s authority based on siyasa shar’iyya. (al- nizam al-asasi). For example both Articles 
55 and 67 of the Basic Law outline the King’s authority to undertake the governing of the 
state in accordance with the Islamic principles. Therefore, the King enjoys authority not 
only as head of the state but also as the enforcer of the ‘truth’. These dual sources of power 
give the King the political and religious raison d'être to defend his right to his power and to 
resort to any violent mechanisms to confront threats against his hybrid authority. Hence, the 
tailored religious narratives as well as the Westphalian state model give the House of Saud 
a legitimate pretext to employ violence and the threat of violence, to confront any 
resistance to their unaccountable exercise of power. Accordingly, the state has never 
hesitated to utilise violence in the enforcement of its policies and the maintenance of its 
ideological infrastructure. The state has used various violent instruments to protect its 
official narrative and sustain its policies of social engineering, with which it enforces its 
official version of truth.  
 
Violence: The Historic Foundation of the Modern Saudi State  
  
It is possible to argue that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, violence was the 
single most important factor in making the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance noticeable in regional 
politics. Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s teaching had hardly received wide attention until the House 
of Saud started to use Wahhabi narratives for offensive campaigns against rival tribes in the 
Peninsula. The army of Muhammad Ibn Saud, equipped with this new ideological force, 
started to take over towns and villages in Najd. These actions brought the Saudi-Wahhabi 
alliance to the attention of tribal actors in the peninsula as well as the regional powers such 
as the Ottoman Empire. By 1765, most of Najd was under the political and religious 
domination of Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the Saudi forces. The expansionist momentum was 
not stopped by the death of Muhammad Ibn Saud in 1765. His son Abd al Aziz took over 
the responsibility of Amir and became the new champion of the Wahhabi cause. In 1801, 
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the Saudi forces invaded Karbala, one of the most important cities in Shiite Islam.19 This 
invasion of the Shiite city was recorded as being particularly brutal; many Shiite Muslims 
were killed at the hands of the Saudi-Wahhabi forces. The same forces destroyed the 
religious monuments and grave markers that were used for prayer to Shiite saints and for 
votive rituals, which the invaders considered acts of polytheism. 
 
By violently destroying symbolic objects of the Shiite faith, the Wahhabi forces claimed to 
replicate the act of the Prophet who destroyed the idols in the House of Ka’ba upon his 
victorious return to Mecca from Medina in 628.20 In 1804, the Saudi army attacked the city of 
Medina, the second most important city in the Islamic umma. They repeated their actions in 
Karbala by destroying numbers of sites which were considered as holy by many Shiite as 
well as Sunni Muslims. The Wahhabi forces also made an attempt to despoil the grave of the 
Prophet. In the following year, they invaded the city of Mecca and massacred many Muslims. 
21Throughout these campaigns violence was used as the main engine of the Wahhabi 
conversion machine.22 
 
In addition to actively destroying symbols and objects, which were not compatible with 
Wahhabism, the Saudi forces did not hesitate to employ force to ‘save deviated’ Muslims. 
Although using violence for religious conversion is nothing new in the history of the region, 
it is extremely doubtful that the Saudi forces had much success in terms of redirecting people 
to sirat al-mustaqim at that stage. Hence, their violent actions, in the absence of any major 
creative measures for dissemination of Wahhabism, were ineffective. (Needless to say, the 
Saudi-Wahhabi dominance in the first and second Saudi emirates were short-lived, and in 
both periods their relative domination was ended militaristically by rival powers such as the 
Ottomans and the House of Rashid.) 
 
                                                
19 Dilip Hiro, War without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response: The Rise of Islamist 
Terrorism and the Global Response (London: Routledge, 2002), 40. 
20 Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (Greenwood Press, 1994), 467. 
21 I. M. N. Al-Jubouri, Islamic Thought (Xlibris Corporation, 2010), 252-3. 
22 Dore Gold, Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, (Regnery Publishing, 
2004) 235. 
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Like many other modern states, the formation of the Saudi nation-state never could be 
successful without the heavy-handed use of violence.23As we have seen, Ibn Saud, the 
founder of the modern Saudi State, employed the Ikhwan, a notorious militia group, to 
conquer much of the territory, which now is part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud 
created this semi-permanent warrior machine from the tribal confederations. This formidable 
military force conducted some of the most strategic military campaigns of Ibn Saud; these 
paved the way for the formation of the current Saudi state. The successful conquest of many 
important areas such as Hejaz, al-Ahsa and Ha’il could not be achieved without the fearsome 
role of the Ikhwan. They had a reputation for being brutal warriors, driven by religious 
dogma.24  
 
However, eventually the alliance between Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan was undermined, due to 
the Ikhwan’s deviation from Ibn Saud ’s control.  As previously stated in chapter two, for the 
Ikhwan close ties with Britain a kuffar country was not acceptable. Furthermore, against the 
wishes of Ibn Saud, the Ikhwan continued to invade neighbouring countries where Britain 
had major interests. A rebellious faction led by Faysal al-Duwaysh, Ibn Bijad and Ibn 
Hithlayn, emerged to challenge the conduct of Ibn Saud   and his British allies. This 
rebellious episode came to an end when Ibn Saud   received support from Britain to crack 
down violently upon a once fearsome militia. Despite their resistance, the Ikhwan were 
eventually defeated in the Battle of Sibilla in 1929. The victory against the Ikhwan was one 
of the last challenges that Ibn Saud   had to face in his establishment of the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
The establishment of the Kingdom did not reduce the dependency of the House of Saud upon 
violence. In fact, the modern nation-state created a viable infrastructure to make the use of 
violence more systematic and institutionalised. Accordingly, after the advent of the modern 
nation-state, the Saudi ruling machine continued to rely on violence to maintain the new 
power structures, which were now tailored in favour of the House of Saud and its ruling 
                                                
23 See, David D. Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
24  See, John Habibi , Ibn Sa'ud's warriors of Islam : the Ikhwan of Najd and their role in the creation of the 
Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930 ( Leiden: Brill, Press 1978). 
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ideology. Once rivals were eliminated from the political landscape, the Al Saud had fewer 
challenges against the implementation of its historic religious mandate. In this way the House 
of Saud, as the main monopoliser of power, it had an opportunity to enforce the supremacist 
narratives of Wahhabism, which would result in the marginalisation and violent mistreatment 
of many religious sects, which were considered to be enemies of the new state and of Islam.  
 
The situation did not change for the religious minorities overnight. In fact, from the early 
days of the first Saudi emirates, the Shiites who live in the coastal region of the Eastern 
Arabian Peninsula had been threatened by the strong anti-Shiite sentiment of the Saudi-
Wahhabi forces. Years before the establishment of the Kingdom, in fact as early as 1913 and 
1925/6, Saudi forces attacked Al-Ahsa, Asir and the Hejaz. All of these areas accommodated 
a significant Shiite population. Although Ibn Saud did not have a monolithic policy for all 
these areas, he was pushed by his Wahhabi ulama to cleanse the ‘shirk’ and spread tawhid. It 
has been suggested that his approach to these areas was based on those political and 
economic compromises essential for his fledgling central state and at the same time the 
Wahhabi ideology.25   
 
Although Ibn Saud was pressurised to embark on an immediate policy of Wahhabisation, he 
hesitated due to possible repercussions from the Muslim world, which he felt could weaken 
his new nation-state project. From 1926, the money generated through the hajj constituted the 
main segment of the national budget. However, some of the radical policies of the emerging 
order disturbed many Muslims throughout the Islamic world.  The destruction of holy shrines 
was among the acts which galvanised many potential pilgrims, who would have brought 
revenue into the country if they had made the pilgrimage. Some religious organisations and 
high profile Muslims in India and other countries called for a boycott in reaction to Saudi 
religious policies 26.By enforcing violent Wahhabi policies against the Shiites, Ibn Saud ran 
the risk of endangering the economy of his emerging state and sparking a heavy reaction 
from minority locals particularly in Hejaz. At this sensitive stage Ibn Saud could not afford 
                                                
25 Rainer Brunner, Werner Ende, The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political Culture 
(Leiden: Brill Press, 2001) 236. 
26 Ibid. 237. 
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troubled relations with the regional powers and other important Muslim countries.27 Despite 
some evidence of political pragmatism regarding the treatment of religious minorities, Ibn 
Saud could not afford to ignore the pressure from the Wahhabi ulama either. After all, the 
new state was based on an ideology which represented a set of ideas which demonised Shiism 
and other interpretations of Islam that were not in conformity with Wahhabism. From the 
start, Ibn Saud imposed difficult conditions on the Shiite population. This was the beginning 
of exerting an economic violence, which came in various shapes against minorities, in 
particular Shiites; this continues until this day.  
 
The jihad-tax was a significant policy, which exerted particular pressure on the Shiites.28 This 
form of taxation was designed for that part of population, which did not provide soldiers for 
the Saudi forces. In the beginning, the jihad-tax was primarily imposed before military 
expeditions, but later on it became a regular form of taxation, whether at times of war or of 
peace.29  The early imposition of economic violence, in the form of excessive taxation, made 
the financial pressure so intense that many Shiites families migrated to Bahrain. This policy 
met two objectives at the same time; it generated relatively good revenue for the state and 
simultaneously exerted pressure on that segment of the population, which was guilty of 
heresy. Economic violence was only one aspect of the pressure exerted on the Shiites. Soon 
other forms of violence became ubiquitous. 
 
As early as 1915/16, as Saudi forces became more visible in al-Ahsa, religious policy 
towards the Shiites became harsher.  Soon some ferocious controlling mechanisms were put 
in place to deny Shiites their religious rights and expressions of belief. Most defining Shiite 
religious practices were banned; they were prevented from celebrating Ashura and many 
people were killed for minor offences such as smoking and wearing silk.30In every conquered 
province, Ibn Saud appointed a chief judge to supervise the legal structure and pave the way 
for the enforcement of Wahhabi and Hanbali laws and regulations. This judge was also in 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 246. 
29 Ibid. 
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charge of implementing Wahhabi norms in public life.  This was an explicit policy of 
homogenisation, which was primarily implemented by force.  
 
Clearly, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance had military superiority, and they attempted to use their 
military might to standardise the Shiites, both religiously and ideologically. As already stated, 
in the earlier years Ibn Saud tried to avoid controversy by appointing less hard line judges, 
but as the pressure increased from the ulama from Riyadh, Ibn Saud took more drastic steps 
for centralisation of religious policy in al-Ahsa, and enforced a greater, more ferocious 
control through the Wahhabi ulama of Riyadh.31 
 
The religious policies of Ibn Saud towards Shiites entered a more radical stage after 1927. Ibn 
Saud was under pressure from the Ikhwan and some conservative ulama to end co-operation 
with Britain. However, the emerging Saudi-Wahhabi state was at least partly dependent upon 
the supporting role of Britain, and Ibn Saud was pragmatic enough to avoid antagonising one 
of the main power brokers of the region. Hence, he was not in agreement with the Ikhwan 
forces, who continued to attack the borders of Iraq and Transjordan where Britain had 
strategic and economic interests. In order to offset his external policies towards Britain, Ibn 
Saud saw the religious and political pressure on heretic Shiites as a good opportunity to 
appease the conservative elements of his emerging state. Arguably, Ibn Saud wanted to prove 
that he was still faithful to the tenets of Wahhabism and he had no choice but to compensate 
for his external policies and warm relations with the infidel actors in the region. In a situation 
like this, internal politics comes to address the ‘shortcomings’ of external politics. In 
February 1927, Ibn Saud reached an agreement with the Ikhwan and other conservative 
forces to intensify the process of Wahhabisation in return for the Ikhwan’s silence towards 
Ibn Saud ’s foreign policy. Hence, Ikhwan forces would channel their energies into 
‘reforming’ Shiites instead of attacking the other kuffars in Iraq and Transjordan. In this light, 
there was a more systematic approach to denying the Shiites any religious expression of their 
beliefs. Even worse, high profile Shiite figures had to publicly go through a process of 
                                                
31 Ibid. 248. 
  204 
conversion. During this conversion, Shiites were forced to deny their religious values and 
promise to abstain from Shiite celebrations.  
 
Furthermore, during this period the Shiite mosques and husayniyyas (mourning centres) were 
destroyed, and visits and pilgrimages to holy Shiite cities were banned. They also had to 
subscribe to the teachings of the newly appointed Wahhabi teachers and judges.32 Many 
Shiites found the emerging religious persecution intolerable and they were forced to flee. 
Some Shiite leaders appealed to Ibn Saud and asked him for a reconsideration of his radical 
religious policies. Ibn Saud was even reminded about his pledge offering freedom of religion 
in 191333. However, Ibn Saud continued the victimisation of Shiites to prove his 
determination to construct a Wahhabi state. Although the Ikhwan, as an influential political 
force was eliminated in 1929, Ibn Saud continued his radical policies against Shiites. After 
the defeat of the Ikhwan, the ultra-conservative Wahhabis lost their muscle and also their 
ability to pressurise the King and in fact, until the present day in the House of Saud, the King 
has continued to be in control. 
 
Despite the elimination of the Ikhwan and the weakening radical ulama, Ibn Saud never 
hesitated to make the social and religious lives of the Shiites hard in Saudi Arabia. Not 
surprisingly, after 1930 the Shiites were prevented from building new mosques and 
hussayniyyas. Furthermore, state restrictions provided minimal opportunities for the 
development and continuation of the Shiite educational infrastructure. Despite the rich natural 
resources in the eastern provinces, the Shiite community has been kept as a deprived and 
impoverished group in society.34 One can argue that the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, 
which resulted in a major economic transition, was in some ways bad news for the Shiites.  
This oil-led economic transition worsened the lives of religious minorities in at least three 
ways.  
 
                                                
32 Ibid. 249. 
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34 See, Thomas W. Lippman, Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally ( Potomac 
Books Inc , 2012).208-10. 
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Firstly, the revenue from the oil made the kingdom less dependent upon the money generated 
from religious pilgrimages. Hence, the House of Saud and the Wahhabi ulama were now less 
constrained in imposing their religious policies.  In the past, the House of Saud had no choice 
but to minimise its antagonistic policies to avoid alienating pilgrims who visited the country 
to perform hajj, as hajj was one of the main sources of revenue for the new state. 
Accordingly, the controversial religious policies of the Saudi regime encouraged diverse 
groups of Muslims, from the near and far corners of the Muslim world, to boycott the 
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.  However, the discovery of the oil made the Saudi state less 
dependent upon Muslim opinion across the umma, so they could enforce their controversial 
policies with less constraint. Secondly, the discovery of oil created new revenue, which was 
spent on establishing new state mechanisms, and these would rigorously enforce the state’s 
religious policies. Hence there were more resources than ever before to enforce the process of 
Wahhabisation in the country. The new resources meant that the ‘law enforcement’ agencies 
could be strengthened to impose the strictest religious regulation possible and they would 
also lead to the emergence of a more systematised education system, which could be used as 
an indoctrinating machine to demonise Shiites and other minorities. Thirdly, the discovery of 
oil resulted in some socio-economic transitions, which were not necessarily palatable for the 
conservative Wahhabi ulama. 35For example, an influx of foreign workers, engineers from 
the ‘infidel’ countries plus the emergence of instruments of modern communication, made 
some of the Wahhabi ulama uncomfortable. In order to appease the ulama, the state increased 
the pressure on its subjects through its religious mandate. Therefore, it provided more 
resources to reject any religious forms other than the ‘true’ Islamic teaching to compensate 
for the changes and transitions. This also put more pressure on religious minorities. 
 
The discovery of oil, which brought rapid wealth into the country, did not improve the lives 
of the religious minorities in the same way.  Discriminatory regulations based on the 
Wahhabi teaching were enforced, to prevent the minorities from benefiting from the new 
developments. These discriminatory policies enforced a systematic economic violence 
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against Shiites, which continues today in various shapes and forms. As was mentioned 
before, economic violence includes the economic marginalisation of individuals or social 
groups; this denies access to economic and financial facilities. Although most Shiites were 
already subject to social violence, including hate crimes and stigmatisation, the economic 
policies of the state, which targeted them, put them in a graver situation.   
 
In the 1950s, deprivation and impoverishment among Shiites became so evident that Aramco; 
the major American oil company operating in the country feared a revolt. It thought social 
divisions and systematic discrimination against the Shiites could trigger an uprising, which 
could undermine the company’s operation in the region. Hence, Aramco started to lobby the 
ruling system to allow it to employ Shiites from Qatif and Sihat. Although initially they were 
employed for menial jobs, some of the Shiites gradually rose through the ranks.36  Even 
though eventually the Shiites made up a large work force, they were still lacking in equal 
rights, and they faced both vertical and horizontal discriminatory policies.37 Eventually, the 
Shiites made up as many as 50% of the labour force in Aramco; this alarmed the state and 
raised concerns about the security implications. Shiites continued to be discriminated against 
and were prevented from taking jobs in other sectors, including the army and higher 
educational institutions. In general, the Shiites’ lifestyle continued to be economically 
overshadowed by the Wahhabis. The state hardly made any concessions and even if there 
were some softening approaches, they were often due to external pressures from human 
rights organisations or to offset potential revolts, which could destabilise the state. 38 
 
The events of 1979, and the victory of the Iranian revolution, made the Shiite’s life even 
more difficult in Saudi Arabia.39 Khomeini regarded the Persian Gulf rulers as ‘corrupt men’ 
who fostered what he called ‘American Islam’ or ‘Golden Islam’.40 He strongly criticised 
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their policy of reducing the valuable natural resources of their country in order to satisfy the 
US, whom he described as the ‘Great Satan, the number one source of corruption on earth’. 
Despite the extreme censorship of the Persian Gulf state’s media in covering the revolution, 
the provocative speeches were heard across the region.41 The wind of the Iranian revolution 
was now on the air in every country in the Middle East. Bahrain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia with 
substantial Shiite populations were particularly threatened by the ideas from across the 
border, which at any time could trigger a Shiite revolt. From this very early stage, the Sunni 
politicians expressed their distrust of the emerging Shiite order in Iran. This view was 
classically represented by the King of Jordan in an interview with The Times in January 26, 
1982, where he referred to the Iranian Revolution and stated that: ‘we are facing the most 
difficult time that I ever witnessed in this region of the world. The threat of Zionism is not 
any greater than the threat of Shiite fundamentalism’.42 
 
Following the repercussions of the Iranian Revolution, many Saudi Shiites were inspired to 
challenge the regime in order to regain their religious and political rights. In many areas 
including Qatif, there were Shiite demonstrations. The state responded heavy-handedly and 
cracked down on the protestors by employing the National Guard. In the following year, 
Shiites in Qatif were attacked by helicopter gunships during Ashura, which they had decided 
to celebrate in public for the first time. Many were killed and hundreds of Shiite religious 
leaders were imprisoned.43  
 
These religiously-inspired political events alarmed the Saudi authorities; they were concerned 
about the potential ‘danger’ of Shiites in the Kingdom. They were particularly afraid of the 
connection between the Shiites, Saudi nationals and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The more 
radical a role Iran played, the more the Saudis had reason to be suspicious of their own Shiite 
subjects. The regime openly supported Iraq during the eight years of war with Iran. Like most 
other Arab states, it regarded the war as a chance to defeat the only Shiite state in the region. 
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It is possible to argue that the increasing religious sectarianism in the region gave more 
ideological ammunition to the Saudi state in its marginalisation of the Shiite community, who 
were perceived as a natural ally of Iran. As the regional rivalry increased between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, pressures on the Shiite community increased.  
Not surprisingly, the Ismailis like any other religious minority have been subject to various 
forms of violence from the state. In fact, the history of the Ismailis in Saudi Arabia has been a 
history of discrimination. Like other religious minorities, they have been viewed with 
suspicion and mistreated because of their religious beliefs. Najran, which is located in the 
southwest of Saudi Arabia near the border with Yemen, accommodates a large Ismaili 
community. The Ismaili religion has about 100,000 adherents in Saudi Arabia, and they 
continue to be the main victims of the religious policies of the Wahhabi state.44 
 
 Although all revolt was violently suppressed by the Wahhabi forces, Najran was the setting 
for one of the estimated twenty-six anti-Saud tribal and other rebellions, which took place 
between 1916 and 1928. 45 In these conflicts, in which the Wahhabi forces clearly had the 
upper hand, many civilian victims, women and children, were massacred. It is suggested that 
about 7,000 people in Najran alone may have perished through the actions of the Wahhabi 
forces.46 Persecution of Ismailis did not only take place during the formation of the Saudi 
state. Ismailis have been subject to the same religious policies and have suffered from the 
same economic, social and ideological violence as the Shiites. Economically, they have been 
marginalised and socially discriminated against. Over the last decade there have been clashes 
between the state and the Ismailis. The state continues to persecute them over their religious 
convictions. Their determination to maintain their religious and social heritage has led to 
some heavy-handed reactions from the Saudi state. 
 
For example, in April 2000 the state backed religious police, a group who will be discussed 
later, stormed a major Ismaili mosque and arrested some clerics. Ismailis reacted by firing on 
the security forces. Consequently, as many as forty people were killed and many were 
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injured. Soon the army got involved in the clashes and many Ismailis were arrested. The 
bloodshed, and the events which sparked it, were based purely on the ideological mandate of 
the state and provided yet further evidence that the regime would resort to any measures to 
impose its programme of religious conformity.47 These clashes were triggered when, for the 
first time in many years, the Ismailis decided to celebrate Ashura publicly. 
 
These radical campaigns resulted in many arrests and arbitrary punishments and even land 
confiscation became a commonplace. The state took measures to forcefully transform the 
demographic composition of the city. Accordingly, two Sunni-majority Yemeni tribes were 
granted Saudi citizenship, and were offered land and jobs in Najran while many Ismaili 
Saudis were impoverished and unemployed. After the incident in April 2000, many local 
people were fired or forcefully moved from Najran, and hundreds of Ismailis who were 
employed by the state were sent to other regions of the kingdom. Among many other things, 
four Ismaili students were arrested and whipped for arguing with a Wahhabi teacher, who 
publicly denigrated Ismaili religious beliefs. They were sentenced from two to four years in 
prison, and 500 to 800 lashes.48  
 
Of course, it has to be mentioned that from time to time the Saudi state has adopted a more 
pragmatic approach towards Twelver Shiite, Ismailis and other minorities in order to prevent 
major destabilisation. Although the vast majority of these minorities are still disadvantaged 
and discriminated against, there are signs of a growing middle class among the Shiite 
community. Now there is a small flourishing Shiite population, which is emerging as a result 
of the state’s pragmatism and the external pressure to improve religious rights in the country.  
As already mentioned, after the atrocities of 9/11 Saudi Arabia was subjected to criticism for 
                                                
47 As John Bradley notes, the decision was part of an international campaign to highlight the lack of religious 
freedom and other human rights violations in Saudi Arabia. Previously, some minimal improvements had 
been made in terms of religious freedom in the Eastern Province, which had been partly influenced by 
external pressures. The Ismailis had hoped they could gain some similar concessions. Prior to the incident, the 
persecution of the Ismailis had increased significantly and the state officials had started yet another campaign 
to eliminate the Ismaili faith and other expressions of the ‘infidel’ religions. The pressure for conversion was 
still in place and following the official creed one of the officials had stated that ‘We don’t eat their food, we 
don’t intermarry with them, and we should not pray for their dead or allow them to be buried in our 
cemeteries.’ See John Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis, 74. 
48 Ibid. 78. 
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being one of the worst countries for human rights and freedom of expression. This vast media 
attention and criticism from important western capitals in the climate of ‘War Against Terror’ 
pushed the state to soften their decades-old violent policies of social homogenisation. 
However, within the context of an ideological state, there is a limit to how far compromise 
can go without undermining the core principles, which provide both the mandate and the 
legitimacy for the regime. Accordingly, most of the reforms have been mainly cosmetic and 
the situation for minorities has largely remained the same.49As previously stated, national 
dialogues, which were initiated by the King, did not create a major shift in the improvement 
of human rights. Recent human rights reports indicate that systematic discrimination against 
minorities is still on-going and the conservative Wahhabi ulama are still pushing to ‘cleanse’ 
the country from ‘infidels’ and ‘innovators’. 
 
The International Religious Freedom Report in 2010 highlights many incidents that reflect 
the continuing Saudi institutional violence against minority groups. A large number of 
incidents are reported in which religious minorities, and in particular Shiites, are harassed or 
denied access to ‘Muslim’ mosques. The report refers to an incident where the authorities 
stopped some prominent Shiites in al-Khobar from praying in Sunni Mosques. Furthermore, 
the report refers to another incident in January 2010, in which the state detained a prominent 
Shiite figure, Sayyid Mohammad Baqer al-Nasser, for having performed Friday prayers in a 
Sunni mosque.50  
 
These incidents portray that the sense of Wahhabi moral supremacy is still prevailing so that 
Shiites can face arrest and harassment if they even try to pray in mainstream mosques. These 
events indicate that the Shiites are still perceived as the ‘untouchables’ of the Saudi social 
system with minimal rights and protection from the state. In recent years, the state has 
continued to close down Shiite mosques and yet the Shiites are prevented from praying with 
                                                
49 “Saudi Arabia: Stop Arbitrary Arrests, Travel bans on Opposition” Human Rights Watch, 
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50 International Religious Freedom Report 2010, “Saudi Arabia”, Accessed via internet  
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Sunni Muslims. For example, on November 9, 2009, state officials in the eastern province 
(Ras Tanura and Abqaiq) closed down two Shiite mosques, which had been centres of 
worship for many years. State officials have reportedly closed at least five other Shiite 
mosques and religious foundations in the Eastern Province within that period, as well as 
closing two other mosques in al-Khobar in August 2009. 51 
  
Religious minorities, in particular Shiites, are continually arrested and punished for voicing 
their plight.52 Any attempt to express the systematic discrimination against Shiites is met by a 
heavy-handed reaction from the state. For example in 2009, intelligence officers detained a 
Shiite activist Munir Jassas who was blogging about the state’s poor treatment of Shiite 
Muslims in Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, he spent at least four months in solitary confinement 
although no formal charges were filed.53 In addition, the state has attempted to penetrate the 
most private domains of the ‘heretics’ in order to stop their ‘blasphemous’ practices. The 
Wahhabi state, with its ‘puritan’ narrative of Islam, does not distinguish between the private 
sphere and public sphere. The state has taken a totalitarian approach in imposing its regime of 
truth, thus preventing other individuals and groups from subscribing to any religious and 
political narrative that is not in full conformity with its official creed of state. In March 2010, 
Mohammad Jasim al-Hufufi, a Saudi Shiite teacher, was arrested.  He was accused of reading 
‘polytheistic’ and ‘sacrilegious’ Shiite supplements at al-Baqi cemetery. Sources revealed 
that al-Hufufi was sentenced to three months detention and 60 lashes for reading non-
Wahhabi religious materials as a personal and private act not, it must be emphasised, one in 
which he was using his professional position to influence others.54 
 
The argument that what conceptually constitutes violence goes beyond physical injury and 
harm, has already been presented. Ideological harassment and religious discrimination are 
considered to be violent acts. In addition to the policies of the Saudi state, which have 
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resulted in physical harm and intimidation, the regime has been responsible for heavy-handed 
ideological violence against those who did not subscribe to the official regime of truth. It is 
possible to argue that the decades of ferocious ideological campaigns against non-conformists 
have profoundly influenced the collective culture and have also deepened religious divisions, 
which have resulted in an extreme polarisation of Saudi Society. For decades, the Shiites 
have been portrayed as the enemies of ‘true religion’. Since the state claims to encapsulate 
the ultimate faith, Shiites are therefore considered as the enemies of the state as well as of the 
true religion. The state has been using its vast resources, including educational 
establishments, religious organisations and the media, to portray the Shiites as a  ‘corrupted’ 
community who have deviated from the sirat al-mustaqeem.  
 
Once ideas are repeated for a long time, they become socially sedemented and accepted. For 
decades, the state and its religious establishment have promoted pejorative ideas, portraying 
Shiites as infidels. They are pejoratively referred to as Rifiḍa which is the derogatory term 
used to describe Shiites in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned before, until recently official 
educational materials referred to the Shiites as Rifiḍa. These propagandist narratives falsely 
regarded Shiites as non-Muslims and represented them as a sect who believed in Ali as a 
prophet. The idea circulated that Shiites do not believe in the universally accepted version of 
the Qu’ran, because they have secretly changed the text and added chapters of their own.55  
Reportedly, in Saudi Arabia there are rumours being circulated to warn Sunni Muslims to 
avoid mixing socially with minorities such as Shiites, with warnings like  ‘Shiites will spit in 
cups of water before they hand them over to Sunnis’ and ‘an inherent tenet of Shiite belief is 
the absolute necessity of betraying Sunnis.’56  
 
This is indeed the power of representation, which is exercised by the state over minorities. 
The state uses both brute power and creative measures to represent non -conformists in the 
worst possible way, so as to undermine their social status in society. Whilst minorities such 
as the Shiites do not have the resources to resist state violence, there is minimal social 
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resistance from the mainstream in Saudi Arabia calling for minority protection. Although the 
state claims that it is taking more measures to include Shiites in Saudi society, there is still 
substantial evidence that there is a systematic violation of human rights and discrimination 
against groups who are not of the Wahhabi faith. In 2009, the authorities instituted a ban on 
the building of Shiite Mosques, marking a significant reversal of the policies that had offered 
the Shiites some religious freedom in recent years.57  
 
Mutawwi‘in: The Violent Guardians of Morality 
 
From the early stages of state building, the regime enforced a controlling mechanism to   
standardise the conduct and behaviour of Saudi subjects through force. This controlling 
mechanism has resorted to various forms of violence and intimidation in order to create an 
‘ideal’ Islamic state in which Wahhabi values and practices are observed.  This is none other 
than the fearsome religious police (Mutawwi‘in plural and mutawa singular) in Saudi 
Arabia,58 the Mutawwi‘in is the vanguard of Wahhabism, which is commissioned to cleanse 
the Saudi society from ‘corrupt’, ‘polytheistic’ and ‘sacrilegious’ practices and enforce the 
state’s regime of truth. This agency otherwise is known as the Committee for Encouraging 
Virtue and Preventing Vice (Hay'at al-Amr bil-ma'ruf wal-Nahi 'an al-Munkar). 
 
Although the Mutawwi‘in are known as the religious police force, they are a highly 
politicised mechanism, which is primarily responsible for enforcing the state’s ideological 
and religious narratives.  Their job is to explicitly monitor the personal affairs of the Saudi 
subjects or foreign expatriates, to ensure their full conformity with Wahhabism. The Saudi 
religious police actively operate to ensure conformity with the national culture in accordance 
with the state’s ideology. This organisation actively challenges any form of religious 
individualism and suppresses any sign of religious or social expression, which is not 
acceptable to the prevailing Wahhabi doctrine. Throughout its history in modern Saudi 
Arabia, the Mutawwi‘in has forcefully striven to homogenise the individual and make life 
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extremely difficult for those who do not conform. The Mutawwi‘in are extremely hostile 
towards any religious narratives, which question the finality and the totality of Wahhabi 
Islam. Therefore, they constantly seek measures to prevent any non-Islamic (non-Wahhabi) 
religious practices. They actively attack non-Wahhabi religious congregations and confiscate 
religious materials and arrest worshippers who do not adhere to the prevailing religious 
narratives of the state.  
 
Although there are no official Christian, Jewish and Hindu places of worship, the Mutawwi‘in 
do not even tolerate worship in secret. If they find people practising their religion within their 
own private sphere, the worshippers may still face heavy-handed consequences including 
imprisonment, lashing and deportation if the transgressors are not Saudi nationals. Any form 
of religious symbolism, which contradicts Wahhabi Islam, is harshly repressed by the vigilant 
religious police. By law, all Saudi nationals are required to be Muslims. This law, which 
enforces the totality of Islam, justifies the ban on the public practice of any religion other than 
Islam.  Of course, the government claims to respect the right of non-Muslims to worship in 
their private sphere, but often in practice it does not respect this right.59 
 
The current organisational structure of the Committee for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing 
Vice is not transparent. There is no easy way for observers to study the organisation closely. 
Its members are said to be from the lower segment of society and often with minimal 
religious or secular education. Of course, there is much speculation about the motivation 
behind people’s desire to join this organisation. Some individuals may join because they are 
from less privileged social backgrounds and the organisation provides them with jobs and 
economic prospects.  Others may join out of conviction, and they may believe that this job is 
offering them a chance to fight both the moral corruption and the nefarious beliefs, which 
stand in the way of the truth’. Thus, this job may give them the empowering role of guarding 
the moral parameters of society. They are active all over the kingdom. However, their 
presence is felt to a greater degree in places such as Riyadh, Qasim and the surrounding Najd 
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region, the origin of the Al Saud while places like Jeddah are perceived to be less intensively 
patrolled. 
 
In 1980, a legal mandate was given to the Mutawwi‘in permitting them to arrest, detain and 
interrogate people for undefined criminal offences. In the following year, an amendment was 
made to the law preventing the Mutawwi‘in from detaining and interrogating suspects in their 
own centres and in 2006, the government went even further by banning the Mutawwi‘in from 
entering private homes.60 However, in July 2007, Prince Nayef, the Interior Minister, 
reaffirmed the 1981 decree, hence contradicting and rolling back the ban on entering private 
homes. This was followed by the statement made by Shaikh al- Ghayth in 2006, that the 
Mutawwi‘in could enter private homes if they knew of a grave ‘crime’ in progress.61  
 
The current head of the organisation is Shaykh Abdul Aziz al-Humayn who started his job in 
February 2009. He replaced Ibrahim Al Gayth who supported those extremists who wanted to 
kill the owners of television networks broadcasting ‘corrupt’ programmes. Al-Humayn is 
considered to be a learned man in Wahhabi Islam, with a more moderate approach than his 
predecessor. There are different estimates for the exact numbers of Mutawwi‘in in Saudi 
Arabia. According to one source, there are approximately 3,500 Mutawwi‘in working for the 
organisation; most of these are full-time and they receive a monthly income of roughly 3,000 
Rials.62 However, Human Rights Watch asserts that in 2005, there were 5,000 official 
members, together with 5.000 volunteers.63 It is said that the part-time members receive no 
money and they do their job out of religious and ideological conviction.64 The head of 
organisation also has the support of 600 administrative staff, over 100 security officials, 
around 100 messengers, 350 drivers and 250 other workers.65  
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Reportedly, the religious police in Saudi Arabia have a well-connected network of spies. It 
has been alleged that some expatriate organisations act as informers for the Mutawwi‘in.  
Although there is no explicit evidence Joy Raphael, an Indian journalist who spent many 
years in Saudi Arabia, claims that organisations such as the Islahi Group based in the Batha 
quarter of Riyadh, are flourishing due to their collaboration with the religious police. He 
suggests that the members of The Islahi Group spy on people from Kerala and other Indian 
states noting any misbehaviour; in return for their services, they receive financial rewards and 
well-paid government jobs. 66  
  
The Mutawwi‘in have a distinctive appearance. They usually wear ankle-length white robes 
and a chequered or pure white headdress without the circular black bands, which are widely 
used in Saudi Arabia. Since 2006, those members who do not wear uniforms must wear 
identifying badges.67 In the 90s, many of them were recognisable from their choice of car, 
some of them used to patrol the streets with GMC Suburbans. 68 Literally, ‘Mutawa’ means 
‘volunteer’. The Mutawwi‘in were organised into local committees in the earlier years of the 
modern Saudi State.  Historically, they played a crucial role in establishing Al-Saud’s power   
in Najd by spreading Wahhabism to the Bedouin. Once the Saudi forces had conquered 
Hejaz, the Mutawwi‘in became instrumental in converting Muslims to Wahhabism and 
therefore, accordingly, the committees were incorporated into the civil service. The roots of 
the Mutawwi‘in can be traced back to the Ikhwan who were considered to be dogmatic 
Wahhabis with strict social values. The Mutawwi‘in are organised under the King and they 
collaborate with the ulama. The head of the organisation has ministerial status and holds    
cabinet rank.  Hence, the Mutawwi‘in are incorporated within the official political structure of 
the state. Currently the headquarters of the organisation is in the Murabba area of Riyadh.  
 
The Mutawwi‘in influence has varied from time to time, but their nature of activities has 
more or less remained the same.69 For example, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
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and the seizure of the Holy Mosque, social and religious rules became stricter and the 
operations of religious police were intensified .A similar process of intensification took place 
after the First Persian Gulf War, when the US army entered the Kingdom to protect the Saudi 
state. The events of 9/11 and their consequences in the region, also increased the activities of 
the religious police inside Saudi Arabia, and the enforcement of the rules became much 
stricter.  
 
There are grounds for the argument that if at any time the state is facing a political challenge, 
it intensifies the role of the Mutawwi‘in in society. It is difficult to explain this correlation, 
but one can relate it to the crisis of legitimacy. Arguably, at a time when the Saudi state faces 
major political challenges, it reminds its subjects that the House of Saud is primarily in power 
to enforce the true Islamic Shari‘a. Even if the state is challenged by internal and external 
political dynamics, it is still a ‘legitimate’ system based on transcendental narratives. Thus, 
even if the political problems have resulted from mismanagement, corruption and a lack of 
transparency, it is the religious root of the system, which is called upon to justify the Saudi 
state’s continuity.       
 
The Mutawwi‘in as the vanguard of Wahhabi Islam, have played an active role in broadening 
the Wahhabi’s sphere of influence throughout the newly built kingdom. 70As well as their 
aforementioned programmes of conversion they attempted to minimise the boundaries 
between the private and the public sphere in the country. For them Wahhabi Islam is the 
absolute truth which needs to be applied comprehensively in every facet of society. 
Accordingly, Saudi subjects have to observe the Wahhabi code of conduct in its entirety even 
within their private domain. Some of the most personal life choices, about how to socialise, 
what to eat, what to wear and when to pray are subject to the Mutawwi‘in’s scrutiny. Being 
fuelled by this Wahhabi moral supremacy as well as the necessary support of the state, the 
Mutawwi‘in are constantly searching to find signs of nonconformity. When the Mutawwi‘in 
observe any individual behaviour, which is outside strict Wahhabi parameters, they use their 
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power to arrest or harass the ‘sinner’. They are particularly fixated on rituals. In 2005 alone, 
the Mutawwi‘in carried out 40000 arrests.71 
 
They engage in forceful action to ensure conformity. For example, they close down all the 
commercial places they can during prayer time in order to compel Muslims to pray on time 
and72to prevent any consumption of food and drink in public during the month of Ramadan, 
they patrol the cities and look vigilantly for any offenders. They constantly search to stop 
activities such as men advancing towards women, unrelated men and women socialising, 
disrupting prayer by playing media near mosques, celebrating events inconsistent with the 
official creed, selling and buying non-Islamic religious symbols, gambling and any other acts 
which are considered as heresy.73In addition to public places, the Mutawwi‘in regularly 
monitor places such as halal slaughterhouses and women’s tailors.74Although alcohol is 
strictly forbidden in the Kingdom, various alcoholic brands are available on the black market. 
The Mutawwi‘in are particularly harsh if they find someone consuming alcohol or watching 
‘indecent’ movies coming from the West. Generally, Western cultural productions are 
perceived negatively and the religious police force seeks to minimise public exposure to any 
‘immoral’ materials. 
 
However, it has to be noted that, despite the strict surveillance of the religious police, many 
Saudi subjects defy the strict Wahhabi regulations and break the laws in secret.  For example, 
data collected by the World Health Organisation Regional Office for the Eastern 
Mediterranean in 2003 estimate that the extent of alcohol use in Saudi Arabia is considerable 
and that there is a steady consumption of alcohol in the Kingdom. (See figure 1)75  According 
to that report, ‘The unrecorded alcohol consumption in Saudi Arabia is estimated to be 0.6 
litres pure alcohol per capita for population older than 15 for the years after 1995.’76 The 
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report highlights a cross-sectional study conducted in al-Amal Hospital in Riyadh in March 
1998, which found that out of 160 male patients aged 20 years or older, 23.75% consumed 
alcohol.77 
 
 
FIGURE 1: RECORDED ADULT PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, a number of ideological states emerged which used the 
transformative nature of violence to reshape the cultural characteristics of the nation in 
accordance with each state’s dogma. Like the Saudi state, they thrived on sharp ideological 
binaries and reserved the ‘moral’ right to cleanse the society from ‘evil’ elements. For 
example during the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976), Mao asserted that the 
‘corrupt’ bourgeois culture was hindering the success of his socialist revolution.78 He was 
also a pious ideologue who believed in the fundamentals of the ideology, which he was 
advocating.  
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Therefore, he attempted to remove ‘deviant revisionist’ elements from the state and society. 
To this effect, the Red Guard was mobilised to cleanse the system and pave the way for the 
establishment of an‘ideal’ social and political system. The Red Guard, which was invigorated 
by the supremacist ideology of the state, used violence to disfranchise that section of the 
population, which was perceived to be ‘deviant’ and ‘corrupt’. Clearly there are some 
similarities between the Red Guards and the Mutawwi‘in, as both use violent instruments to 
‘transform’ their particular society in accordance with the supremacist ideology of the state. 
Apart from some obvious differences in terms of tactics, implementations and the nature of 
ideology, there is one striking difference, which is the longevity of the operation. Unlike so 
many other ideological states, the Saudi kingdom has been on a constant ‘cultural revolution’ 
from its advent until the present day.  
 
Although both external and internal influences may have affected the zeal with which they 
pursued their chosen cause, the determination to tailor the social and religious fabric of the 
society has always remained the same.  Indeed, there has not been any major revision in the 
state’s methods of ideological enforcement. The Saudi state continues to use heavy-handed 
violent instruments to impose its transcendental ideological vision of creating a utopian 
society, a society where politically and socially homogeneity is a given and whose people are 
fulfilled because they live with the strongest personal moral precepts under the ‘highest’ 
moral order   possible as prescribed by their rulers.  
 
However, as the data from the World Health Organisation also indicated, despite the violence 
employed by the state to create an ‘ideal’ society, people find ways to challenge   official 
‘ideals’. As the religious police use violent instruments to standardise people, so people find 
new channels to defy the state. Although the state authorities are aware of this trend, they 
cannot fully stop the activities of the religious police, as the role of the religious police is both 
symbolic and tactical.   
 
On the one hand, the religious police attempt to tactically homogenise the masses in 
accordance with official narratives and on the other hand, they symbolise the state’s mandate 
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aimed at purifying society, purging all ill practices.  Indeed, the Islamisation/ Wahhabisation 
policies of the religious police are but practical extensions of the religious mandate, which the 
state claims to have. The religious police attempt to eliminate any expression of ideas other 
than the official narrative.  
 
Hence, as long as signs of nonconformity are openly repressed, the state can claim that it is 
doing its duty by maintaining the ethical structures of society. By incorporating these violent 
mechanisms of social control, it aims to enforce obedience and conformity, which are both 
essential for the survival of the state. The religious police also symbolise the politics of fear, 
which the state depends upon for its continuity. The activities of the religious police are a 
constant reminder that the state is vigilant and will repress any sign of nonconformity.  For a 
highly ideologised state, any activity in the social sphere may symbolise a political message. 
Therefore, religious nonconformity is seen as more than mere moral negligence, as it is seen 
as a symbolic act which questions the moral prescriptions of the state.  
 
Sexual Segregation   
 
Shiites and other religious minorities are not the only victims of institutional violence in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There are grounds for argument that women are also subject to 
distinct ideological treatment by the state, which have some violent implications. Ultra social 
conservatism has been embedded in the Wahhabi discourse and accordingly Wahhabism has 
strong views on gender segregation and has a strict set of principles concerning the role of 
women in society.79Although these ideas, historically, were inseparable aspects of 
Wahhabism, the emergence of a modern nation-state provided the House of Saud and ulama 
with greater opportunities to systematically enforce sexual segregation in the country. The 
role of women, and the ways in which they are expected to behave, are almost entrenched in 
the official narratives of the state. Hence, the state uses both various mechanisms of social 
control and law enforcement agencies to implement  sexual segregation in the country.   
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What is meant by sexual segregation here is an official and systematic segregation of 
unrelated men and women in the public sphere in Saudi Arabia. This sexual segregation, 
which is based on gender discrimination and social marginalisation, is an obvious example of 
the institutional violence against women, which is rationalised both through religious 
narratives, and the laws and customs of the country. It is possible to argue that sexual 
segregation is an attempt to minimise any social platform for the intermingling of men and 
women who are not mahram.   
 
In Islamic jurisprudence there are two categories of mahrams. Firstly, it refers to relatives 
with whom sexual intercourse is believed to be incestuous. For example, mahrams for 
Muslim women include father, grandfather, son and grandsons.80 Secondly, a Muslim can 
become mahram to other people through marriage for example father-in-law and son-in- law. 
In other words, the circle of mahram includes either immediate relatives through blood or 
immediate relatives through marriage. Khalwa (privacy) between man and women beyond 
the circle of mahram is haram and therefore, religiously forbidden.81   
 
These principles are deep-seated and officially enforced by the state.82Thus, the regime in 
Saudi Arabia constantly seeks to enforce measures to prevent Khalwah between unrelated 
men and women. If a Muslim women goes beyond purdah (it literally means a curtain, but it 
implies the limit of exposure between unrelated men and women) she can face 
consequences.83 As will be discussed later, these laws have profound implications for the 
social, political and economic lives of women in Saudi Arabia.  
 
 Wahhabi Islam is particularly strict about ikhtilat (gender mixing) and has taken heavy-
handed measures to force the Saudi subjects and foreign expatriates to respect their preferred 
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boundaries laid down between men and women. Since the formation of the modern state, the 
Saudi regime has utilised various strategies, both those dependent upon force and those 
dependent upon education, to systematically prevent male and female socialisation beyond 
the circle of maharms. However, these policies have been intensified since the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and its repercussions on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Today, in Saudi Arabia, women have to be covered in black and strictly avoid any attempt at 
individual expression through their clothing. Any individual expression, which breaches the 
concept of womanhood in Wahhabi Islam, is legally forbidden and any attempt to challenge it 
faces a heavy-handed reaction from the state’s mechanisms of social control. Among many 
other roles, the religious police are responsible for maintaining this sexual segregation in the 
Kingdom.84 They patrol the streets looking vigilantly for any sign of socialisation between 
the opposite sexes. They actively stop and interrogate couples who do not come across as 
husband and wife or close relatives. Most public places such as cafés and restaurants are 
segregated. Often there is a designated place for men and an area for families. The 
Mutawwi‘in go and monitor the family areas to make sure unrelated men and women are not 
mingling in any shape or form.  
 
If unrelated couples get arrested they can face harsh treatment from the religious police. Of 
course, the judiciary as an enforcer of the Hanbali/Wahhabi laws treat the ‘sinners’ equally 
harshly and often those who are convicted, face torturous punishments such as lashing or 
imprisonment. In the case of adultery and sex outside marriage the transgressors can face 
harsher sentences such as the death penalty. All married couples appearing in public should 
be prepared to produce documents to prove their legal status, if the Mutawwi‘in stop them.  
Failure to produce documents may lead to consequences such as detention until the couple is 
proved innocent.  
 
                                                
84   Minky Worden, The Unfinished Revolution: Voices from the Global Fight for Women's Rights (New York 
Seven Stories Press, 2012). 
 
  224 
 Sexual segregation is not only applicable to the Saudi subjects.  In fact all expatriates and 
foreign workers are subject to the same rigid laws.85 For example, in 2008, a 37-year-old 
American businesswoman, a married mother of three, was thrown in jail for sitting with a 
male colleague at a Starbucks coffee shop in Riyadh.86 She and her colleague went to the 
family area of the café to use the wireless Internet when they were arrested. There are many 
other cases showing the uncompromising approach taken by the Mutawwi‘in to enforce the 
state’s ‘ideal’ social model for interaction between men and women. For example, in 2007 in 
the city of Tabuk, Ahmad al-Bluwi who was fifty, died in custody after he invited a woman 
outside his immediate family into his car.87 In the same year the victim of a gang rape was 
sentenced to two hundred lashes and six years in jail for having been in an unrelated man’s 
car at the time. Although the King pardoned her, he maintained that the sentence had been 
fair.88 One of these incidents, which resulted in the death of fifteen schoolgirls in the city of 
Mecca, galvanised many people both nationally and internationally. There were about 800 
pupils inside the school in the holy city when fire started. However, the uncompromising 
Mutawwi‘in actively hindered the efforts of the fire brigade to save lives. It was reported that 
Mutawwi‘in prevented the firemen from going in because the girls were not dressed in 
accordance with strict Wahhabi dress code.  One witness stated that he saw three Mutawwi‘in 
‘beating young girls to prevent them from leaving the school because they were not wearing 
the abaya’.89 
 
As mentioned before, in 2006, after much national and international criticism, the Saudi state 
declared that it was taking measures to gain more control over the conduct of its controversial 
religious police force. The Interior Minister, Prince Nayef, who had been a strong supporter 
of the Mutawwi‘in, resisted calls for it to be dismantled. However, in order to ease the 
situation he declared that the force was obliged to hand suspects over to prosecutors 
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immediately after identification.90 In 2008 King Abdullah took further steps to reform the 
Mutawwi‘in. A training programme was initiated to help the religious police to deal with 
suspects in a civil manner. 91 However, recent human rights reports suggest that the religious 
police consistently ignore the law and that things hardly have changed.92  
 
Having said that, even if the Religious Force did hand over the ‘sinners’ to other law 
enforcement agencies, the subjects would still face harsh treatment if it could be proved that 
they had violated the Wahhabi laws. For example, among many other cases, in that same 
year, an academic and his female student were arrested, convicted and subject to harsh 
punishment for transgressing the strict Wahhabi sexual segregation laws. Their telephone 
conversations, which they claimed to be work-related, were suspected as being a front for a 
‘love affair’. The academic was sentenced to eight months in prison and 800 lashes; the 
female student received four months in prison plus 350 lashes.93  
 
Wahhabi sexual segregation has wider applications; these structurally marginalise women 
who are legally considered as minors. The strict enforcement of gender segregation 
throughout the kingdom, include workplaces, hinder women's full participation in public 
life.94  A survey, which was conducted in March 2010, suggested that today women make up 
14.4 % of the workforce, triple the rate in 1992.95 However, women's unemployment rate is 
four times that of men.  
 
Despite the presence of a large educated female population, Saudi women’s share of 
employment and economic participation is minimal. According to the World Economic 
Forum Global Gender Gap Report in 2009, Saudi Arabia was ranked 130th out of 134 
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countries for gender parity. In 2010 the same report ranked the country 129th. Even those 
Saudi women, who are employed, are confronted with various obstacles including transport 
and logistics. A report in 2010, suggested that some 35% of Saudi women’s monthly income 
is spent on drivers and taxis as they are not allowed to drive and they are largely excluded 
from the Saudi public transport system. 
 
It is possible to argue that the existing restrictions, and the discrimination against women, 
represent a form of structural violence, which systematically disfranchises a large segment of 
the population. Those who are committing the violence are those who are in dominant 
positions, and structural violence is a hidden form of violence that affects women in many 
aspects of their lives. With the assistance of prevailing ideologies, violence can be 
legitimatised and, accordingly, victims are prevented from identifying this structural violence 
as a form of violence. As religion, coupled with ideology, rationalises discrimination against 
women, there are limited social platforms from which to resist the existing discourse.  
 
Although the state asserts it is making progress, Human Rights Watch report highlights the 
fact that there are minimal signs of improvement.  In fact a report finds that the legal system 
continues to discriminate against women institutionally in accordance with the laws of the 
state.  Among many other cases, the report refers to the case of a medical doctor in her forties 
who lost a court appeal to remove her father as her guardian after he refused to give her hand 
away in marriage and confiscated her income. She ended up living in a women's shelter as the 
result of the dispute.96The report also highlights forced marriages, which continue to be 
imposed on women by their guardians. For example, the brothers of two unrelated women, 
one in Burayda, the other in Riyadh, acting as their guardians, compelled their sisters to 
marry five men each, against their will, for the money and other benefits which would accrue 
to the brothers.97 Furthermore, the report referred to a case in January 2010 in which a court 
in Qasim province sentenced Sawsan Salim to 300 lashes and one-and-a-half years in prison 
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for appearing in court without a male guardian. 98Although this case was extreme even by 
Saudi standards, it shows the capability of the legal system to disfranchise women. 
 
The law strictly states that all women, regardless of age or status, are required to have a male 
guardian. Either they have to be ‘protected’ by the males in their immediate family, or their 
husbands. Accordingly, all women require their guardian's permission for most essential 
activities in their lives. Activities such as marriage, divorce, education, employment, opening 
a bank account, elective surgery and travelling (if under 45), require the prerequisite 
permission from a male guardian.  
 
These violent mechanisms of social control, which champion the ‘ideal’ social order, 
institutionally paralyse a large segment of the population. The state uses it’s legal and law 
enforcement instruments to impose a regime of truth, which systematically disfranchises 
women.99 The conservative ulama, who feed the state with their religious zeal, refer to the 
literal reading of the Qu’ran to justify the law. For example, they refer to a segment of the 
Qu’ran which states that, ‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah 
has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their 
means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) 
absence what Allah would have them guard.’100 
 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that there is a monolithic approach to many of 
these laws.  From time to time, there are debates within the establishment and there are calls 
for reform from influential people. For example, recently Shaykh Ahmad Qassim Al-
Ghamdi, Chief of the religious police in Mecca, told the Arabic-language daily newspaper 
Okaz that ‘Ikhtilat’ (mixing) was part of normal life for the umma and its societies...’In many 
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Muslim houses – even those of Muslims who say mixing is haram – you can find female 
servants working around unrelated males,’101  
 
However, Shaykh Ahmad Qassim al-Ghamdi was confronted with heavy criticism from other 
influential figures in the state and beyond. For example, Shaykh Muhammad al-Nujaimi, 
professor of Comparative Jurisprudence at the Higher Institute of Law at the Imam 
Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, went on a Saudi television programme 
Al-Bayina and publicly rejected gender Ikhtilat. He endorsed a issued by Shaykh Abdul 
Rahman Al-Barrak that forbids the mixing of genders.102 Despite theological factionalism, 
the orthodox Wahhabi norms are entrenched. Although various programmes of reform were 
initiated, sexual apartheid remains a part of the institutional character of Saudi society.  
 
In March 2004, the Saudi government initiated a National Society for Human Rights 
(NSHR), which is the country‘s first and only independent human rights organisation. There 
are 41 members in NSHR including 10 women. This organisation reports its 
recommendations directly to the King. The NSHR third annual report was issued in 2010, 
outlining some of the violations of human rights in the Kingdom and offering various 
recommendations for reform. This report welcomed the recent actions of the state aimed at 
stopping the violation of human rights, but it criticised the ongoing Mutawwi‘in’s conduct 
and re-emphasised the various restrictions imposed on women.  
 
Nonetheless, there is no sign as yet of a major policy shift in Saudi Arabia regarding women. 
In spring 2011, the country witnessed some sign of social disobedience from women who 
wanted to contest the restrictions on driving. Many women broke the law and drove their cars 
in public despite the restrictions. Nonetheless, the state was determined to impose its 
regulations.  At least one Saudi woman was arrested after uploading a video of her driver. 
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Manal al-Sherif was accused of ‘besmirching the kingdom's reputation abroad and stirring up 
public opinion’. She was freed after 10 days but she had to promise to not drive again.103 
 
 These ultra-conservative principles are embedded in Wahhabism and officially promoted and 
enforced by the state. The state does not hesitate to use violent mechanisms of social control, 
the legal system and law enforcement agencies to implement its mandate to keep the society 
‘safe’ by enforcing sexual apartheid . The violence inflicted on women is multifaceted. They 
are subject to economic, legal and social violence and the state uses a rigid religious 
framework to rationalise its support for these various forms of hidden violence. These 
policies correspond directly to the official ideology of the state. In the absence of a 
democratic mandate, the state promises to establish an unsullied society where the ‘purest’ 
Islamic principles are observed. By enforcing such policies, the state expresses its 
uncompromising commitment to ‘uncorrupted’ Islamic tenets. Such heavy-handed policies 
reinforce the state’s claims to be committed to the ‘truth’ regardless of any consideration of 
the prevailing socio-political particularities of the time.  Regardless of the rapid changes in 
the global attitudes towards women, the Saudi state has to prove that it is fully committed to 
its official regime of truth. Furthermore, by enforcing such policies, the House of Saud 
maintains its historic relations with the conservative ulama who have been fundamental in 
ensuring the survival of the regime. Hence, in spite of the socio-economic costs of these 
policies, the state has invested heavily in enforcing them so that it can stay true to its religious 
mandate. Clearly, without the state employing violent mechanisms of social control, it is 
doubtful whether such policies could be successfully enforced.  
 
Violence and Political Control  
 
As previously argued, the Saudi state rarely hesitates to employ violent strategies to impose 
its interpretation of Islam. However, the enforcement of these violent measures is not only 
limited to religious and social policies. The state uses the same iron-fist politics to protect its 
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interests in the political sphere as there is no theoretical distinction between religion and state. 
Religion and politics are indeed two sides of the same coin. In the eyes of the rulers, 
Wahhabism did not emerge as the result of the formation of the modern state, but on the 
contrary the state emerged to enforce the true interpretation of Islam. Although the Saudi 
state is not a theocracy, it is constructed, sustained and legitimised through religious 
narratives. It uses religion as a frame of reference for governance and for the management of 
affairs in almost every facet of its society. As was discussed before, the modern Saudi state is 
not based on any official constitution. There is no set of constitutional laws determining the 
political structure of the state. In 1992 the state introduced the Basic Law, which was the 
closest document it has to a constitution. The Basic Law reaffirmed the indisputable 
monopoly of power by the House of Saud and declared that the Qu’ran and the Sunna are the 
country’s constitution.  
 
Beside some family rivalries within the House of Saud, the King has near absolute political 
power. Of course, in many areas he has to negotiate his policies with other influential 
figures such as the high-ranking ulama and other senior members of the House of Saud. 
Nonetheless, he is not legally accountable to anyone. The cabinet acts as a kind of 
deliberative assembly with the power to pass, amend, and repeal legislation. What they 
propose becomes law only once it is ratified by royal decree. The King appoints all the 
cabinet ministers in the first place. There is also the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) 
which only functions as an advisory body; the King, himself, appoints a hundred and fifty 
members. 
 
Limited elections for advisory councils at the municipal level were introduced in 2005; 
however, women were excluded from participation. Having said that, in 2011 King 
Abdullah pledged that women will be given opportunities to vote and stand in 2015 
municipal elections.  
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 There has been minimal electoral development since 2005.104Although the state indicated 
it would hold an election in 2009, they have postponed until 2011. Although some limited 
elections have been taking place, all political parties are still banned in the Kingdom. The 
state does not tolerate any form of political opposition and many of its opponents organise 
their anti-government activities outside the Kingdom. During the Arab Cold War, the 
Kingdom welcomed many political activists with Islamic orientations from such opposing 
countries as Egypt and Syria.  In the West, London became one of the main hubs of Saudi 
opposition. 
 
Freedom of expression is almost non-existent as the state heavily supervises the activities 
of the press and the media. Recent human rights reports suggest that the state continues to 
prevent public criticism of officials or government policies.105 The Ministry of Culture and 
Information has to approve the appointment of newspaper and television editors, and 
heavily censors print and broadcast media. Recently, a Sunni human rights activist Shaykh 
Mikhlif bin Dahham al-Shammari was arrested for ‘annoying others’ for articles he wrote 
criticising prominent Sunni clerics for their anti-Shia perspectives.106The state has taken 
measures to control the virtual world as well. It is estimated that the state has blocked over 
four hundred thousand websites, which are perceived to be either politically sensitive or 
religiously unsuitable.107 Those who attempt to cross this ‘red line’ will face persecution.108 
 
The state uses various measures to penalise activists whom it judges act against the interest 
of the state.109 One of the punishments that the state uses to restrict nonconformists is to 
deny them freedom of movement. There are some cases suggesting that the state punishes 
critics by limiting their ability to travel outside the country. Those who campaign for 
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reform are often stripped of their passports.110However, it has to be mentioned that the state 
has not been applying the same heavy-handed policies against all opposition groups in 
recent years. For example, around 2006, the state took a new initiative to deal with jihadi 
activists in Saudi Arabia.  The Ministry of the Interior initiated a new ‘rehabilitation’ prison 
to redirect inmates’ ideological affiliations. The Ministry of the Interior oversees this new 
scheme and has created the Ideological Security Unit (ISU), which is in charge of co-
ordinating the project. 
 
This prison is not like a normal prison, as all the inmates enjoy comfortable, air-
conditioned accommodation, gardens and wide-ranging recreational facilities such as 
swimming pools, video games and table tennis. In return for these exceptional facilities, the 
inmates have to participate in religious classes. Within this privileged climate, prisoners 
receive education and training in accordance with the state’s ideological parameters. 
 
In fact, the privileges go beyond recreational facilities. If prisoners get ideologically 
‘redirected’ in accordance with the prevailing ideology, they are given financial packages 
including the cost of their weddings if they are single, and home refurbishments along with 
new cars.111 In other words, the state provides generous financial support and a comfortable 
‘re-education’ period in return for ideological loyalty. Although it is too early to determine 
the success of this new policy, the state has tried to offset jihadi ideologies in the kingdom.  
 
Although the authorities have shown some new initiatives aimed at dealing with the religio-
political polarity, the state’s approach to political opposition remains intact. Overall, the 
state does not tolerate the formation of any political platform with which to challenge the 
status quo.  The king, the House of Saud and the state’s Wahhabi ulama remain as the 
indisputable political actors of the Kingdom. There are minimal grounds allowed for 
challenging the prevailing ideology and its attached utopian social model and there are 
almost no grounds for meaningful political participation. The state continues to resort to the 
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use of various violent instruments to repress any political opposition, and freedom of 
expression remains the victim of this prevailing absolutist ideology.  
 
As in the case of the rehabilitation camp, the state is prepared to be financially generous in 
return for conformity. However, if loyalty is not given the state does not hesitate to use its 
iron fist.  For almost a century, the state has used powerful mechanisms to sustain its 
version of ‘official Islam’. Although it has created various social mechanisms to socialise 
its ideology, it continues to be dependent on violence to enforce its chosen social, religious 
and political model. In many areas the state’s educational and social establishments may 
have been successful in creating some conformity, but there are enough social paradoxes in 
the Kingdom to prevent the state from attaining its utopian vision.  
 
Conclusion  
 
There are various implicit and explicit violent mechanisms, which have helped the state of 
Saudi Arabia to sustain its political and ideological dominance. People’s exposure to the 
violent mechanisms of the state is determined in accordance with the ways in which the 
official ideology defines and represents them. Accordingly, religious minorities, women 
and nonconformists are the most exposed to the violent mechanisms of the state.  
 
The state, through both economic and ideological violence, has continuously punished 
those who failed to subscribe to the official regime of truth.  For example, by using the 
denial of economic opportunities as a means of discrimination, the state has pushed 
religious minorities onto the fringes of Saudi society. Deprivation, favouritism, 
impoverishment and marginalisation are violent instruments used by the state to punish 
those who do not subscribe to the official narratives. Through ideological violence, the state 
promotes hatred towards nonconformists who do not fit in with the religious mandate of the 
state. The state also structurally marginalises social groups such as women, who are defined 
and represented in a certain way by the state’s ideology. Of course, these discriminatory 
policies are both economically and politically costly for the state.  Nonetheless, in the 
  234 
absence of democratic legitimacy, enforcing such policies shows the uncompromising 
commitment of the state to what it regards as the purest Islamic values. This highlights the 
state’s commitment to the ‘truth’ regardless of any consequences. Furthermore, such 
policies serve to preserve historic relations with the conservative ulama, who have been 
fundamental to the survival of the regime and at the same time provide a cosy religious 
legitimacy for the state.  
 
Through organisations such as the religious police, the state attempts to eliminate any 
expression of ideas other than the official narrative. Hence, so long as nonconformity is 
restrained, the state feels that it is doing its duty by maintaining the ‘ethical’ structures of 
society. By incorporating these violent mechanisms of social control, it aims to enforce 
conformity and at the same time displays the politics of fear, those very politics the state 
depends upon for its continuity. The activities of the religious police are a constant 
reminder that the state is vigilant in monitoring and subjugating unorthodox activities.  
 
Any unorthodox activity in the social sphere could symbolise a political message with 
various possible implications.  In particular, the religious nonconformity is seen as more than 
mere moral negligence of the citizens, because any religious ‘deviation’ could cause the 
state’s moral supremacist claims to be questioned. The state portrays its ideology as a kind of 
‘vaccine’, which immunises the believers from ‘moral corruption’. Therefore, explicit and 
implicit punitive systems operate to add to the pressure for more conformity and 
homogeneity, and at the same time discipline any form of resistance to the official regime of 
truth. 
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C o n c l u s i o n  
 
The central question of this study was: how has the Saudi state constructed and managed 
the prevailing regime of ‘truth’? It aimed to explore the ways in which the official truth is 
constructed and promulgated in the country. It attempted to analyse some of the ways in 
which the official truth is constructed to rationalise and reinforce the prevailing model of 
the distribution of power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The central concepts in this 
study were thus truth and truth management. This study attempted to highlight the link 
between power and ‘truth’ and elucidate why and how the management of ‘truth’ is at the 
heart of the Saudi state.  
 
It suggested that there are two interrelated notions with which to articulate the ways in 
which ‘truth’ is conceptualised in Islam. One, at the macro level, constitutes the unchanging 
foundational principles of the religion, a set of entrenched beliefs, which establish the 
finality and oneness of Islam in relation to other competing narratives, and the other, at the 
micro level, takes place internally to find ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’. Understanding Islamic 
truth at the macro level is a prerequisite for addressing Islamic truth at the micro level. 
Unlike Islamic truth at the macro level, which can be defined in a trans-historical manner, 
the Islamic truth at the micro level refers to the various attempts by different agencies 
throughout Islamic history to claim to have found the ‘truth’ within the ‘truth’.   
 
This study suggested that Wahhabism, which has been adopted as the official creed of the 
Saudi state is the manifestation of Islamic truth management at the micro level as it claims 
to have the interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy. Wahhabism emerged with the mission to 
offer the ‘purest’ narrative of Islam and emancipate Muslims from Jahiliyya. Now it is a 
creed with the assertive mandate of ‘authenticating’ Islam.  According to Wahhabism the 
‘truth’ has been the hostage of earthly interpretations for centuries and heretic practices. 
These ‘false’ interpretations, which have been the product of both culture and man made 
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reasoning, have corrupted the religion and deviated Muslims from the rightful path. Thus 
Wahhabism founds its justification in ‘reconditioning the truth’. 
 
The main ingredients of truth management at micro level are leadership, narrative 
construction, socialisation and violence. This work attempted to elucidate the ways in 
which these factors helped the House of Saud to turn Wahhabism into the official truth of 
the state and to demonstrate how they are intimately interconnected. 
 
In a similar  way to  other religious and social phenomena, Wahhabism was the product of 
its own time and was shaped by the different driving forces in Najd. As in many other 
revivalist movements, Wahhabism sought to restores the true foundations of the religion. 
Its frame of reference was the past and it had a vision of building a future based on what it 
supposed to be the ‘authentic’ Islamic values. Thus, Wahhabi narratives did not seek to 
introduce radical new interpretations, but paid a tremendous amount of attention to the 
ways in which Muslims should internalise the faith in the way it had been introduced by the 
Prophet and his followers. Hence, Wahhabi narratives are more about the recovery rather 
than the discovery of the ‘truth’. Although Wahhabi narratives were hardly original, 
Wahhabism found its way to the twentieth century to form a legitimising context for the 
assertion of power by the house of Saud. The leadership, which was offered by the House 
of Saud, brought Wahhabism into the forefront of religious and political life within the 
Arabian Peninsula. The Saudi leadership provided the political engine for Wahhabism so 
that it could broaden its sphere of influence within and beyond the Arabian Peninsula. The 
House of Saud provided an effective mechanism whereby Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
Wahhab’s rigid religious perspectives could be translated into power.  
 
This sense of religious mission was vital for the House of Saud, since it would provide a 
rational context for the monopoly of power by the House of Saud. After the official 
declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the mandating machine of Wahhabism 
became even more instrumental in helping the House of Saud to strengthen their control. 
Indeed, Wahhabism became a national frame of reference with which to synchronise the 
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existing tribes with the ruling family. Wahhabism became a useful instrument with which 
to create religious notional subjectivities naturally linking the rulers and the ruled.   
 
Indeed, the fledgling regime required operative trans-tribal institutions to socialise the 
Wahhabi narratives, which would in effect legitimise its rule. This process of top down 
socialisation could not emerge in the absence of a necessary structure, which would 
effectively translate direct repression based on brute power to indirect control based on 
consent. By necessary structure, I referred to a set of social agencies which were developed 
and used by the ruling regime to foster its own ideological perspectives for gaining 
legitimacy. Accordingly, the new state took measures to construct a horizontally bonded 
society in which they could be perceived as the ‘natural’ possessors of power within the 
organic territory in which the state and the nation were naturally connected.    
 
Various national institutions such as the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Hajj and 
Dar al-Ifta emerged to standardise the collective consciousness in accordance with  the 
official truth. For example, the Saudi state relied heavily on the education system to 
socialise Wahhabi narratives as unquestionable truth. Indeed, all ideological education 
systems share a common task. They attempt to rationalise the prevailing structures by using 
various pedagogical activities to portray the prevailing order so that it appears legitimate, 
natural, rational and authentic. The Saudi education system implemented the same task, 
standardising the collective consciousness in accordance to the prevailing regime of ‘truth’. 
 Socialising agencies like education have been responsive to socio-political dynamics and 
are constantly on guard to prevent a crisis of legitimacy. For example, since the Islamic 
uprising of 1979, which resulted in the seizure of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, the Saudi 
education system intensified its Islamisation policies. Indeed, the Islamisation of the 
education was an attempt to expand Islamic studies within the ideological framework of the 
state. In other words, the Islamisation of the education system was nothing more than the 
Wahhabisation of educational materials, which were tailored to rationalise the existing 
power structures.   
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Socialising agencies such as education and religious institutions have been constantly on 
guard using the power of representation to reduce any sign of nonconformity as heretical 
and profane. In a climate in which the state is regarded as the guardian of the divine truth, 
any resistance to the state is always going to be projected as sacrilegious.  Through re-
writing history the education system has attempted to demonise competing perspectives and 
canonise those historical narratives, which correspond to the core teaching of Wahhabism. 
Through manipulation of history an ‘organic’ historical context is provided for the 
domination of the House of Saud. Accordingly, every historical narrative which does not 
correspond to the socio-political particularities of the state has been eliminated in the 
textbooks. Education has become the continuation of the war against any incompatible 
forces standing against the state. 
 
Although the state heavily relied on positive power and creative measures to institutionalise 
its official truth, it has never hesitated to use violence to maintain the status quo. As was 
elucidated in this study, violence has always remained as one of the key elements of the 
Saudi-Wahhabi truth management. The state has justified its heavy-handed use of violence 
as an avoidable consequence of its religious mission to cleanse the society from ‘heresy’ 
and ‘corruption’. Violence is rationalised in a religious context to justify those forceful 
mechanisms of social control, which attempt to socially, politically and culturally 
standardise the masses both in the public and in the private sphere.  
 
The Saudi state through both economic and ideological violence has continuously 
marginalised those who failed to adhere to the official regime of ‘truth’. Through denying 
economic opportunities, the state has punished religious minorities for their resistance to 
the official ‘truth’.  Deprivation, favouritism, impoverishment and ostracism are all part of 
violent mechanisms of control to discipline those who do not endorse and accept the 
official narratives. Through ideological violence, the state sponsors enmity towards who 
resist religious and social homogeneity.  
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The violent standardising activities of organisations such as the Mutawwi‘in are a reminder 
that any unconventionality and rebelliousness in either the public or the private sphere 
could be the symbol of a political message with grave implications.  In particular,  religious 
nonconformity is seen as more than the mere moral negligence of the citizens, because any 
religious deviation could question the state’s claim to  moral supremacy. Indeed, the 
official ‘truth’ is holistic; hence it  applies to every facet of society. The ways in which 
people live, worship, and socialise becomes the subject of scrutiny by the guardians of the 
‘truth’ who show little mercy for those disregarding the moral prescriptions of the state.    
 
This attempt at the collectivisation of morality, which is enforced by violence and 
discrimination, is costly for the state and its Realpolitik objectives, but the state remains 
resilient. What encourages the state to absorb this cost? In the absence of democratic 
legitimacy, enforcing such policies shows the hard-nosed commitment of the state to the 
‘truest’ Islamic edicts.  In other words, when there are no meaningful representative 
institutions, these policies symbolise the state’s commitment to the ‘truth’ regardless of the 
depth of the scars, these policies inflict on its anatomy. Therefore, in absence of a 
democratic mandate the state has no choice but to stick to its religious mission to prevent a 
crisis of legitimacy.  The state believes that it is enforcing the laws of God, as the Qur’an is 
its constitution. This creates a situation in which the state becomes accountable to God 
alone rather than accountable to its people. This lack of accountability to its people and the 
need for legitimacy continue to make the politics of truth management vital for the survival 
of the Saudi state. 
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Appendix 1: Map of Saudi Arabia1 
 
 
                                                
1 http://www.al-islam.org/ziyarat/saudimap.gif  
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Appendix 2: Map of Najd1 
 
 
                                                
1 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bc/Ibrahin-pasha-english.jpg  
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